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I. Introduction
As an internet technology developed, especially advances in
semiconductor technology making it possible to increase both processing speed and
capacity, there have been reported almost daily in Japan new establishments of electronic
market places on web sites where businesses can purchase and sell goods and services
from others just like they do on real market places. This is called the business-to-business
electronic market place (“B2B”) and has been heralded as one of the most revolutionary
1
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1998 at the Chuo University in Japan as the Chuo University Scholarship Student. Passing the Chuo
University Faculty of Law Assistant Professor Examination in 1999. Passing the Japanese Bar
Examination in 1997 and admitted as the member of the Tokyo Bar Association in 2000. From 1988
to 2000, trainee at the Legal Training and Research Institute of the Supreme Court of Japan. Since
2000, the member of the Japan Copy Right Institute and the Japan Civil Law Institute.

1

ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF B2B TRANSACTION: AKIRA INOUE

innovation in the business world.2 This new technology gives great benefits to both
sellers and purchasers. As to the purchasers, because they can negotiate several sellers
through B2B almost at the same time, they can reduce the costs of procuring raw
materials. In addition, they can obtain the most recent information as to price and
quantity supplied at the specified time through B2B, which is almost impossible at real
market places. On the other hand, sellers are able to find purchasers who need their
products easily. Needless to say, in real marketplaces, finding purchasers is no easy and
is also a time consuming and costly task. For businesses being able to supply high quality
products but lacking network in real market places, a transaction through B2B gives
greater business opportunities.3
One of the examples of newly created B2B in the U.S. is “Covisint.” 4 On
September 2000, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) approved the establishment of
“Covisint” formed by five automobile corporations in the U.S. for the purpose of
procuring raw materials through the internet with low price and high efficiency. The main
concern of the FTC was that its formation should be a violation of the section 7 of the
Clayton Act. However, the FTC concluded that it would let Covisint go forward with the

2

The Federal Trade Commission, Entering the 21st century: Competition Policy in the World of
B2B Electric Market Place, introduction (2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/10/b2breport.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2005) [hereinafter Staff Report].
Staff Report includes a description of various aspects of B2B and efficiency it provides, and outlines
the guideline to cope with antitrust concern in the context of B2B.
3
Nikkei Computer. Co., B2Btointernettorihikisho [B2B and Transaction Through Internet],
NIKKEI COMPUTOR, Jun 19, 2000, at 206-207 [hereinafter Transaction Through Internet].
4
The Federal Trade Commission, FTC Terminates HSR Waiting Period for Covisint B2B Venture,
(2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/09/covisint.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2005)
[hereinafter Press Release Covisist]. See also F. Martin Dajani, Beyond Covisint-Antitrust Scrutiny of
B2B Exchanges, 57 J. MO. B. 186, 186-190 (2001). See also Compuware Corporation, About Covisint,
at http://www.covisint.com/about/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2005). It describes Covisint as central hub
where suppliers of all sizes do business in single environment using the same interface, user i.d., and
pass word. Id.
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reservation that the FTC was continuing concern about its operation.5 Also, in Japan, in
the fields of information equipment, software, and components of automobile, especially
after 2000, several B2Bs have been created.6
Because, as mentioned before, it is easy on the web site for many sellers
and purchasers to join a transaction at the same time compared to real market places and
easy to communicate with each other, we can expect substantial reduction of the costs
concerning each transaction.7 In fact, Matsushita Electric Corporation announced that it
could achieve from 10% to 15% of cost reduction by procuring components of television
through B2B which had started its operation on April 2000.8 After this announcement, a
lot of businesses directed their attention to B2B in order to reduce costs concerning each

5

See, e.g., Press Release Covisist, supra note 4. It says that “because Covisint is in the early stages
of its development and has not yet adopted bylaws, operating rules, or terms for participant access,
because it is not yet operational, and because its founders represent such a large share of the
automobile market, the Commission cannot say that implementation of the Covisint venture will not
cause competitive concerns.” Id.
6
See e.g., GYO HAYASHI, NIHONBAN DOTCOM BUSINESS SEIRYOKUZU [POWER
BALANCE IN INTERNET BUSINESS IN JAPAN] 2-16 (Askee, 2000).
7
Transaction Through Internet, supra note 3, at 206. In Japan, the primary form of transaction on
B2B has been conducted with using the “auction function.” Under this form, in a transaction of its
initiative in a seller, after several purchasers bit for it, a seller compare the price presented by each
purchaser and conclude the transaction with the purchaser who presented the highest price. On the
other hand, in a transaction of its initiative in a purchaser, after several sellers bit for it, a purchaser
compare the price presented by each seller and conclude the transaction with the seller who presented
the lowest price. Id. at 207. Other form of transaction on B2B in Japan has been the catalogue sales. In
fact, in addition to hosting auctions, most of B2Bs post online catalogue, which are essentially the
electronic equivalent of paper catalogues. Online catalogues are often tailored for specific customers
by including specialized pricing or product selections. Id. at 207-208.
8
YOHJI TANIGUCHI, DENKISHOTORIHIKISHIJOH KOHCHIKU [ESTABLISHMENT OF
WEB-BASED MARKET PLACE] 18-22 (Seiseisha, 2000). In Japan, the importance of establishing
internet market places and realization of procurement of raw materials through them has been
recognized after 1996. It has been, however, the main hurdle of this realization that the only internet
resource available at that time for businesses was the low speed internet. It can be said that the recent
developments of the broadband internet all over the country made it possible to establish the internet
market places. In addition, other characteristics to be pointed out in the course of development of B2B
in Japan is, different from the U.S., B2B had been established not by venture companies but by
corporate giants to lower their procurement cost. Id. at 20-22.
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transaction by purchasing raw materials through the internet jointly with competitors.9
After the bubble economy came to a deadlock, the Japanese economy has been suffering
from depression and struggling cost reduction as well as restructuring. Due to its potential
procompetitive effects, that is, the possibility to reduce costs dramatically, this new
market place is expected to turn around the Japanese economy.10
However, the fact that buyers communicate easily through the internet
means they can form a cartel or conclude agreements easily to restrain free competition
on the web site markets11 and detect deviation12 from them. There must have been
9

The Fair Trade Commission in Japan, Genzairyotouno choutatuwomokutekitosuru
kigyoukanndennsishoutorihikisijounoseturitunikannsuru jigyoukshakaranosoudannjireunituite
[Consultation Case Concerning Establishment of E-Commerce market with the view to Purchasing
Raw Materials Jointly], (2000), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/pressrelease/12index.htm#dec (last
visited Feb. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Consultation Case Concerning B2B].
10
Conor Maguire, B2BhaEUtonihonnodokusennkinnsiseisakujounokyouteinokibantonaruka
[Whether B2B become a foundation of treaty concerning antitrust policy between EU and Japan],
(2000), at http://www.jmcti.org/jmchomepage/jmcjournal/data/2000_09/kikou01.pdf (last visited Dec.
22, 2004).
11
It has been recognized that easy communication through web-based communication tools might
facilitate the formation of cartels or other form of anticompetitive agreements. See e.g., U.S. v. Airline
Tariff Publishing Co., 58 FR 3971, 3974 (Department of Justice Jan. 12, 1993) (Proposed Final
Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement). It said that “These agreements, understandings, and
concerted actions were reached and effectuated through each of the airline defendant's use of the
computerized fare dissemination services of ATP to (1) exchange proposals and negotiate fare
changes; (2) trade fare changes in certain markets in exchange for fare changes in other markets; and
(3) exchange mutual assurances concerning the level, scope, and timing of fare changes. The
combinations and conspiracies alleged in the first cause of action had the effect of depriving
consumers of scheduled air passenger transportation services of the benefits of free and open
competition in the sale of such services.” Id. at 3974.
This case was a sellers’ price fixing case not buyers’. However, what is notable is that sellers relied
heavily on computerized communication as indicated above. It cannot be denied that, compared to real
market places, participants in B2B transaction tend to use web-based communication more than when
joining real market places, because, faced with more convenient way of communication, there are no
reasons for their withholding to take advantage of it. In this sense, an antitrust concern that web-based
communication facilitates the formation of cartels would apply to purchasers’ participants of B2B
transaction. In addition, this case demonstrates that as commerce shifts to the electronic marketplaces
and courts confront the question of whether communication concerning price between competitors
constitutes an unlawful antitrust activities, the critical inquiry shifts from whether the firms meet the
agreement to whether or not it is possible to find an agreement from a record of communication, in
other words, whether or not it is possible to find that their observed interactions constituted the
forbidden process and that so can be enjoined under the section 1 of the Sherman Act. An obtaining a
record of communication between competitors as to challenged conduct would be easier in
transactions on the web site than ones using telephones or writing letters, since communications
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buyers’ agreements long before B2B and these agreements were concluded without using
internet based communication. However the potential for B2B to aid buyers’ agreements
is worth focusing on13 because the newly enhanced ability of commercial buyers to reach
purchasing agreements might lead to anticompetitive collusive monopsony
(“oligopsony”)14 agreements15 to lower input prices by conspiring to depress the
quantities of input purchased.16

among parties are to be recorded at servers located in internet providers. However, as explained later
in this article, even when a record of communications should be obtained, direct evidence to find
agreements is not always easy. In addition, since the most of B2Bs lack the signaling system to inform
competitors of their prospects about future price, it would be sometimes difficult to infer agreements
only from a record of communications.
12
Jonathan B. Baker, Identifying Horizontal Price Fixing in The Electronic Marketplace, 65
ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 44 (1996). It says that “improved information exchange may also facilitate
coordination by reducing any single firm's incentive to deviate from a coordinated…But if rivals can
detect and will match price reductions very quickly, as may occur when prices are posted in the
electronic marketplace, this incentive can be greatly weakened.” Id. at 44.
13
Id. at 44-45.
14
Monopsony is the “term used to describe the situation where there is only one seller of a product,
monopsony where there is only one buyer.” In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 907 F.2d 510, 514
(5th Cir. Tex. 1990). The court in this case defined the term “monopsony” by quoting RICHARD
POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASE, ECONOMIC NOTE AND OTHER
MATERIALS 148 (2d ed. 1981). The classic example of monopsony is said to be the company town
existed even today in rural area of Japan. The company was often the only employer for hundreds of
miles and thus it had a captive labor market. The residents, sellers of labor, had the only one purchaser
to which to sell their labor. Because there are no other competitors for labor force, the company
usually pays artificially low wages and otherwise takes advantage of captive labor market. Eventually
residents leave the company town, exiting the market and reducing the output of labor. It is this
exiting from the market that antitrust regulators seek to prevent. When buyers have market power, in
the short term, prices are reduced as sellers reduce their margins and increase efficiencies in order to
meet the demand of a powerful purchaser. However, at some point, sellers may no longer find it
profitable to produce the goods and services and eventually leave the market, making it less
competitive. See generally Dajani, supra note 4, at 190.
On the other hand, according to Jonathan M. Jacobson & Gary J. Dorman, Monopsony Revisited: A
Comment on Blair & Harrision, 37 ANTITRUST BULL. 151, 152 (1992), the term “oligopsony” is
used to refer a buyers’ agreement to “restrict output (purchases) on the buying side of a market,
thereby depressing purchasing prices.” Id. at 152.
15
There are no examinations about natural monopsony in Japan. However, in the U.S. it has been
pointed out that the antitrust law does not appear to forbid the existence of natural monopsony itself.
See Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1539, 1568
(1989). It also says that “[n]atural monopsonies arise from the existence of a single buyer, where the
buyer’s sole participation is due to circumstances beyond the buyer’s control. The result is appropriate
because the buyer cannot do much about the fact that no one else wants to buy the product in question.
This is not to say that there will be no adverse consequence for social welfare, but there is no remedy.”
Id. at 1568. In other words, a dismantling of a single buyer of natural monopsony into small units to
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Although, as mentioned above, transactions through B2B include antitrust
concerns, especially oligopsony agreements which could be facilitated by easy
communications, in Japan, there have been few studies on this area. Also, the only
guidelines issued by the Fair Trade Commission in Japan (“FTCJ”) is Consultation Case
Concerning B2B.17 This is because all the factors which could facilitate the formation of
oligopsony agreements are relatively new in Japan.
The first of all, the formation of B2B has started recently in Japan.
Traditionally in Japan, sellers have had a strong bargaining power advantage over
purchasers. Sellers have been corporate giants, who always purchased raw materials from
their subsidiaries and sold their final products to consumers. Consumers have been, in
general, willing to accept proposed prices from corporate giants without thinking whether
it was too expensive. Therefore little attention has been focused on anticompetitive
effects which might be caused by buyers’ agreements. Consumers have never dreamed of
forming buyers’ cartel to negotiate the corporate giants to lower the proposed prices.
In addition, in general, buyers are numerous and it has been difficult to
unify them into agreements. The internet, however, drastically changed the bargaining
eliminate its market power would impose welfare losses of uncertain magnitude, which means that
productive inefficiencies would result. However, when a natural monopsony abuses its market power
to influence price, it would fall within the prohibition of the section 2 of the Sherman Act.
16
Costs concerning reaching agreements to fix the price are one of the principal costs in forming a
price fixing cartel. See e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 51 (University of Chicago Press 1976). It discussed such a cost in the context of
sellers’ cartel. However, on B2B market places, these costs can be reduced through web-based
communication.
17
Consultation Case Concerning B2B, supra note 9. In the guidelines, the FTCJ pointed out several
antitrust apprehensions concerning B2B by citing the real cases it had been consulted. However, the
FTCJ did not clarify any criteria to decide an antitrust illegality of each case. Since there have been no
recommendations nor hearing cases which the FTCJ dealt with concerning B2B, in concluding its
analysis, the FTCJ says that, although it is desirable that B2B will be established more and more since
it gives procompetitive effects on the national economy, because whether or not it includes an antitrust
illegality depends on the way of its operation, the FTCJ’s basic policy of B2B is that it will continue
its further supervision on B2B transactions.

6
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power balance between sellers and purchasers. It has made it possible for purchasers to
obtain as much information as they can with extremely low costs and to communicate
with each other. This aspect can enhance a formation of cartels among purchasers to
decrease the input purchased and lower the prices. Further, on B2B, the number of
participants in a given market is relatively small compared to real market places, which
could make it possible to unify buyers into agreements.
The second factor which could facilitate the formation of oligopsony
agreements in Japan is that because of the long lasting depression even corporate giants
are forced to participate in internet market places to reduce procurement costs of raw
materials, after examining well if it would contribute more cost reduction than dealing
with their subsidiaries. Because Japanese corporate giants have been so conservative and
unwilling to transact with the businesses which have not dealt with them before, without
the long lasting depression, it can be said that there was only a small possibility for
corporate giants to join B2B.18 Corporate giants, with initial huge bargaining power, have
participated in B2B as purchasers and raised an antitrust apprehension due to their
buyers’ agreements. It should be noted that in Japan buyers who have raised an antitrust
18

See generally International Information Study Group at Chiba University Faculty of Horticulture
Economy Division, Aiteinosinpotoryutuseido [Development of IT technology and distribution system],
(2004), available at http://www.h.chiba-u.ac.jp/glocal/lec10404.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
According to this article, at the perfectly competitive market places, purchasers might look for the best
suppliers, including the one which they have never dealt with before, in order to reduce their costs
concerning manufacturing their products. In order to find the best supplier, purchasers have to compile
as much information as they can, which would force them to incur a lot of costs. On the other hand,
given that purchasers would transact with suppliers within their hierarchy, although they do not have
to incur costs in order to find the best supplier, total costs concerning manufacturing their products
should be higher. Whether purchasers would choose to look for the best supplier or transact with
suppliers within their hierarchy depends on a lot of factors, such as economical condition, nationality,
traditional way of transaction in the country, and so on. It cannot be denied that, in spite of the fact
that web-based communication tools drastically reduce the costs to look for the best supplier,
generally speaking, corporate giants in Japan are reluctant to deal with new suppliers, but rather prefer
procuring raw materials and components within their hierarchy. In this sense, it can be said that the
long lasting depressions gave corporate giants an incentive to participate in B2B transaction and to
deal with new suppliers.
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apprehension because of buyers’ cartel are not consumers and newly established joint
ventures but in most cases corporate giants and their subsidiaries. The present
circumstances in Japan are different from the U.S. in that corporate giants rather than
consumers and newly formed joint ventures have taken advantage of convenient tools of
communication on B2B.
As explained above, all the factors which could facilitate the formation of
oligopsony agreements are relatively new in Japan. The emerging of high speed internet
which have made it possible to communicate more effectively on B2B and the long
standing depression which forced corporate giants with huge bargaining power are all
newly appeared factors. Due to the emergence of these factors, an antitrust apprehensions
of buyer cartels has arisen in Japan. For the reason explained above, in Japan, there are
few studies on oligopsony agreements which could be caused by convenient tools of
communication through the internet as well as B2B and only the guidelines issued by the
FTCJ is Consultation Case Concerning B2B.
The FTCJ points out several antitrust concerns in its guidelines named
Consultation Case Concerning B2B: First, in B2B transactions, there might be
unreasonable restrictions on trades; Second, participants of markets tend to restrict
competition through web-based communication among sellers or buyers. Third, given
that, participants are obliged to buy anything on B2B, such a conduct might cause an
antitrust illegality as unreasonable restrain of trade; and Fourth, given that procurement
of raw materials on the B2B market places should be indispensable for participants, a
foreclosure from the market should be a violation of the Law Concerning Prohibition of

8
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Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade19 (“Japanese Antimonopoly
Law”).20 In this guideline, however, the FTCJ does not analyze an antitrust concern that
B2B transaction might encourage the formation of oligopsony agreements among buyers.
This article seeks to provide a lodestar in applying the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law to real cases concerning B2B in which the exercise of market power
by buyers would cause an antitrust illegality. The cases which would be accused as the
exercise of market power under the Japanese Antimonopoly Law are that buyers agree to
reduce the price by lowering input purchased. Absent an agreement among buyers, even
if an input purchased at a market has actually been lowered, such a business activity
would not be a violation of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law as explained later in this
article. Thus, this article focuses on cases with buyers’ agreements and provides the
criteria to determine an antitrust illegality under the Japanese Antimonopoly Law. Also,
19

Law No. 54 of 1947 in Japan. The Japanese Antimonopoly Law prohibits (1) to restraint “free
and fair competition” by consulting with other entrepreneurs, (2) to unjustly maintain its monopolistic
position or unjustly exclude other competitors, or (3) to distort any competition by using any of the 16
types of unfair trade practices. Among the three conducts as mentioned above, the conduct referred to
in item (1) is called “unreasonable restraint of trade (cartel),” which means “to mutually restrict the
business activities by making cooperative decision concerning sales price, sales volume, consolidation
of manufacturing facilities and restriction of business partners among competitors, and thereby
causing to substantially restrict the competition in any field of trade. This unreasonable restraint of
trade constitute conducts such as “bid rigging,” “price cartel,” “market segmentation cartel,”
“transaction terms cartel,” “cartel on supply restriction,” “trading partner restriction cartel,” and others.
The conduct stated in (2) above is called “private monopolization,” which means for the entrepreneurs
to “exclude or control the business activities of other entrepreneurs, thereby causing contrary to the
public interest, a substantial restraint of competition in any particular field of trade.” Specifically, this
means any conduct by a company with high market share to exclude participation of new entrants or
restrain the business activities of other competitors by using unjust means (in many cases, but not
limited to, any means that violate the law) in order to increase or maintain its market share. “Unfair
Trade Practices” described in (3) above means 16 types of conduct designated by the FTCJ which may
inhibit fair trade (efficient competition). These types of conduct are prohibited as preliminary acts of
aforementioned cartel or private monopolization. These conducts are (i) concerted refusal to deal, (ii)
other refusal to deal, (iii) discriminatory pricing, (iv) discriminatory treatment of transaction terms,
etc., (v) discriminatory treatment in a trade association, (vi) unjust low price sales, (vii) unjust high
price purchasing, (viii) deceptive customer inducement, (ix) customer inducement by unjust benefits,
(x) tie-in sales, etc., (xi) dealing on exclusive terms, (xii) resale price maintenance, (xiii) dealing on
restrictive terms, (xiv) abuse of dominant bargaining position, (xv) interference with a competitor’s
transaction, and (xvi) interference with internal operation of a competitor’s company.
20
Consultation Case Concerning B2B, supra note 9.
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this article analyzes several tangential facts and circumstantial evidence to infer buyers’
agreement. This is because, in the real practices under the Japanese Antimonopoly Law,
in spite of the fact that finding an agreement among buyers is often the decisive point in
cartel cases, obtaining direct evidence to find an agreement is not always easy task even
on B2B. Namely, in Japan, the proof of an agreement in cartel cases has tended to rely
heavily on direct evidence and the information provided by whistle blowers. However,
both direct evidence and the information from whistle blowers are not always obtainable
and continuing relying on them could promote the illegal interrogation practices. As
explained later in this article, Japan has a bad interrogational tradition that illegal ways
such as fraudulent means have been used to obtain direct evidence and one of the factors
that caused this tradition was the heavy reliance of direct evidence by both the FTCJ and
courts. In addition, in Japan, there are no protections on whistle blowers. Therefore the
examination on tangential facts and circumstantial evidence are always necessary in
cartel cases.
Part II of this article describes the characteristics of B2B transaction,
explaining its procompetitive and anticompetitive effects and how it may facilitate
formation of buyers’ agreements to lower the input and drive down the price.
Part III of this article analyzes both procompetitive and anticompetitive
effects of buyers’ agreements from the viewpoint of economics. This gives an overview
of how both suppliers and consumers might be affected due to collusive buyers’
agreements to exercise market power.
Part IV of this article summarizes legal responses to buyers’
anticompetitive agreements in the U.S. as well as in Japan and interpretation of the

10
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Japanese Antimonopoly Law and provides a framework in applying the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law to real cases in which buyers’ oligopsony agreements causes antitrust
concerns. As explained later in this article, in order to determine a certain business
activity as a violation of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law, it is necessary to find that such
a business activity substantially restrains the competition through an agreement.21 Even
when input of purchased has been reduced, absent an agreement among purchasers, such
a business activity would not be a violation of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law.22

21

The Japanese Antimonopoly Law, art. 2, para. 6.
In Japanese judicial precedents, it has been construed that in order to determine certain business
activity as a cartel, a concurring of intent among the parities based on communication is necessary.
See Toshiba Chemical Co. v. Fair Trade Commission, 906 HANREITIMES 136 (Tokyo Hi. Ct. Sep.
25, 1995). In this case, the FTCJ issued the recommendation to the companies including Toshiba
Chemical Co. (“Toshiba Chemical”) on the ground that they formed the cartel in violating the
Japanese Antimonopoly Law, art. 3. on June 6, 1989. Seven companies except for Toshiba Chemical
accepted the recommendation. Accordingly, the FTCJ issued the judgment the content of which was
the same as the recommendation and the Punitive Penalty (Surcharge) order to seven companies on
August 8, 1989 and seven companies accepted them. On the other hand, since Toshiba Chemical
refused to accept the recommendation, the FTCJ commenced the hearing on August 8, 1989 and
rendered the judgment that Toshiba Chemical violated the Japanese Antimonopoly Law, art. 3. on
September 16, 1992. Toshiba Chemical filed the litigation at the Tokyo High Court seeking denial of
the judgment by the FTCJ. The Tokyo High Court rendered the judgment remanding the case to the
FTCJ on the ground that the hearing proceeding at the FTCJ violated the law because one of the
referees had participated in the investigation conducted before the hearing on February 25, 1994. The
FTCJ reformed the member of the hearing and rendered the same judgment on May 26, 1994 against
which Tochiba Chemical filed the litigation at the Tokyo High Court. The court rendered the
judgment on September 25, 1995 and said that the term “mutually” used in the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law, art.2, para. 6. meant that several businesses recognized and anticipated that others
would raise the price of same kind and content of commodities almost at the same time. It also pointed
out that although it was not necessary to communicate explicitly about how much price to raise, it is
necessary for each business to anticipate others would raise the price based on their communication. It
should be noted, however, that in this case the court found the content of communication among
competitors prior to and after the price raise, participants of the communications, date, place and time
of each meetings and same business conducts adopted by conspirators. Therefore, it can be said that
the court almost found direct evidence to infer the agreement among competitors. The judgment had
recognized the main point of this case as the question concerning whether there were enough
inferences of communication among the competitors as to their price raise and explained the general
principal to find an agreement from tangential facts. It was not necessary to mention, however, this
general principal because it was able to find the agreement from direct evidence. Rather, the main
point of this case was whether the withdrawal from the agreement should be admitted because
colluding companies except for Toshiba Chemical had already admitted the charge before Toshiba
case had been commenced at the FTCJ and only Toshiba Chemical had contended that it did not
concluded the agreement. In other word, since the agreement among parties had been found before the
commencement of Toshiba case, only point to be discussed at Toshiba case was not whether or not it
22
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was able to find the agreement but whether or not withdrawal from the agreement already found
should be admitted. In this case, however, Toshiba Chemical exchanged information as to the price
raise with seven companies before the meeting held on June 10, 1987 and consented such a price raise
clearly before the meeting. In addition, there was no evidence introduced from Toshiba Chemical as to
its withdrawing from the agreement. Therefore, even if Toshiba Chemical did not express its view
concerning the price raise clearly on the meeting, the argument that it had withdrawn from the
agreement, had it raised, would not be admitted in this case.
See also Kyowa Excio Co. v. Fair Trade Commission, 552 KOSEITORIHIKI 25 (Tokyo Hi. Ct.
Mar. 29, 1996). In this case, ten companies formed the body named Kabutokai in which they
exchanged the information and agreed to cooperate to decide which company would obtain orders in
bidding. Based on this agreement, ten companies colluded in connection with which company would
obtain the orders in twenty seven biddings conducted from April 1, 1981 to June 15, 1983. The FTCJ,
after finding the agreement, ordered the Punitive Penalty (Surcharge) order to three companies
including Kyowa Excio Co. (“Kyowa Excio”) all of which actually obtained orders in the biddings.
Two of the three companies accepted the order by the FTCJ. On the other hand, since Kyowa Excio
refused to accept the order by the FTCJ, it initiated the hearing proceeding and rendered the judgment
demanding Kyowa Excio to pay the Punitive Penalty (Surcharges) on March 30, 1994. As Kyowa
Excio filed the litigation seeking the denial of the judgment of the FTCJ at the Tokyo High Court, it
dismissed all the claims by Kyowa Excio on March 29, 1996. In rendering its judgment, the Tokyo
High Court detailed its finding agreements among the parties of Kabutokai. Eight companies of the
ten members of Kabutokai lacked any intention and capability to get orders as to given work at the
time of forming Kabutokai. In this regard, the court said that because even if they lacked the intention
and the capability, they were able to expect a substantial collateral for their contribution for two
companies in obtaining orders, there were the agreements among ten companies of Kabutokai. As the
judgment detailed, since it is almost impossible to know the intention and the capability of other
competitors and therefore it is quite natural to act on the premise that the competitors have the
intention and the capability to get orders, it is appropriate to find that ten companies were the member
of the agreement. In this case, although it was assumed that the content of implicit agreement was to
decide the companies which would obtain orders in biddings through consultation among the members
and cooperation by other members, all of them were not clear enough to find in this case (some of
them were specified to some extent). In addition, in this fact-finding, the date, the place and progress
of the meetings in which the agreement was concluded were not specified. In spite of this, fact-inissue of implicit agreement among the parties was found based on the inferences from twenty seven
collusive bidding from March 1981 to June 1988 as well as numerous communications among the
members of Kabutokai. Based on this fact-finding, the court determined that the agreement
substantially restricted the competition at the given industry and violated the Japanese Antimonopoly
Law. Especially in bid rigging cases, this kind of fact-finding is effective way to find an agreement
among parties because, as explained later in this article, a single bid rigging do not constitute a
violation of the law since “substantial restrain of competition,” one of the elements of the law, art. 2,
para. 6., requires certain span of time and expanse of land. In order to judge bid riggings as a violation
of the law, it is indispensable to find a principal agreement based on which members colluded for each
bid rigging and therefore it would be appropriate to find a principal agreement from each bid rigging.
Further, the Supreme Court of Japan requires a concurring of intent among parties based on
communication in order to determine certain business activities in issue as a violation of the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law. This is, explained later in this article, clear from the languages of its judgment
that it determined that when parties reached collusive agreements, at this point, they violated the
Japanese Antimonopoly Law. See e.g., Japanese Government v. Idemitu Co., 33 KEISHU 1287 (Sup.
Ct. Feb. 24, 1984).
There is, however, an unsolved discussion as to what extent of concurring is necessary to find an
agreement among partiers. In this regard, see Yuasakizaikohgyo, 1 SINKETUSHU 62 (FTC, Aug. 30,
1949). This is the case where the defendants bided approximately at the same price, however there
were discovered no definite agreements as to the price. The referee said that judging from the fact that
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the defendants bided approximately the same price, it could be found that, through the meeting among
the defendants held twice before the bid and other communications, they concluded the implicit
agreement on how much price they would bid. Further, the referee added that, as it was necessary to
determine to what extent of concurrent was needed to find an agreement, it was not enough to find
only the fact that the price they bided was the same but said that it was necessary to find that there
were some kinds of communications among the defendants as to price and that each defendant acted
the same way thinking that others would act likewise. Based on these facts-findings, the referee
concluded that there was an agreement as to price among the defendants. Although it is construed that
it is not necessary to find an exact agreement as to price, it is needed to find a communication among
the parties as to price and concurrent action based upon them. The expression that that each defendant
acted the same way thinking that other would act likewise could cover broad business activities. This
is, however, the case where since the purpose, date, time, participants, and content of conversation of
each meeting were all specified, the referee would be able to find an agreement as to price from these
tangential facts easily or simply from direct evidence. However, it should be noted that there is an
argument in Japan that since the recommendation procedure is not intended to find facts but to give
simply an opportunity to redress an inappropriateness of a given business activity, it is not proper to
examine recommendation cases in the context of finding an agreement among buyers from tangential
facts and circumstantial evidence.
Hiroshimashisekiyushogyokumiai, 44 SHINKETUSHU 3 (FTC, June 24 1998) adopted the similar
framework explained above in a cartel case and found an agreement on price from the content of
meetings held among the parties, communications, the price raised after the meeting, date of price
raise, and date, place, and participants of the each meeting. The referee in this case noted that
communications among the parties involved in the cartel should be necessary to find an agreement on
price. As explained above, in Japan, in order to find an agreement, at least it is necessary to find a
communication as to price among parties and fact-finding practice at courts and the FTCJ have
followed this principal so far. It should be noted, as briefly explained above, that the basic pattern of
fact-finding at both courts and the FTCJ concerning an agreement have been that, in a industry where
agreements on price had been concluded repeatedly, after meeting several times among competitors in
a given industry and communicating price raises, one of the competitors proposed a price fixing
agreement or how much to bid and other participants of meetings consented and followed them.
In addition to above cases, there are several recommendation cases at the FTCJ which found
agreement among competitors using same method outlined above. See e.g., Akitashichuoriyokumiai,
13 SINKETUSHU 55 (FTC, Aug. 11, 1965); Asahigarasukabusikigaisha, 22 SINKETUSHU 92 (FTC,
Dec. 9, 1975). Overall trend of fact finding at the FTCJ is said to become more careful after the
introduction of the Punitive Penalty (Surcharge) order in 1977. Under the Punitive Penalty
(Surcharges) system, the FTCJ is compelled to order a larger amount of penalty compared to the
normal administrative or criminal penalty when finding an agreement among competitors. Also, since
its introduction the Punitive Penalty (Surcharges) system has been criticized as against the double
jeopardy rule of the Japanese Constitution, art. 39. Taking into consideration of these factors, the
FTCJ seemed to have adopted more careful approach in finding an agreement as to price raise from
tangential facts and circumstantial evidence. See e.g., Mitsubishibiltechnoservice, 41 SINKETUSHU
46 (FTC, July 28, 1994). In this case, six companies including Mitsubishi Building Maintenance Co.
(“Mitsubishi”) attended several meetings named “Tohkakai” to exchange information as to their
business from August 31, 1982. The FTCJ issued its recommendation to the participants of the
meeting after careful investigation on the case on the ground that they agreed to fix the price at that
meeting on March 9, 1984. As six companies refused to accept the recommendation, the FTCJ
commenced the formal hearing and rendered the judgment which said there were no agreements as to
price among the parties. The referees in this case found that there were some communications as to the
price among the parties at the meeting held on August 31, 1982. They said, however, that had six
companies actually agreed on price raise at that meeting, Mitsuishi should have distributed
documentations reflecting such a price raise before or after the meeting and informed five other
companies how much to raise based on which they should have reviewed thoroughly. They found no
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Therefore, this article examines cases in which buyers agree to lower the input purchased
and does not review cases where no agreements among buyers can be found.
Part V of this article provides several factors to find an agreement to
exercise market power under the Japanese Antimonopoly Law as a fact-finding matter
because in the real antitrust practices in Japan it is often difficult to obtain direct evidence
to prove buyers’ agreements. Part V of this article tries to fill the gap between a
theoretical analysis and the real antitrust practice in Japan.
II. Characteristics of B2B Transaction
B2B is the virtual market place on the web site that connects each business
via internet.23 There has been developed by software systems that allow business to
purchase input from commercial suppliers using the high-speed internet
communications.24 Because, on the web site, it is easy for many sellers and purchasers to

evidence to prove these facts. In addition, they concluded that there was not enough time to examine
the price raise considering the number of topics discussed at that meeting and total meeting time.
What is notable in this case is that the referees of this case denied finding the agreement among the
parties although they found several communications as to price at that meeting. This case was the first
case in which the FTCJ initiated the hearing but referees did not find a violation of the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law in twenty nine years since its establishment and demonstrated that the hearing
proceeding at the FTCJ functioned. In addition, up until now, there have been no cases which the
FTCJ initiated the hearing on the ground that an exchange of information that had not reached an
agreement should be a violation of the law.
On the other hand, in the U.S, it has also been considered that a mere parallel conduct engaged in
by competitors with knowledge of each other’s action does not constitute an agreement within the
context of the Sherman Act. See e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939);
Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954). It said, citing
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, “[b]ut this Court has never held that proof of parallel business
behavior conclusively establishes agreement or, phrased differently, that such behavior itself
constitutes a Sherman Act offense. Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have
made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but "conscious
parallelism" has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely.” Id. at 541. See also William
E. Kovacic, The Identification and Proof of Horizontal Agreement Under the Antitrust Laws, 38
ANTITRUST BULL. 5, 31-55 (1993). It points out that rather than deeming mere conscious
parallelism an agreement, it is necessary to find certain additional feature of firms’ behavior called
“plus factor” supporting the inference of agreement.
23
Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, supra note 2, at 1.
24
Id.
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join a transaction at the same time and to communicate each other, we can expect a
substantial reduction of the costs concerning each transaction. In addition, as explained in
this section, the characteristics of B2B make it possible to enhance efficiency,
productivity and profitability. However these pro transactional natures of B2B, all of
which are largely attained by efficient communication tools through the internet, could
also cause anticompetitive effects on market places. In other words, the fact that buyers
communicate easily through the internet means that they are able to conclude an
anticompetitive agreement and to detect deviation from them easily. Because B2B could
yield both procompetitive effects and anticompetitive effects, examining only one side of
its characteristics is not appropriate when considering whether or not a certain business
activity on B2B should be a violation of the antitrust law. It is, therefore, necessary to
consider both sides of characters of B2B when examining specific business activity in the
context of reviewing whether anticompetitive effects are inevitable outcomes to
accomplish pro transactional effects on B2B. The overview of general characteristics of
both procompetitive effects and anticompetitive effects of B2B are as follows:
(1) Procompetitive Effects of B2B
(A) Improvement of Quality of Goods
The B2B technology makes it possible to achieve a design coordination
that could improve the quality of goods through communications between sellers and
buyers, which is time consuming and hard to maintain at real markets.25 The
communication efficiencies on B2B could reduce the time and the labor associated with
the coordination, although achieving it is still easier said than done even on B2B. The

25

Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, supra note 2, at 12.
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FTC, however, recognized its potential of cost saving and improvement of quality of
goods.26 This potential significance of B2B is worth to get attention.
(B) Communication Efficiencies
B2B enables sellers and buyers to communicate rapidly and inexpensively.
This could allow suppliers and suppliers’ suppliers to learn more quickly what buyers
want and when they want, which reduces forecasting which has been proved almost
always inaccurate, expensive and waste of time and labor.27 When an upstream of
businesses obtains a large order, the software used in B2B can calculate the necessary
increase in input purchased, determine the necessary adjustment at various upstream level
and transmit this information to relevant suppliers.28 In addition to the fact that
communication will be done more quickly, the potential of errors or delays is
dramatically reduced.29 These features are advanced by a secure plat form and common
technological standard. The FTC has clearly mentioned this efficiency with its
recognition that “the sharing of information among competitors may be pro-competitive
and is often reasonably necessary to achieve the pro-competitive benefit of certain
collaborations.”30

26

See e.g., Press Release Covisist, supra note 4. It quoted the FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky’s
comment that “As we learned at the FTC's workshop in June, B2B electronic marketplaces offer great
promise as means through which significant cost savings can be achieved, business processes can be
more efficiently organized, and competition may be enhanced. B2Bs have a great potential to benefit
both businesses and consumers through increased productivity and lower prices.”
27
Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, supra note 2, at 1.
28
Id.
29
Gail F. Levine, B2Bs, E-Commerce & The All- Or- Nothing Deal, 28 RUT. COM. & TECH. L. J.
383, 391 (2002).
30
The Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for
Collaborations Among Competitors, 15 (2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2005) [hereinafter
Collaboration Guideline]. See also id. at 27-28. According to this guidelines, in order for an efficiency
attained through B2B to be cognizable, an efficiency claim must be substantive, which includes 1) the
likelihood of an efficiency to be achieved, 2) the magnitude of an efficiency, 3) how it will be
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(C) Reduced Administrative Costs
B2B can reduce administrative costs, such as the time and energy a
business shall expend to process orders and to correct any mistakes in their processing.31
In transaction at real market places, buyers must prepare orders in writing, over telephone
or via email.32 On the other hand, sellers must put that orders into their system so that
they can progress them. Checking all the status until buyers receive the products is
multistep, labor-intensive operations.33 Communications required in each step would be
time consuming as well as costly and increase the possibilities that any errors should
happen.34 The Automating process via online communications makes it possible for
businesses to reduce these costs.
(D) Reduced Research Costs
Through B2B, it is possible to reduce research costs which business must
bear in order to obtain input. Finding out suppliers which provide the very goods and
services and comparing them would be time consuming and therefore costly processes.
B2B can reduce these costs by “making it easier for buyers to comparison-shop, replacing,
thumbing through bulky paper catalogs with quick and efficient mouse click searching.”35
In this way, B2B can “reduce the costs that buyers and sellers would otherwise expend to
locate and negotiate with each other.”36 B2B makes it possible for sellers to enjoy
“greater and cheaper access to more potential customers.”37 Due to this reduced research

achieved, and 4) how it will enhance the B2B’s and its ability to compete. In addition, the efficiency
must be B2B specific, which means that it cannot be obtained other than B2B. Id. at 27-28.
31
Levine, supra note 29, at 391.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, supra note 2, at 1.
36
Levine, supra note 29, at 391.
37
Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, supra note 2, at 1.
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costs, more businesses can access new products, services, and markets for them never
participated by thembefore with cheaper costs.
(2) Anticompetitive Effects of B2B
(A) Information Exchange
As explained before, B2B allows participants of markets to share
information through the internet at an unprecedented rate. Although the FTC38 and the
Supreme Court in the U. S.39 recognized procompetitive effects of information sharing, it
could also raise an antitrust concern.40
On the other hand, although the FTCJ seems to recognize procompetitive
aspects of information exchange, it says that whether an information exchange at B2B
would be a violation of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law depends upon the structure,
rules or whether information exchange might facilitate price coordination.41
The most obvious form of anticompetitive information exchange is
sharing costs and price information.42 In order to examine information exchange in B2B

38

Id. at 6.
See e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 443 (1978). It mentioned
procompetitive effects of information sharing in general that “[t]he exchange of price data and other
information among competitors does not invariably have anticompetitive effects; indeed such
practices can in certain circumstances increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather
than less, competitive. For this reason, we have held that such exchanges of information do not
constitute a per se violation of the Sherman Act.” Id. at 443.
40
Collaboration Guideline, supra note 30, at 13-14. It notes that “Competitor collaborations may
involve agreements jointly to produce a product sold to others or used by the participants as an input.
Such agreements are often procompetitive. Participants may combine complementary technologies,
know-how, or other assets to enable the collaboration to produce a good more efficiently or to produce
a good that no one participant alone could produce.” Id. at 13-14.
41
Consultation Case Concerning B2B, supra note 9. In this guidelines, the FTCJ says that since the
useful information in making strategy of competition such as price, quantity and what like is likely to
gather at an operating companies of B2B, when participants are able to access such information easily,
they are likely to form cartel agreements. Also, it says that when operating companies should be
capitalized by participants or their employees should be dispatched from them, a careful examination
would be necessary because in these cases unlawful agreements might be facilitated.
42
The Fair Trade Commission in Japan,
Jigyoshadantainokatudonikansurudokusennkinnshioujounosisin [The Guideline of the Japanese
39
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from the viewpoint of antitrust concerns, according to the FTC, the following factors
should be noted:
(1) The structure of market that B2B provides goods and services (the greater the degree
of concentration in the market, and the greater the share of the market controlled by
the B2B information sharers, the greater the risk of harm to competition through
information exchange);43
(2) Whether the information is shared among competitors;44
(3) Whether the information relates to more competitively sensitive areas, such as price,
output, costs or strategic planning as to direct input;45
(4) Whether the information is current or historical;46 and
(5) Whether the information is unique to the B2B or can be found elsewhere easily.47
The FTC also pointed out that, when a high barrier to enter B2B was
created by policies to exclude competitors, the risk of anticompetitive practices such as
collusion concerning prices through information exchange would increase.48

Antimonopoly Law Concerning Activities by the Body of Businesses], section 9 (1995), available at
http://hrsk.jftc.go.jp/dk/View_HTML.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). In Japan, there have been no
cases and recommendations at the FTCJ which determined a certain information exchange itself as a
violation of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law. It shall be noted, as explained earlier in this article, that
even if competitors are only exchanging information, it could become illegal under the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law as cartel practices given that the parties formed any implicit understanding or
common intention as to price through information exchange and a reasonable inference could be made
that the parties have reached a cartel agreement. When communications among parties included
information as to price, such practices are likely to be a violation of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law,
art.3. since it is regarded as an agreement in connection with price. On the contrary, should it be
determined that communications having some relevance to price have not reached an agreement level,
such a information exchange itself is not likely to be a violation of the law.
On the other hand, in the U.S. legality of information sharing is determined under rule of reason.
See e.g., United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 443. It said that “we have held that such exchanges of
information do not constitute a per se violation of the Sherman Act. ” Id. at 443.
43
Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, supra note 2, at 7.
44
Id. at 8.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 8-9.
47
Id. at 9-10.
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(B) Formation of Cartels
Since on B2B it is quite easy for buyers to communicate prices and
quantities of goods and services, they are likely to form cartels either on a B2B market
level or a final products market level. When products purchased through B2B are an
indispensable factor in producing final products, buyers are more likely to form cartels in
selling final products because their conspiracy to reduce quantities and raise prices of
final products would be more successful.
(C) Exclusionary Practices
One of the anticompetitive effects caused by B2B would be that it could
be used as a method to foreclose competitors from markets. The FTC had expressed this
concern in its report that “there may be circumstances under which participant owners of
the B2B could undermine competition by denying their competitors access to the B2B, or
by otherwise disadvantaging those competitors in their use of the B2B.” 49 Given that a
certain materials should be necessary to produce final products and they are not
obtainable other than markets on B2B,50 it would be possible to foreclose competitors by

48

Id. at 10.
Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, supra note 2, at 16.
50
In the U.S., it is recognized that when a participation in a certain market is indispensable in a
given industry, an exclusion concern would be greater. See e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc.
v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 293 (1985). In this case, the plaintiff claimed that
its expulsion from a joint buying cooperative of one hundred office supply retailers constituted a per
se illegal group boycott. The buying cooperative generated several efficiencies including economies of
scale in purchasing and warehousing and ready access to inventory. The court said that “[u]nless the
cooperative possesses market power or exclusive access to an element…essential to effective
competition, the conclusion that expulsion is virtually always likely to have an anticompetitive effect
is not warranted…(Per se rules may require considerable inquiry into market conditions before the
evidence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive conduct"). Absent such a showing with respect to
a cooperative buying arrangement, courts should apply a rule-of-reason analysis.” Id. at 293. In
addition, once courts found that participation in a certain market is essential, they have traditionally
deemed a refusal to deal to be a per se illegal. See e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light &
Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961). This is the case concerning the refusal of an industry wide standardssetting organization to provide its seal of approval to plaitiff’s gal burner. The burner was not
approved despite its apparent safety and efficiency. Without the seal of approval, the plaintiff was
49
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denying the access to B2B. This being the case, it is obvious that a competitor will suffer
from losses due to not being able to manufacture final products.
(3) Facilitation a Formation of Buyers’ Anticompetitive Agreement
B2B could allow buyers to purchase jointly the inputs they need to
manufacture final products based on agreements at markets of raw materials (“upstream
market”).51 It is, however, important to distinguish the exercise of an illegal oligopsony
power from a regular bargaining power, which is the result of procompetitive effects
through B2B. To put it in another way, it should benoted not to decide a regular
bargaining power as an illegal exercising of market power.
effectively excluded from the market. The court characterized the association’s conduct as a group
boycott and applied the per se rule. It says that “conspiratorial refusal "to provide gas for use in the
plaintiff's Radiant Burner[s] [because they] are not approved by AGA" therefore falls within one of
the "classes of restraints which from their 'nature or character' [are] unduly restrictive, and hence
forbidden by both the common law and the statute.” Id. at 659-660. Further, when the courts found
that an access to certain facilities is essential, they have imposed controllers of such facilities a duty to
deal. See United States v. Terminal R. Association, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). In this case, fourteen
railroads jointly owned the Terminal Railroad Association. The association controlled the only means
of access the Mississippi River to the city of St. Louise (two bridge and car ferry). No railroad could
access St. Louise, then major railroad hub, from the east without using the Association’s facilities. The
cost for competitors to acquire similar means of access was prohibitive. Although the government
sought dissolution of the Association, the court did not opt for such a severe remedy. Instead, the court
required that the Association allow all other railroads to use the bridge and ferry. Id. at 411-412. See
also Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963). In this case, the New York Stock
Exchange disapproved a broker-dealer’s application for connection to a private wire system among
stock exchange members. The wire permitted brokers to receive instantaneously available market
information and to trade with other brokers in the market. The court concluded that an access to a
private wire system was essential to compete effectively at the given market and that the concerted
action by the Exchange and its members was group boycott. Id. at 346-348. It should be noted,
however, that the Supreme Court in the U.S. came to adopt the rule of reason analysis, not the per se
approach, in the case where exclusionary practices by parties had been alleged to be a violation of the
antitrust law. See e.g., FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). This case involved
an association of dentists who refused to supply patient x-rays to insurance companies seeking to
evaluate benefit claims. Although ultimately finding this practice illegal under the rule of reason, the
court did not adopt the per se approach. It said that “we decline to resolve this case by forcing the
Federation's policy into the "boycott" pigeonhole and invoking the per se rule…per se approach has
generally been limited to cases in which firms with market power boycott suppliers or customers in
order to discourage them from doing business with a competitor -- a situation obviously not present
here.” Id. at 458.
51
Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, supra note 2, at 1-2. See also Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey
L. Harrison, Cooperative Buying, Monopsony Power, and Antitrust Policy, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 331,
333-336 (1992).
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Both types of behavior result in the purchasers’ paying a lower price for
products. Collusive buyers with the exercise of oligopsony power, however, achieve the
same result by reducing their demands for goods by restricting their level of purchases to
an extent sufficient to force sellers to reduce the price. The reduction in demands makes
the sellers to reduce manufacturing of their products, diminishing quantity of their
manufacturing. In turn, given that collusive buyers have market power in a market for
final products (“downstream market”), they are likely to restrict the output of final
products available for purchase by consumers, which lead to increase the retail price of
the goods.
On the other hand, a regular buying power involves buyers’ utilizing the
particular strengths in its bargaining position to negotiate a better price with the sellers.
Given that joint purchasers have not dominated a downstream market, a lowered price
encourages the buyers to purchase the goods in greater quantity at an upstream market,
thus increasing the total amount of products available for purchases by consumers at a
downstream market, and therefore lowering the retail price.52
As briefly described above, the method to achieve lowered price at an
upstream market and the effects on a downstream markets are particularly different
between an illegalexercise of market power and a regular bargaining power. The effects
on a downstream market attained through regular bargaining power are procompetitive,
quite different from the exercise of oligopsony power. Therefore, even when the price of
commodities at an upstream market seemed to be lowered below competitive level, it is
necessary to examine what has caused such an effect so as not to determine a regular

52

Garen Gotfredson, Business-to-Business Internet Purchasing Exchanges: The Promises and
Antitrust Risks of a New e-Commerce Platform, 2 MIMM. INTELL. PROP. REV. 107, 118 (2001).
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bargaining power as an illegal exercise of market power. In this sense, as explained later
in this article, it is indispensable to review what is an illegal exercise of market power by
purchasers.
To be sure, even with the web-based communications, it is true to say that
a group buying could be still hard to coordinate. This is maybe the part of the reason why
many B2Bs in Japan simply let their members place individual orders for their inputs.
Compared to transactions in real market places with communications through telephone,
however, it is also true to say that an easy communication through B2B may make it
easier for buyers to arrive at purchasing agreements and detect deviation from them.53
The cost of arriving at a common price agreement is principal cost of price fixing
agreement54 and it can be reduced through B2B.55 In order to reach an agreement, it is
required for buyers to negotiate prices, outputs, and other related matters. These
negotiations would be made easier through web-based communications that enable to
convey useful information among the parties quickly and cheaply.56 B2B can allow this
kind of information exchange and can facilitate greatly a formation of buyers’ agreements

53

Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, supra note 2, at 4. See also Ian Ayres, How Cartels
Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 295, 295-325 (1987).
54
See generally Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988). It said
that “Cartels are neither easy to form nor easy to maintain. Uncertainty over the terms of the cartel,
particularly the prices to be charged in the future, obstructs both formation and adherence by making
cheating easier…Without an agreement with the remaining dealer on price, the manufacturer both
retains its incentive to cheat on any manufacturer-level cartel (since lower prices can still be passed on
to consumers) and cannot as easily be used to organize and hold together a retailer-level cartel.” Id. at
727. See also Collaboration Guideline, supra note 30, at 22. It says “the exercise of monopsony
power by a buying collaboration may be deterred or counteracted by the entry of new purchasers. To
the extent that collaborators reduce their purchases, they may create an opportunity for new buyers to
make purchases without forcing the price of the input above pre-relevant agreement levels.” Id. at 22.
55
Levine, supra note 29, at 391-394.
56
Baker, supra note 12, at 44. It notes that “The rapid and inexpensive exchange of information
among sellers may make it easier for sellers that want to coordinate to find a set of prices and output
on which they can implicitly (explicitly) agree…Rapid information exchange can reduce coordination
difficulties by permitting firms to engage in complex discussion more easily.” Id. at 44.
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to reduce the price. In addition, B2B can facilitate the maintenance of agreements57 that
basically depend upon member’s adherence to lower inputs purchased by detecting easily
cheating of members and by reducing the time to respond to it.58 One of the chores of
buyers’ cartel members might be monitoring buyers’ purchasing, making sure to see if
one of the members cheat by buying too much.59 B2B has made it so much easier that
buyers’ incentive to cheat can be diminished by rapid exchanging information through
web-based communications.60 B2B based on peer-to-peer system could allow for even
more fluid exchange of information, increasing antitrust apprehensions for exchanging
information in an illegal way.61 In addition to above, compared to real market places, the
number of purchasers in B2B is relatively small, which means that it is easier to unify
them into an agreement.
To summarize, in B2B, buyers’ anticompetitive agreements which could
lead to the exercise of market power are more likely to be formed because of the
communication efficiency among purchasers and relatively small number of participants
in a given market of B2B. Here lies the real reason why the potential of B2B to aid
buyers’ agreement is worth paying attention.
(4) Summary of Analysis
As discussed above, the characteristics of B2B could make it possible to
enhance efficiency, productivity and profitability as well as causing anticompetitive

57

Levine, supra note 29, at 394-395
See Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. Pa. 1993). It
said that “Petruzzi's IGA contends that the defendants created a cartel to ensure that prices for raw
materials would be artificially low. Game theory teaches us that a cartel cannot survive absent some
enforcement mechanism because otherwise the incentives to cheat are too great.” Id. at 1233.
59
Levine, supra note 29, at 392-395.
60
Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, supra note 2, at 4.
61
Levine, supra note 29, at 393.
58
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effects on competitions, most of which are achieved through easier, cheaper, and more
convenient communications through the internet. It can be said that the most distinct
characteristics of B2B lies in this communication efficiency that could facilitate a
conclusion of anticompetitive buyers’ agreements.
It should be noted, however, as explained in this section, that buyers’
anticompetitive agreements are not an inevitable outcome of efficiencies attained by B2B.
To put it differently, without concluding buyers’ anticompetitive agreements, it is
possible to achieve only procompetitive effects of B2B outlined above. Suppliers and
consumers could enjoy only benefits from B2B without suffering from anticompetitive
effects which would be caused by buyers’ anticompetitive agreements.
Therefore, when considering competitive effects by buyers’
anticompetitive agreements, it is necessary to examine whether or not procompetitive
effects on B2B could not be achieved absent them and what effects both suppliers and
consumers might have only from them. To put it another way, when examining buyers’
anticompetitive agreements on B2B, it is necessary to consider both anticompetitive and
procompetitive effects only arising out of them.
For that purpose, Part III of this article discusses competitive effects of
oligopsony from the viewpoint of economics in order to analyze how it should be treated
under the Japanese Antimonopoly Law.
III. Analysis of Oligopsony
Even when purchasers buy certain materials from suppliers through B2B
jointly, given that they lacked the power to control the price of these products at the
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markets, they will pay for the products at the competitive level, thus yielding a
maximized social welfare.62
The problem is not the joint purchasing activities themselves but the
exercise of market power to establish the lowered price through joint purchasing, in other
words, oligopsony.
Thus, in order to understand the anticompetitive effects of joint purchasing
activities on B2B, it is necessary to analyze the real effects on both an upstream and a
downstream market by the exercise of oligopsony power, that is to say, the power to
control a price of products at a given market which could be realized 63 and sustained 64
under certain market conditions.

62

Blair & Harrison, supra note 51, at 334.
Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, supra note 2, at 14-15. See also The Federal Trade
Commission Public Workshop, Emerging Issues for Competition Policy in the World of E-Commerce
(Thursday, June 29 2000) Volume 1, (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/b2b/b2btrans000630
(last visited Feb. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Competition Policy in E-Commerce]. In this report, Mr. Rick
Warren-Boulton opined that “I agree with you. If you have a B2B where the purpose of the B2B is a
bunch of people are buying office supplies and paper clips and things like this, this is really moot. The
issue only really comes up when you have a small group of buyers who account for a very large share
of the demand for a very specialized input where the suppliers have incurred some kind of sunk cost.
The supply curve has to be upward sloping. There has to be some ability to reduce price by restricting
purchases, and that's fairly limited, and a first screen obviously is that the buyers account for a very
large share of the purchases of that input.” Id. at 537. See also Jacobson & Dorman, supra note 14, at
157. According to this article, an upward sloping supply curve should be indispensable to exercise
monopsony power. This means that buyers must increase the price they will pay for each additional
product in order to induce suppliers to supply more of it. See also James Murphy Dowd, Oligopsony:
Antitrust Injury and Collusive Buyer Practice in Input Market, 76 B. U. L. REV. 1075, 1084-1085
(1996). According to this article, in order to exercise oligopsony power, four factors must exist. The
first, the firms must agree to act together. The second, the firms acting in concert must purchase a
large portion of market supply relative to total market production. The third, the firms must have some
mechanism to police their agreement and prevent cheating. The fourth, the firms must be capable of
preventing both entry of new buyers into the market and sales by existing sellers to alternate
purchasers outside the market. Id. at 1084-1085.
64
See Dowd, supra note 63, 1089-1090. According to this article, the first, the goods offered in the
market are perishable. The second, potential purchasers’ start-up costs are relatively high when
compared with other investment opportunities. The third, potential purchasers in a given industry must
face an entry barrier to the market. Finally, producers find that sunk costs or transition costs present
formidable barriers to exit from the market. For an examination of the conditions as they pertain to
sellers, see George Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, and Antitrust Law,67 CORNELL L. REV. 439,
439-482 (1982).
63
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Joint purchasers, after buying raw materials from suppliers, manufacture
certain products and provide them with consumers at a downstream market. Therefore,
both suppliers and consumers can be affected by the exercise of market power by
purchasers whose antitrust apprehension is not mere hypothesis.65 In order to analyze
whether or not the exercise of market power by purchasers should be a violation of the
Japanese Antimonopoly Law, it is very much important to examine what effects both
suppliers and consumers would suffer due to the exercise of oligopsony power because
there are no lodestars as to oligopsony in Japan in the context of judging antitrust
violation.
Provided that there are no effects caused by oligopsony or effects caused
by oligopsony were apparently permissible under the Japanese Antimonopoly Law, there
would be no violation of the law. But, should there be the possibility to exceed the
permissible range provided by the law, then it is necessary to examine exactly what
competitive will happen and what standard will apply to examine it.
This article first analyzes the effects caused by oligopsony on suppliers at
an upstream market and consumers at a downstream market.
Next, it examines whether or not procompetitive effects, such as
enhancements of efficiency in producing final products, attained through joint purchasing,
might affect the anticompetitive harm that have been caused by oligopsony. In other
words, this article examines whether or not the procompetitive effects attained through
joint purchasing are likely to offset the anticompetitive effects caused by oligopsony.

65

Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, supra note 2, at 13-16. Levine, supra note 29, at 397.
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In addition, this article examines the difference between oligopsony and
an all-or-nothing deal,66 in which buyers accomplish lowered price without decreasing
their quantity input purchased. In an all-or-nothing deal, buyers would be able to achieve
the best of both world, namely lowered prices and maintaining of quantity of input
purchased. This might be the best result for buyers. It is necessary, however, to analyze
what effects both suppliers and consumers might have in an all-or-nothing deal. Even if
there are no effects on social welfare due to an all-or-nothing deal and its consequences
are purely distributional, it is necessary to examine what competitive effects would
happen due to the transfer of wealth, because, as this article shall demonstrate later, to
describe it as mere “transfer” is an oversimplification. Should there be any effects on
social welfare, it is necessary to examine how suppliers, consumers and a society would
be affected. In addition, in both oligopsony and an all-or-nothing deal, it is necessary to
examine whether or not it is essential to distinguish oligopsony from all-or-nothing deal
and if so what standard to apply under the Japanese Antimonopoly Law.
Moreover, this article examines the difference between oligopsony and
buyers’ collusion to increase their input purchased in order to depress the price. Like an
all-or-nothing deal, buyers accomplish lowered price without decreasing their quantity
input purchased. It is necessary, however, to analyze what effects both suppliers and
consumers might have in this kind of transaction to review whether or not this agreement
would be permitted under the Japanese Antimonopoly Law.
(1) Suppliers’ Harm due to Oligopsony

66

ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY ANTITRUST LAW AND
ECONOMICS 73 (Princeton University Press 1993).
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In competitive markets, willing buyers interact with willing suppliers. It is
assumed that no single firm or individual are able to control the price or quantity of
available goods. Also, it is supposed that it is only one among many firms producing
identical products and only one among many purchasers willing to buy specific products.
Further, it is assumed that there are no significant inhibition on entry into and exit from
the market.67 In addition, competitive markets could benefit both suppliers with producer
surplus and purchasers with consumer surplus. When operating at competitive
equilibrium of supply and demand, social welfare could be maximized.68
On the other hand, joint purchasers, when they have market power at an
upstream market, they could maximize their profits by manipulating to depress the
quantity of their input purchased from suppliers and, thus, producing lower prices.
Although lowered prices may seem at first sight consistent with principal purpose of
antitrust law, 69 this is not always the case.70
The impact of oligopsony is best understood by examining monopsony, a
market structure with single buyer, as oligopsony and monopsony are economically

67

Blair & Harrison, supra note 51, at 334.
Id.
69
Courts in the U.S. seem to presume benefits to consumers from the lowered price realized
through oligopsony. See Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d 313, 316
(6th Cir. Tenn. 1989). This hypothesis is not always the case because a lowered price realized through
the exercise of oligopsony power at an upstream market is not always pass down to consumers at a
downstream market as explained later in this article. In most cases, the oligopsonist still faces
competition at a downstream market. Therefore, the oligopsonistic buyers would maximize their profit
by pricing their product at the competitive downstream market price. In addition, in an oligopsonistic
market, since marginal factor cost increase as explained later in this article, oligopsonistic buyers are
not likely to pass down their benefit they enjoy at an upstream market.
70
Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76 CORNELL. L. REV.
297, 303-306 (1991).
68
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equivalent in terms of their impact on price and output.71 The consequences of
monopsony (oligopsony) on social welfare can be understood with the aid of Figure 1.
[Figure 1] Welfare Loss due to Oligopsony
Price
a
Marginal Factor Cost
Supply:
Marginal Social Cost

b
(C)
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(A) Transfer of Wealth
Demand:
Marginal Revenue Product
e

Q2

Q1

Quantity

In a competitive market, a firm attempt to maximize the profits by setting
output levels at the place where the firm’s marginal cost equal to the obtainable price
because at that equilibrium the firm could provide goods and services with minimum cost.
If each of the firms in the competitive industry follows this decision rule, we will be able
to obtain a market supply curve by adding up the quantities produced by each firm at any
given price, which will be the sum of the quantity determined by marginal cost for each
of them. Therefore, supply curve in a competitive market is represented as marginal cost
for a society shown as marginal social cost curve in Figure 1.
71

Blair & Harrison, supra note 51, at 334.
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When firms act in concert to purchase the entire market supply of an input
good, the firms’ buying decisions reflect the marginal factor cost (“MFC”) of that input.72
The MFC is an additional cost which shall be borne by purchasers when buying one more
unit. In a competitive market, a firm could obtain all necessary goods at the prevailing
market price. Therefore, the MFC for each input is negligible. In an oligopsonized market,
the colluding firms purchase close to the entire supply of goods at the given market. The
MFC curve rises more rapidly than supply curve, because, in order to buy a greater
volume of input, the oligopsonists must pay a higher price not only for an additional unit
but also for all of the other units they have purchased in order to induce expansion in
quantity supplied.73 Therefore, as Figure 1 illustrates, in the oligopsonized market, the
MFC curve should be steeper than supply curve.
Intermediate goods are valued for their contributions in producing the
buyers’ final products.74 As a result, the demand by buyers for intermediate goods is
determined bymultiplying the increase in output of final products resulting from the use
of one more unit of the intermediate goods purchased from suppliers times the output
price of buyer’s final products. Therefore, the demand is called the value of marginal
revenue product (“MRP”) as shown in Figure 1.75 In other words, the MRP is an
additional revenue which purchasers obtain when buying additional more one unit.

72

DON BELLANTE & MARK JACHSON, LABOR ECONOMICS: CHOICE IN LABOR
MARKET 180-184 (McGraw-Hill 1979).
73
Dowd, supra note 63, at 1086. If purchasers try to discriminate by paying higher price to only the
added product, suppliers would quit producing. In this way, an arbitrage would destroy these efforts at
price discrimination.
74
Blair & Harrison, supra note 51, at 334.
75
Id. Precisely speaking, an oligopsonist does not have a demand function because the oligopsonist
determines the price and quantity simultaneously. The MRP curve, however, demonstrates the same
information as the demand curve does, that is, the addition to total revenue that an increment in the
input generates. To put it differently, assuming that all other goods to manufacture final products are
constant, an oligopsonist continues to increase its use of a good until the MRP of the good equal to the
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An oligopsonists have market power to establish the price because their
purchases could influence the price they pay for the products. The more quantity an
ologopsonist buys, the higher the price becomes. On the contrary, the less it buys, the
lower the price becomes. An oligopsonists achieve a lowered price by less buying the
quantity of products compared to the competitive market,76 so that revenue that once
flowed into sellers “now flow into the coffers of the oligopsonistic [buyers] in the form of
reduced cost.” 77 In addition, its buying decision will cause a social loss because an
oligposonist does not purchase the quantity that a society needs.78 Figure 1 demonstrates
how the price and the quantity of an intermediate good would be decided and what
competitive effects will happen.
In a competitive market, where both sellers and purchasers are assumed to
have no market power to control the output price, the price is P1 and quantity is Q1,
whose combination maximizes the social welfare, the sum of consumer and producer

price, because inasmuch as the cost of the final products are smaller than the MRP, the profit will
increase. On the other hand, at any price, we may purchase the quantity for which marginal value
equals the price. So, the demand curve is identical to the marginal value curve, which is calculated
through dividing marginal utility by income. As a result of this, the MRP serves much the same
function as the demand curve. In this regard, See DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 85-90,
189-190 (2d ed. 1990).
76
See ROGER D. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 34-37 (Richard D.
Irwin 1985). The competitive firms try to maximize profits by setting output levels at the place where
the firm’s marginal cost equal to the obtainable price. If competitive firms always produce the
quantity so that the MC is equal to the P, then its supply curve, that is, the amount it produces as a
function of price is equal to its MC curve. The MC first falls as the increasing the size of the firm
produces advantages, realizing more efficient production on a large scale. The model for competitive
firms assumes, however, that the MC then rises after the firm has taken the full advantage of largescale production and further increases in size mean more and more levels of administration between
the president and the factory floor, leading to less efficient production. Despite this, for simplification
of the discussion, this article uses the straight Marginal Social Cost Curve in Figure 1. See
FRIEDMAN, supra note 75, at 221.
77
Dowd, supra note 63, at 1092.
78
Blair & Harrison, supra note 51, at 334.
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surplus.79 In Figure 1, the consumer surplus is described in the area under the demand
curve and above P1, which is triangle aP1c, while the producer surplus is the area above
the supply curve and below P1, which is triangle eP1c.
On the other hand, an oligopsonist, when facing with positively sloping
supply curve described in Figure 1, will discover that it can influence the price it has to
pay for an intermediate good by adjusting the quantity that it buys.80 In an oligopsonized
market, an oligopsonist does not compete with each other in the intermediate good
markets. As the result, they will buy where the increase in total cost resulting from the
purchase of one more additional unit of input from supplier, the MFC, equals to demand,
the MRP since profit maximization requires expanding quantity of input purchased until
the MRP contributed by that expansion is equal to the MFC so that marginal impact on
profit is zero.81 In other words, because each of the firms compete in their downstream
market, their demands for an input good will equal the marginal revenue produced by that
input. Consequently, each firm will demand additional units of the input up to a point
where marginal revenue product is equal to marginal factor cost 82 which is represented in
Figure 1 as the intersection of the MFC curve with the MRP curve. As a result, quantity
is reduced to Q2 and price becomes P2.83
An oligopsonic behavior causes two kinds of competitive effects, that is,
the social welfare loss and the redistributive effects.

79

Id. Consumer surplus in a given market is the difference between what consumers would
willingly have paid for the quantity they consumed and the amount they actually paid for that quantity.
On the other hand, a producer surplus is the amount by which a producer’s price exceeds the
competitive price.
80
Id.
81
BELLANTE & JACHSON, supra note 72, at 182.
82
Dowd, supra note 63, at 1088.
83
Blair & Harrison, supra note 15, at 1568.
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The social welfare effects of oligopsony are analogous to those of
oligopoly, that is, too few resources will be employed. At the point where supply and
demand are equal, the total social welfare generated by the operation of the market will
be optimal, whereas it is not privately optimal for an olipogosonist. In order to maximize
the private welfare, an opigopsonist will purchase Q2 units of goods at price P2. As a
result, the total social welfare will be reduced from the competitive potential by an area
(B)+(C), that is, bdc. This is the potential welfare gain to the society that is unrealized. To
put it another way, it is a decrease of social welfare that the society might have enjoyed
but for oligopsony power and called the dead weight loss.84 (B) of Figure 1 indicates a
reduction of the revenue that suppliers might have enjoyed but for opigopsony and need
to continue their business. Due to this reduction of revenue, suppliers might have to
manufacture inferior products which they would never supply under competitive market
places or close the factories which have been producing raw materials which should have
been purchased by purchasers. (C) of Figure 1 shows a reduction of the total amount and
variety of products of final product which consumers at a downstream market might have
enjoyed absent oligopsony.85
The redistributive effects is that an oligopsonist appropriate revenue that
once accrued to suppliers from the production and sale of their goods. (A) in Figure 1, the
area P1fdP2, represents this effects of oligopsonic behavior, depicting a portion of what
84

See Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and Nonstructual
Market Power, 69 N. Y. U. L. REV. 1, 15 (1994). The author of this article discusses the dead weight
loss in the context of monopoly. It says “the increased market power from the practice permits the
parties to restrict output. Society thus loses the value of that lost output (less its cost of production) as
consumers must turn to less preferred alternatives. This is the familiar dead-weight welfare loss of the
monopoly model.” Id. at 15. See also James D. Hurwitz, Abuse of Governmental Prosecces, the First
Amendment, and the Boundaries of Noerr, 74 GEO. L. J. 65, 69 (1985). It suggests that the dead
weight loss arises from reduced output and the dissipation of additional resources to maintain illgained market power.
85
Dowd, supra note 63, at 1088-1089.
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was producer surplus in a competitive market that flows to the oligopsonist as consumer
surplus.86 In other words, (A) in Figure 1 demonstrates the depression of input good
prices to the oligopsonist firms due to their exertion of market power. It is from this
activity that most of the antitrust injury87 experienced by suppliers arises.88 The suppliers
in a oligopsonized market are the best position to feel the effect of this anticompetitive
behaviors.89
As outlined above, by the exercise of oligopsony power, both suppliers
and a society could be harmed. This is the harm against which the antitrust laws should
protect.
(2) Consumers’ Harm due to Oligopsony
Next, this article examines what damages consumers at a downstream
market would suffer due to oligopsony.

86

Economically, this is transferring of wealth from suppliers to an oligopsonist by the exercise of
oligopsony (monopsony) power and can be viewed that a society does not suffer from any loss. On the
other hand, there is the view that regards this transfer of wealth as a social loss. See Law v. N. C. A.
A., 134 F.3d 1010, 1022 (10th Cir. Kan. 1998). The transfer of wealth might have the suppliers lose
their incentive to innovate production of raw materials by conducting research and interest to continue
their business. Also, an oligopsonist would spend additional wealth gained through transfer in socially
inefficient ways, maintaining its market power and sabotaging its rival’s plan to enter the market. In
this sense, transfer of wealth should be viewed as a social loss.
87
In the U.S. an antitrust injury is defined an “injury of the type antitrust laws were intended to
prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful”. See e.g.,Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
88
In Japan, there are no profound discussions at to what is the antitrust damage because in Japan
civil litigations seeking the compensation for damages incurred due to a violation of the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law are usually filed as a part of general tort claims based on the Civil Law in Japan,
art. 709. in spite of the absolute liability under art. 25. of the law. On the other hand, in the U.S. there
are several discussions as to how to measure an antitrust damage. See e.g., BLAIR & HARRISON,
supra note 66, at 150. It says that “In comparison with the burden of proving the fact of damage,
courts traditionally have applied a very relaxed standard to the level of certainty with which the
amount of damages must be shown. The reasoning behind this policy is that proof would result in
many wrongdoers escaping penalty. All antitrust harm ultimately manifests itself as a loss of profits
and in theory, lost profit is the proper measure of damage.” Id. at 150. Regard with the complexity of
proving an antitrust damage, see generally Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273
U.S. 359 (1927).
89
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 66, at 151-152.
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When suppliers at an upstream market should suffer from harm due to
oligopsony, intuitively, regardless of whether an oligopsonist has market power at a
downstream market, we will consider one of two scenarios.
The first scenario is to consider that an oligopsonist is likely to collude at a
downstream market and thereby cause anticompetitive harm to consumers and a society.
The second counterintuitive scenario is to consider that oligopsony at an
upstream market will lower the costs for an oligopsonist and thereby benefit consumers at
a downstream market through lowered price of the final goods and services.90 However,
even when an oligopsonist has market power at an upstream market, given that an
oligopsonist lacked market power at a downstream market, they should be compelled to

90

Some of lower court cases in the U.S. seem to be confused in this regard. See Balmoral Cinema,
Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1989). It said as follows;
“Based on the record before us, this claim may well be incorrect. The practice at issue does not
facially appear always or almost always to restrict competition, decrease output and raise prices.
Rather it may simply lower prices paid by exhibitors to distributors and hence indirectly to producers
in a market where the distributors and the producers have historically wielded great market power
over film products at the expense of exhibitors. Exhibitors, as purchasers of films, may be justified in
combating the market power of film suppliers by group action. Such action may lower prices to
moviegoers at the box office and may serve rather than undermine consumer welfare.” Id. at 316-317.
Although it could be the case that the expense which consumers shall bear would be lowered though
the group action taken by film exhibitors, it is not necessarily the case.
See also Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found, 888 F. Supp. 274 (D. Mass. 1995). In this case,
Addamax Corporation, a producer of security system for computer industry, filed the lawsuit against
Hewlett-Packerd and Open Software Foundation (“OSF”), alleging their violation of the antitrust laws
after the OFS selected to use Addamax’s competitor’s security system in its new operating system. Id.
at 277. The OFS was consisted of many of the major competitors in the market for computer system.
Id. The members competed each other in both the market for the input used for producing their
computer system and in the market for the sale of their finished product. Id. Addamax alleged that the
OSF was the illegal joint venture designed to influence the market for operating system technology. In
ruling on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court noted that “Lower prices usually
benefit consumers, and are not generally considered harmful to competition…For this reason,
agreements to set prices at below-market rates do not ordinarily give rise to antitrust injury…But,
when lower prices input prices do not produce lower prices to consumers, courts have found antitrust
injury in the presence of agreements to lower prices. This occurs when the colluding buyers possess
market power on a downstream market. Only with control of a downstream market can the
monopsonist decrease output and raise prices.” Id. at 280. However, the assumption that the
agreement to lower the price at an upstream market always benefits consumers at a downstream
market is not always true.
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sell their products at the competitive price, which means that consumers are unlikely to
benefit by oligopsony at an upstream market.
Provided that an oligopsonist has market power not only at an upstream
market but also at a downstream market, consumers at a downstream market are likely to
be harmed instead of being benefited. In order to analyze exactly what competitive
effects would happen, however, an economical analysis is also indispensable.
This article examines what happens to consumers at a downstream market
and society in both cases, a downstream market being competitive and dominated by an
oligopsonist.
(A) Downstream Market-Competitive
Although it is counterintuitive to consider that the fact that an oligopsonist
dominates an upstream market entails the conclusion that it also dominates a downstream
market, it still could face the competition at a downstream market. Given the import
goods similar to the final products provided by an oligopsonist and there are low barrier
of entry, even an oligopsonist is forced to compete with them.
An oligopsonist reduces their amount of input purchased and drives down
the price by the exercise of oligopsony power at an upstream market. Accordingly, the
quantity of final products at a downstream market supplied by an oligopsonist would
decrease. This reduction of supplies, however, does not affect a downstream market,
because, in a competitive market, even when one of market participants reduces its
supplies, other competitors substitute this reduction.
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Therefore, inasmuch as a downstream market is competitive, even if an
oligopsonist dominates an upstream market, consumers at a downstream market are not
likely to suffer from any damages.91
(B) Downstream Market- Dominated by an Oligopsonist at an Upstream Market
As indicated earlier in this article, provided that an oligopsonist at an
upstream market should dominate an upstream market, an oligopsonist is likely to collude
even at a downstream market level and thereby cause anticompetitive harm.

91

There could be a view that given that a downstream market was competitive, consumers will
always benefit since an oligopsonist at an upstream market will pass savings it obtain from supplier to
consumers. See Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d at 316. An oligopsonist, however, will sell the
final product at a competitive price determined under a competitive downstream market. It is
necessary to recall the basic principal explained earlier in this article that an oligopsonist would try to
adjust the quantity of input purchased until the marginal impact on the profit is zero, which lead to the
conclusion that output price (P) times Marginal Physical Product (“MPP”) is equal to the MFC,
putting it another way, P*MPP=MFC. The MPP is the change in the quantity of total product resulting
from a unit change in a variable input, keeping all other inputs unchanged and is found by dividing the
change in total product by the change in the variable input. As explained earlier in this article, since
the standard economic theory indicates that competitive firms produce at the point where output price
would equal the marginal cost of production, by dividing both side of the aforementioned equation by
MPP, we will obtain P=MC=MFC/MPP. As shown in Figure 1, since the MFC is lager in an
oligopsonized market, the MC for an oligopsonist, that is, MFC/MPP is actually larger than the MC
for a firm with no oligopsony power. Because the MC is what drives the firm’s output decision, an
oligopsonist actually will reduce its output below the level that a seller without oligopsony power will
select. As the aforementioned equation indicates, there is a good reason to assume that, rather than
passing its saving on consumers, an oligopsonist will increase the price of final products since the MC
goes up. Inasmuch as a downstream market is competitive, the demand curve an oligopsonist will face
is perfectly elastic, which means that the larger MC will cause the reduction of output quantity.
On the assumption that the industry has the perfectly elastic supply curve, which is realized in the
industry in which the cost of an additional unit of production is independent of quantity, this output
reduction at a competitive downstream market, however, will have no impact on the price determined
by competitive market because the competitors of an oligopsonist will easily substitute the reduced
quantity.
However, in the industry where the cost of producing more quantity of product is not constant but
instead increasing, the supply curve of the industry is upward sloping. Under this situation, when an
oligopsonist reduces its output, although the competitors would be able to substitute the reduced
quantity, the total average cost incurred by them would increase, thereby making the industry supply
curve shifting go upward. Therefore, under this situation, due to the output reduction by an
oligopsonist, the market price will increase.
As appeared in this analysis, different from the counterintuitive scenario, the reduction in the input
price is not passed on to consumers.
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As detailed later in this article, in National Macaroni Manufacture
Association v. Federal Trade Commission, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965), what the
macaroni factures attempted to do was to control the price paid for its primary inputs, that
is, durum wheat by agreeing to change their recipe and to use a blend of fifty percent
durum wheat and fifty percent of farina instead of using 100 percent durum wheat. Their
agreement would thereby cause anticompetitive harm to a society and consumers at a
downstream market. As the collusion at a downstream market in this case was used to
make the collusion at an upstream market effective, what is notable is that the collusion at
an upstream market is prone to cause the one at a downstream market.
This article would note that the competitive effects explained in this
section could happen even when an oligopsonist does not completely dominate a
downstream market but just posses market power. However, in order to simplify the
analysis, this article would like to examine the situation where a downstream market is
dominated by an oligopsonist hereinafter.
When an oligopsonist dominates not only an upstream market but also a
downstream market with an entry barrier, even if an oligopsonist reduces the quantity of
supplies at a downstream market, there are no competitors which substitute this reduction.
Therefore, so long as the proportion of a certain raw material of final
products is constant, the quantity of supplies of final products would decrease
automatically by the reduction of the quantity of input purchased by an oligopsonist,
because the amount of final products would be determined by the quantity of a certain
raw materials that an oligopsonist obtains from suppliers at an upstream market.
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Even when the proportion of a certain raw material of final products is not
constant, that is, there are substitutes for it, provided that an oligopsonist has market
power at a downstream market, one of two anticompetitive effects would emerge.
This article first considers what competitive effect will happen if an
oligopsonist decides not to maintain its production level.
Given that an oligopsonist manufactures the final goods, due to its market
power at a downstream market, the price it is going to set is a function of the number of
goods available for consumers. P represent for the price and G for the final goods.
P=P(G)
When an oligopsonist has market power at a downstream market, it will
find that it is facing a negatively sloped demand curve, that is, the price of final products
is a declining function of the quantity sold. That is,
dP(G)/dG<0
Also, on the assumption that an oligopsonist will produce its final products
by raw material (R) and machine (M), its profit function is,
Profit=P(G)*G-w(R)R-pM
Where w(R) is the unit price of a raw material that an oligopsonist
purchased at an upstream market, R is the quantity, p is the machine price.
In that case, an oligopsonist tries to expand its procurement of goods from
suppliers at an upstream market at the point where the marginal impact on profit is zero.
That is,
Price * MPP=MFC
Price is represented in
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P(G)+ dPG(G)/dG
Therefore, the aforementioned equation is transformed into
P(G)+dPG(G)/dG=MFC/MPP
or, in more familiar forms
MR=MFC/MPP
As clear from above, because the MR decline as the quantity increase, an
increase in the MC will lead to a decrease of an oligopsonist’s profit maximizing quantity
since firms with market power try to maximize its private profit so that the MC is equal
to the MR.
[Figure 2] Welfare Loss at a Downstream Market
Price
a
Marginal Cost 2
P2
b

Marginal Cost 1
(B)Deal Weight Loss

c

d

P1

(A) Transfer of Wealth
Demand

Marginal Revenue
Q2

Q1

Quantity
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Thus, in a downstream market where an oligpsonist has market power,
meaning that the demand curve is downward sloping as explained earlier, a decrease in
quantity will result in an increase in price.
These anticompetitive consequences on social welfare at a downstream
market can be understood with the aid of Figure 2.
Figure 2 demonstrates the relationship between a price and a quantity at a
downstream market dominated by an oligopsonist when an oligopsonist decides not to
maintain the quantity of final products.
When an oligopsonist reduce their input purchased from suppliers at an
upstream market, if it try to maximize their profit at a downstream market, they reduce
their quantity of supplies of final products from Q1 to Q2, the intersection of the marginal
revenue with supply (marginal cost)92 and the price increase from P1 to P2 because at this
point one further unit of production would generate greater expenses than income.93
The total social welfare will be reduced from the competitive potential by
an area (B), that is, bdc. This is the potential welfare gain to the society that is unrealized.
To put it another way, it is a decrease of social welfare that the society might have
enjoyed but for the exercise of market power by an oligopsonist and called the dead
weight loss.
The redistributive effects is that the consumer surplus having been enjoyed
by consumers now transfers an oligopsonist in the form of the producer surplus. (A) in
Figure 2, the area P1bcP2, represents this effects of oligopsonic behavior, depicting a
portion of what was consumer surplus in a competitive market that flows to the
92

E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND
PROCEDURE; CASES, MATERIAL, PROBLEM 55 (Lexis Nexis 5d ed. 2003) (1984).
93
Id. at 604.
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oligopsonist as producer surplus. The transferred wealth can be spent in a variety of ways.
It might be spent in a research and development so that an oligopsonist may become
more efficient than its rival at both an upstream market and a downstream market. On the
other hand, an oligopsonist might spend it sabotaging its rival’s plans or making false
advertisement about its products to maintainits market power.
In short, (A) in Figure 2 does not merely represent the wealth transfer
from consumers to an oligopsonist. To the extent that an oligopsonist has extra fund in
order to acquire market power at a downstream market, even an oligopsonist would not
benefit from (A) in Figure 2. If the transferred fund should be used in socially inefficient
way, (A) in Figure 2 is also dead weight loss.
What competitive effects will happened if the proportion of a certain raw
material of final products is not constant and an oligopsonist decides to maintain its
production level?
This articles has already made an assumption that a dollar’s worth of a raw
material purchased at an upstream market is not the same compared to other input, to put
it another way, the marginal products of input are not the proportional for their prices.
Under this assumption, it is possible for an oligopsonist to alter the bundle of inputs in
such a way as to substitute reduced input of a raw material purchased at an upstream
market while maintaining the same level of output of final products so long as the bundle
has not reached the level of least cost bundle, which is what a profit-maximizing firm will
choose.94

94

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 75, at 209. According to the equimarginal principle, if the firm
minimizing its cost for a given quantity of output, the additional output produced by a dollar’s worth
of any input it uses is the same. Given that MPx is the marginal product of input x and MPy for y and
P means price, it is possible to obtain:
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However, once reaching the least cost bundle level, an oligopsonist can no
longer substitute the reduced input for others to maintain production level. Despite this,
in order to maintain the production level, an oligopsonist has no choice but to select the
different quality of input for the substitution of reduced input, the price of which is the
same or cheaper.
Under this situation, the social cost to produce the same quantity of final
products is the same or less than the market not dominated by an oligopsonist.
But even when the new demand curve would be drawn to respond to that
different quality of product, consumers as a downstream market will not be better off.
This is because, although the demand curve for that different quality of products would
be lower than the original demand curve since the marginal value for that product would
reduce from the marginal value for the original product, consumer would suffer from the
possibility of lowered quality of final products.
In addition, provided that an oligopsonist has to incur additional costs to
transact with suppliers of different products for substitution, the MC of the final products
will increase, resulting in increasing the price of final products. Although an oligopsonist
never gets benefits because this is caused by inefficiencies in connection with its buying
inputs, consumers at a downstream market would suffer from the damages due to the
increase of prices and the decrease of quantity of final products.
Given that the new demand curve would not be formed for that different
quality of product, an oligopsonist would have to decide to reduce its output of final
products.

MPx/Px=MPy/Py
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To summarize, in either case, the proportion of a certain raw material in
the final products being constant or not, when an oligopsonist dominates not only an
upstream market but also a downstream market, a society consumers at a downstream
market would suffer from harm.
(3) Oligopsony and Procompetitive Effects due to Joint Purchasing
(A) Efficiency Obtained through Joint Purchasing
Not all joint purchasing are formed for exploiting buying power.95 In fact,
some of the joint purchasing does not result in exploiting buying power at all. In other
words, it must be distinguished joint purchasing from an exertion of oligopsony power.
Instead, some of the joint purchasing yields procompetitive efficiencies by doing business
on a large scale. Further joint purchasers can reduce their costs concerning warehouses
and storage by operating these functions jointly. This procompetitive effect attained by
joint purchasing has been recognized by the Supreme Court in the U.S.96

95

Blair & Harrison, supra note 51, at 336.
The efficiency attained through joint purchasing has been recognized in the Supreme Court
judgment in the U.S. See e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing
Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985). It said as follows; “Wholesale purchasing cooperatives such as Northwest
are not a form of concerted activity characteristically likely to result in predominantly anticompetitive
effects. Rather, such cooperative arrangements would seem to be "designed to increase economic
efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive…The arrangement permits the
participating retailers to achieve economies of scale in both the purchase and warehousing of
wholesale supplies, and also ensures ready access to a stock of goods that might otherwise be
unavailable on short notice. The cost savings and order-filling guarantees enable smaller retailers to
reduce prices and maintain their retail stock so as to compete more effectively with larger retailers.” Id.
at 295.
See also United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). In this case, a group of small
and medium sized supermarket chains combined to procure for and distribute to its members food and
nonfood items under Topco brand label in order to compete with the private brand of larger chains.
One element of their scheme was designation of territories within which the various sellers of Topco
brand would not compete each other. This market division was found to be a per se violation of the
section 1 of the Scherman Act. Id. at 608. Another possible objection to the arrangement in this case
could have been that it involved horizontal price fixing by buyers. In fact, horizontal price fixing was
necessary in order for member to enjoy the large scale purchases. Thus, rather than exercising market
power, the buyers should have simply combined their order in order to operate more efficiently.
However it should be noted that some of the recent lower court cases demonstrated its skepticism
96
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However, it should be noted that not all procompetitive effects
accomplished by joint purchasing has an externality, that is, effects on net cost or benefit
which a certain business activity imposes on market.97 Even when economic action has
been taken, some of them have only negligible effects on others through their effects on
the prices of goods or services. To put it another way, even when joint purchasing yields
procompetitive effects, what should be considered is those which have an externality,
since other than that has no effects on the price and quantity at an upstream market.
[Figure 3] Improved Productivity due to Joint Purchasing
Price
a

Marginal Social Cost
b

P2

c
Marginal Revenue Product 2
(after enhancement of productivity)

d
P1

Marginal Revenue Product 1
Q1

Q2

Quantity

Suppose that due to the efficiency attained by joint purchasing activities,
the quality of a products purchased from suppliers at an upstream market has been

about efficiency claim. See FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 345 U.S. App. D.C. 364 (2001). In this case, the
court rejected an efficiencies defense to rebut the presumptively anticompetitive merger.
97
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 75, at 517.
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improved, a technological externality happens or the productive capacity of an
oligopsonist to manufacture final products have been improved, to put in another way, an
oligpsonist has become able to produce more quantity of final products from the same
quantity of raw material.
Now, as explained earlier in this article, the MRP is
P*MPP
Also, MPP could be represented in
Increase of Total Quantity of Final Product/Increase of Total Quantity of Input Purchased
And the increase of total quantity of final product could be shown in
Efficiency*Production Capability*Capital Input98
Efficiency means how efficiently the firm could produce its final product,
production capacity means the capability of the facility of the firm to produce its final
product, and capital input means the capital spend to acquire necessary raw materials to
produce its final products.
Therefore, on the assumption that the productive efficiency to produce
final products is improved, the MRP shift upper right as shown in Figure 3 because joint
purchasers could expand their revenue from selling final products at a downstream
market by reducing the cost involved in manufacturing final products when a down
stream market is competitive.
As Figure 3 demonstrates, when the productivity of an oligopsonist has
been enhanced, both the producer and the consumer surplus will expand, making it
possible for both suppliers and joint purchasers to be benefited. Area P1cdP2 indicates

98

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 75, at 204.
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the expanded producer surplus. Likewise, the consumer surplus for an oligopsonist
expands from the area bP1d to the area acP2.
It should be noted, however, that procompetitive effects of joint
purchasing is not an automatic result of the exercise of oligopsony power. The exercise of
oligopsony power does not entail the procompetitive effects.99 Even when the efficiency
is attained, it might have been obtained absent the exercise of oligopsony power.100
Therefore, it can be said that it is up to the oligopsonist to link the use the oligopsony
power to the procompetitive effects.101
Also, even when joint purchasing activity by an oligopsonist yields
procompetitive effects, as explained above, they do not always improve the productivity
of final products. Absent the improvement of the productivity, even when some
efficiencies are achieved, suppliers and a society are not likely to benefit from them.
(B) Enhanced Efficiency and Oligopsony
Assume that joint purchasing yields procompetitive effects which entail
the improvement of the productive capacity of final products. Then, there could be the
conflict between enhanced productivity and an anticompetitive effect caused by
oligopsony.
Although whether or not the society would benefit would depend upon the
magnitude of the conflicting oligopsony power and efficiency effects,102 there would
emerge one of two situations, that is, anticompetitive effects exceeding procompetitive
effects and anticompetitive exceeded by procompetitive effects.

99

BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 66, at 343.
Id. at 340.
101
Id.
102
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 66, at 96.
100
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[Figure 4] Enhanced Productivity and Oligopsony
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When the anticompetitive effects swamp the productive efficiency, the
result is that both the social loss and the allocative efficiencies will emerge, whereby both
suppliers and a society will be harmed.103

103

In this regard, there are indication that whether or not the exercise of oligopsony power should
be prohibited or permitted under the situation where anticompetitive effects should swamp the
productive efficiency should be determined through a comparison between the social loss due to
oligopsony, to put it another way, the dead weight loss, and the expansion of consumer surplus by
joint purchasing activity. See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 66, at 98.
It is not appropriate, however, to admit the conclusion that an oligopsonist will be better off at the
sacrifice of suppliers and a society. Even when the expansion of consumer surplus is larger than the
dead weight loss due to oligopsony, admitting the aforementioned indication is equal to permitting
that an oligopsonist could be benefited at the sacrifice of suppliers and a society. Also, the
aforementioned indication ignores the transfer of wealth from suppliers to an oligopsonist, in other
words, the allocative inefficiencies. Even when the expanded consumer surplus is larger than the dead
weight loss, the allocative inefficiencies would cause social harm as explained earlier in this article.
Therefore, even when the exercise of market power will yield the enhancement of productivity,
inasmuch as anticompetitive effects excel productive efficiencies, it is appropriate to construe that
both suppliers and a society will be harmed.
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On the other hand, when the enhanced productivity swamps an
anticompetitive effect, the result will be the increase of quantity at higher price, that is, a
positive welfare effects as shown in Figure 4.
Prior to joint purchasing activity, the market equilibrium occurred at the
intersection of the MRP1 and the MSC (Supply). The price is P1 with quantity of Q1.
As a result of an enhanced productivity, the MRP curve moves from
MRP1 to MRP2. At the same time, a quantity would expand from Q1 to Q3 and
accordingly a price would become higher from P1 to P3. Oligopsony power is displayed
by the hither MFC curve. As a result of joint purchasing activity, the producer surplus
expands by the area P1cfP3 and the consumer surplus expands from P1cd to P2ba.
However, should an oligopsonist not exert market power, since the
quantity should have been determined from the intersection between the MSC curve and
the MRP2, a quantity should have been Q2 at the price of P2.
The outcome with Q3 and P3 is still superior in terms of social welfare
when compared to Q1 and P1.
However, O3 and P3 outcome cannot equate to the outcome where an
oligopsonist does not exert market power.104 The total social benefit enjoyed may be even
greater by prohibiting the use of oligopspny power, which can be said a potential loss to
the society.
Also, due to the exercise of market power, the producer surplus that
should have been enjoyed by suppliers absent the exercise of market power now transfers
to an oligopsonist in the form of consumer surplus. This transfer of wealth is represented
in the area P2efP3 in Figure 4. Because there is no guarantee that the transferred wealth
104

BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 66, at 97.
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will be used socially benefited way, this allocative inefficiency is also the potential loss
to the society.
In addition to the aforementioned short term anticompetitive effects,
although it is difficult to predict precisely, the long term anticompetitive effects would
also emerge.
Suppliers might lose their incentive to innovate a quality of their products
in the long run, since the procompetitive efficiency is accomplished by suppliers’ dealing
with an oligopsonist. Also, suppliers might lower the quality of their products in order to
expand their profit, because their profits will be artificially depressed by an oligopsonist.
In addition, as suppliers’ profits are reduced, their incentive to
manufacture would also diminish and they would curtail their supply in the future.105 This
reduction in supply entails adverse consequences for consumer welfare in the future.
If the price offered from an oligopsonist is set below average total cost,
some of suppliers may leave the market in the long run and the lower price would
discourage new suppliers entry into the market. Under the real world, suppliers’ leaving
from the market is not so likely because the interest of an oligosonosits are not served to
set the price so low that there is a long run exit of suppliers because this exit would alter
the balance of bargaining in favor of the remaining suppliers. But once it did happen,
competitive effects on social welfare would not be negligible.
In relation to the long term anticompetitive effects, the National Macaroni
Manufacture Association v. Federal Trade Commission, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965) is
worth getting attention.

105

Blair & Harrison, supra note 70, at 316. See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 75, at 118-120.It is
discussing how supply changes.
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In this case, the macaroni factures attempted to control the price paid for
its primary inputs, that is, durum wheat. During growing season, the maximum quantity
supplied by farmers of durum wheat could not respond to changes in quantity, meaning
that its supply was inelastic.
[Figure 5] Inelastic Supply and Oligopsony
Price
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Collusive Demand
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High-quality macaroni requires the use of 100 percent durum wheat,
which is easier for the manufactures to work with and yields a macaroni product that has
the most desirable cooking properties. In a normal situation, a crop damage of wheat
causes a shortage of durum wheat, which leads to rise of its price. In this case, however,
the manufactures of macaroni agreed to change their recipe and use a blend of fifty
percent durum wheat and fifty percent of farina. This change in recipe worsened the
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quality of final product and artificially depressed the demand for durum wheat, thereby
lowered the price.
In the absence of supply disruptions, the intersection of demand and
supply, which occurred at a price of P1 and a quantity of Q1 in Figure 5, determines the
free market equilibrium price and quantity of durum wheat. Due to major crop damage,
which forced to curtail the supply of durum wheat, for the growing season in question,
the maximum supply reduced to Q2 demonstrated in Figure 5. Absent collusion by the
macaroni manufactures, competition among them should have driven the price up to P2.
The court in this case said as follows:
The Supreme Court has held that price fixing is contrary to the
policy of competition underlying the Sherman Act and that its
illegality does not depend on a showing of its unreasonableness,
since it is conclusively presumed to be unreasonable. It makes
no difference whether the motives of the participants are good
or evil; whether the price fixing is accomplished by express
contract or by some more subtle means; whether the
participants possess market control; whether the amount of
interstate commerce affected is large or small; or whether the
effect of the agreement is to raise or to decrease prices…The
combination found in the instant case is illegal per se…We
hold that under the record as a whole there is substantial
support for the findings of Commission that the course of
industry action entered into by petitioners, in combination, to
unlawfully fix prices constituted a per se violation of Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Id. at 427.
When suppliers of durum wheat bumper crops, the supply may be so great
that the price will fall and the resulting profit are low. The antitrust law does not permit
suppliers to collude in order to pop up their prices and expand profits in the presence of
bumper crop. The court in National Macaroni Manufacture Association v. Federal Trade
Commission dealt with the flip side of the case and decided even when shortage of
supply due to crop failure boosted price, buyers must not collude to reduce those prices.

53

ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF B2B TRANSACTION: AKIRA INOUE

It should be noted that in a case where the supply of drum wheat is
inelastic, that is, the supply is fixed and reductions in the quantity are not possible in the
short run and the collusion by buyers will have little impact on quantity at the upstream
market in the short run, a social loss would emerge, which is demonstrated by the area
P2abc of Figure 5.
The area P2abc, which should have been enjoyed by suppliers but for
collusion by buyers, has completely lost from a society. Also, the area P1bc in Figure 5
shows the transfer of wealth from suppliers to buyers. As explained earlier in this article,
this allocative efficiency could be a social loss.106
Consumersat a downstream market could be harmed even in the short run.
In this case, the macaroni manufactures lowed the quality of their product in order to
reduce the price of their input at the upstream market, although the lowered quality is not
the logical consequence of their collusion.
The macaroni manufactures might argue that the diminution of the quality
of macaroni was caused by the shortage of durum wheat not by the exercise of
oligopsony power.
But the shortage of durum wheat does not necessarily entail the lowered
quality of macaroni. Some of the manufactures would choose to maintain the quality of
macaroni, while others might decide to lower the quality of macaroni. In this situation,
consumers will be able to enjoy the variety of choices of macaroni, that is, some are the
106

In this regard, see Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 291 U.S. App. D.C. 207, 939 F.2d
1035, 1043 (1991). The court said that "the only legitimate goal of antitrust is the maximization of
consumer welfare…there may be exceptions to the general rule; for example, a supplier's suit alleging
that a carrier has somehow unlawfully exercised monopsony power complains only of a wealth
transfer from the supplier to the carrier.” Id. at 1043. From this languages, it can be said that the court
in this case think that distributional significance on competition is the exception to find antitrust
damage.
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same quality with higher price and others are the lowered quality with higher, same or
lower price.
On the other hand, when the macaroni manufactures agree to lower the
quality of macaroni uniformly, the choices available to consumers will reduce. Also, the
standardization of buying of durum wheat would be a step toward production level
uniformity and consequently output price uniformity.
In addition, the suppliers of durum wheat may lose the incentive to durum
wheat in the long run and curtail their supply in the future, as their profits are reduced by
collusion, whereby consumers at a downstream market and a society will be harmed and
a social welfare will be decreased. This long term effects are also what the antitrust law
should prevent.
To summarize, it should be recognized that even in a case where supply is
fix and reductions in quantity are not possible in the short run, an oligopsonic behavior
would harm consumers and a society by reducing the suppliers’ profit both in the short
run and the long run.
How should we consider when enhancements of productive capacity
would be never attained absent the exercise of market power by an oligopsonist? The key
difference from the situation where enhancements of productive efficiencies are
separatable from oligopsony is that, under this situation, we cannot require an
oligopsonist so that it will yield only procompetitive effects.
Under this hypothesis, there would be no short term anticompetitive
effects, that is, social welfare loss and allocative inefficiencies, because we cannot
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assume the quantity would be determined from the intersection between the MSC curve
and the MRP2 with quantity of Q2 at the price of P2 in Figure 4.
However, despite the difficulty to predict, the aforementioned long term
anticompetitive effects would emerge even in this hypothesis.
To summarize, although joint purchasing activity may yield some kind of
procompetitive effects, what we should take into consideration is the effects which entail
the enhancement of the productive capacity of final products. And regardless of whether
or not this effects is never attained absent oligopsony, at least the long term
anticompetitive effects will almost always happen at an upstream market.
(C) Enhanced Efficiency and Oligopsony Effects on Consumers
When a downstream market is competitive, even when the anticompetitive
effects swamp the procompetitive effects, the quantity input purchased is reduced by an
oligopsonist at an upstream market and an oligopsonist diminish its supply of final
products, this reduction does not affect a downstream market, because, in a competitive
market, even when one of market participants reduces its supplies, other competitors
substitute this reduction.
Therefore, inasmuch as a downstream market is competitive, even if the
anticompetitive effects swamp the procompetitive effects, consumers at a downstream
market are not likely to suffer from any damages.
When an oligopsonist dominates a downstream market, consumers could
suffer from losses due to the decrease of a quantity of input purchased at an upstream
market in the form of reduced quantity of final products at higher price or lowered quality
and a society will be harmed, given that the anticompetitive effects swamp the productive
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efficiencies. In this case, both consumers at a downstream market and a society will
suffer from losses.
On the other hand, regardless of whether or not an oligopsonist dominates
a downstream market, when the productive efficiencies swamp the anticompetitive
effects, this procompetitive effects could be pass on consumers.
As explained before, an oligopsonist tries to expand its procurement of
goods from suppliers at an upstream market at the point where the marginal impact on
profit is zero.
Price * MPP=MRP=MFC
The above equations leads to
MR=MFC/MPP=MC
This means that when the MRP expands due to the productive efficiency,
the MR and the MC would decline. Although the exercise of oligopsony power entails
the hither MFC, when the productive efficiencies swamp the anticompetitive effects,
there could be the situation where the expansion of MPP is larger than the increase of
MFC. The MR declines as output expands, leading to the outcome that the lower MC and
the MR could result in an increase in an oligopsonist’s profit maximizing output at a
lower price. In this case, consumers could be better off due to the procompetitive effects
in spite of the anticompetitive effect due to oligopsony.
Therefore, regardless of whether or not an oligopsonist dominates a
downstream market, when productive efficiencies swamp the anticompetitive effect at an
upstream market, consumers and a society could be better of f at least in the short term.
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However, when the long term anticompetitive effects should happen at an
upstream market, that is, sellers’ leaving from the market, it could lead to the decrease of
the quantity of the products supplied to an oligopsonist, leading the increase of its total
coststo produce the fin al products. In that case, consumers could be harmed due to the
decrease of the quantity and the increase of the price of final products.
(4) Difference Between Oligopsony and All-or-Nothing Deal107
As explained above, in order to obtain the lower prices, an oligopsonist
must reduce the quantity of input purchased. It would be more desirablefrom an
oligopsonist’ s point of view if it could achieve the lowered prices without reducing the
quantity purchased. In an all- or-nothing deal, the collusive buyers realize the reduced
price by not buying less. In other words, the collusive buyers do not agree to reduce the
number of product they are going to buy from suppliers. Instead, the collusive buyers
agree to buy no fewer than competitive quantity but aggregate their purchasing and award
a single supplier a contract for their pooled purchases, in order to realize a lowered price,
108

because ordinarily, an all-or-nothing deal is not possible unless the collusive buyers

could push suppliers onto their all-or-nothing supply curve.
The all-or-nothing supply curve reveals the answer to the question of what
is the maximum quantity suppliers will make available at each price when the alternative

107

It has been pointed out that the powerful communication capacity of B2B can make it easier for
buyers to formulate and execute an all-or-nothing deal. See Levine, supra note 29, at 404. See also
Sam Kinney, An Overview of B2B and Purchasing Technology, (2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/b2b/comments/freemarketsinc.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). It mentions
concerning the internet auctions that “Unlike a traditional negotiation, though, an Internet auction can
achieve a high level of interactivity in a short period of time. It is not unusual to see more than 50 bids
and counter-bids within the span of an hour. This is far more interaction than a face-to-face
negotiation could obtain.” Id. at 34. In addition, it says that an internet auction can be over in just a
few hours, rather than the days and even weeks it can take to conduct face-to-face or phone-and faxnegotiation. Id. at 40. This feature makes it possible for buyers to process more work in less time.
108
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 66, at 73.
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is to sell nothing at all.109 By framing the question in this way, the collusive buyers seek
to extract all of the producer surplus, which makes the all-or-nothing supply curve lies
below the standard supply curve.110 Knowledge of the all-or-nothing supply curve
enables the collusive buyers to exploit its power by extracting the producer surplus.
Due to the term of this all-or-nothing deal, buying one more unit costs the
collusive buyers nothing more than the cost of that additional unit. This is one of the
major differences from oligopsony in which in order to buy one more additional unit, the
collusive buyers are obliged to pay not only the price of that additional unit but also the
cost of increasing the price of every unit of input they have already paid.111
[Figure 6] Oligopsony and All-or-Nothing Deal
Price
A
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Id.
Id. See also MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 16 (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.
1976).
111
Levine, supra note 29, at 404.
110
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As shown in Figure 6, the interaction of the normal supply curve with the
demand curve determines an equilibrium price and the quantity of competitive market
with Q1 at the price of P1.
In an all-or-nothing deal, the collusive buyers exert their market power to
push the suppliers off the traditional supply curve and onto the all-or-nothing supply
curve at the quantity of Q1, which is the privately optimal quantity for the collusive
buyers.112 The price actually paid falls from P1 to P2 without any reduction in the
quantity transacted.113
The economic effects of an all-or-nothing deal are also different from that
of oligopsony.
At an upstream market, with regard to the allocative inefficiency, like
oligopsony, the producer surplus is transferred to the collusive buyers.114
In Figure 6, under the competitive market, the consumer surplus is the area
AP1B with the producer surplus of the area P1BD. After imposing all-or-nothing
conditions on the suppliers, the collusive buyers increase their consumer surplus by the
area P1BCP2. The producer surplus diminishes from the area DBP1 to the area CDP2.
The area P1BEP2 is the transferred wealth from suppliers to the collusive buyers.
Although through an all-or-nothing deal, the producer surplus becomes the area P2CD,
the difference between the area DCE and the area P1BEP2 represent loss to suppliers.

112

BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 66, at 73.
Id.
114
See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 66, at 74. It should be noted that the allocative efficiency
could cause social harm. See also Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982). It
points out that “in the interest of consumer welfare, the antitrust laws should be concerned only with
improving allocative efficiency.” Id. at 87-88.
113
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With regard to a social welfare at an upstream market, however, an all-ornothing deal is a little bit different from oligopsony.
Contrary to oligopsony in which in order to buy one more additional unit,
the collusive buyers are obliged to pay not only the price of that additional unit but also
the cost of increasing the price of every unit of input they have already paid, in an all-ornothing deal, the collusive buyers have to paynothing more than the cost of that
additional unit in order to buy one more unit.
Further, when suppliers are charging the price above their marginal cost
level, like a monopolist, setting the price artificially high above the MC level, an all-ornothing deal could allow the collusive buyers to force the suppliers’ price down to the
marginal cost level by forcing suppliers onto their all-or-nothing supply curve. This
reduces the collusive buyers’ marginal cost, which is quite opposite from oligopsony
because oligopsonists reduce their purchase price but increase their marginal cost.115
Given that sufficient inputs are actually available for each buyer, it would be possible for
the collusive buyers in an all-or-nothing deal to purchase more input at lower cost.116
On the other hand, at a downstream market, the differences of economic
impact are significant.
Regardless of whether or not the collusive buyers have market power at a
downstream market, consumers could benefit more than they would have if the collusive
buyers have never colluded and had paid at suppliers’ price of above the marginal cost.117

115

Levine, supra note 29, at 404.
Id.
117
Jonathan M. Jacobson & Gary J. Dorman, Joint Purchasing, Monopsony, and Antitrust, 36
ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 20 (1991). It says that an all-or-nothing deal could “lead to an increase in the
input quantity, a drop in the output price and a rise in the output quantity-effects that are clearly
procompetitive.” Id. at 20.
116
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This is because in an all-or-nothing deal the collusive buyers’ marginal cost have been
lowered and they have incentive to pass such savings to consumers.118 This happens
regardless of whether or not the collusive buyers posses market power at a downstream
market because, in any case, the collusive buyers’ reduced MC could affect their prices to
consumers.
Therefore, it can be said that, at least in the short term, an all-or-nothing
deal could make it possible for the collusive buyers to continue the same production level
at a lower price for consumers at a downstream market.119
In addition, in an all-or-nothing deal, different from oligopsony, in spite of
the allocative efficiency which could cause a social harm, regardless of collusive buyers’
market power at a downstream market, consumer could benefit from the reduced
consumer prices.120
With regard to the long term anticompetitive effects, like oligopsony, an
all-or-nothing deal could cause a social harm.121
Suppliers may leave the market when their income from oligopsonist
remain below average total cost.122 The long term results harm the oligopsonist through

118

Competition Policy in E-Commerce, supra note 63, at 529. Mr. Rick Warren Boulton opined that
“the big difference is the way a monopsonist reduces the prices he pays is by buying less because he
drives the prices down by restricting his purchases, and you have the opposite effect if you have a
better procurement or a better bargaining. What you do is you buy more because you get a lower price,
so that one of the first obvious differences between monopsony and better bargaining is with
monopsony output goes down, and prices to consumers go up, and with better bargaining prices go
down, output goes up, and prices to consumers go down.” Id. at 529. From this opinion, it can be said
that Mr. Rick Warren Boulton thought that in an all-or-nothing deal consumers are likely to benefit
regardless of the market power of collusive buyers at a downstream market.
119
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 66, at 74-75.
120
Levine, supra note 29, at 405.
121
See James C. Lanik, Stopping the Tailspin: Use of Oligopolistic and Oligopsonistic Power to
Produce Profits in the Airline Industry, 22 TRANSP. L. J. 510, 529 (1995). See also BLAIR &
HARRISON, supra note 66, at 74.
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the exit of suppliers, the exodus ceases to serve the benefit of oligopsonists.123 As the
number of suppliers falls, a bargaining power shift to those who remains the market,124

122

See Lanik, supra note 121, at 529. See also Kartell v. Blue Shield, 749 F.2d 922, 923-924 (1st
Cir. Mass. 1984). In this case, a group of physicians challenged the pricing policies of Blue Shield,
which offered reimbursement on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Plaintiffs contended that the rates were set
so low that it would discourage an entry into the physician services market. The argument, if accurate
as empirical matter, could support the possibility of the long run anticompetitive effects due to all-ornothing deal.
It should be noted, however, suppliers would be able to stay in a market even if they are compelled
to sell below the average total cost level in the short term. In that sense, suppliers’ leaving from the
market would happen in the long term. The good example of the situation where supplier could
provide their goods below the average total cost level in the short term is the industry with unexploited
scale economics, where there is an excess capacity. Economies of scale are said to be exist when a
firm is producing on the negatively sloped portion of its average total cost curve. See FREDERICK M.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 81-102
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1980). Suppose that a firm could produce Q1 quantity of goods at an
average total cost of A1 and Q2 at A2 (Q1 is larger than Q2 and the average total cost curve is
declining at both Q1 and Q2.) and that a large buyer account for Q1-Q2 units of the total output sold.
If a large buyers leave from the market, suppliers will lose whatever profit they had been earning on
that buyer’s purchase. In addition, suppliers will lose their profit they had been earning on sales to
their other customers. In the event that a large buyers leave the market, the quantity provided by
suppliers will fall to Q2 and the average total cost will rise A2. As a result, the total cost of serving the
customers that remain at the market will rise by (A2-A1)*Q2. By taking advantage of this situation, a
large buyers may threaten suppliers to withdraw its business unless suppliers agree to the price equal
to the average total cost, that is, A1, or even below that level. This would mean no profits on the sales
to the large buyer, but suppliers would preserve all of the profits on the sales to other customers. In the
limit, the large buyer could require that suppliers agree to a price below cost such that the losses
incurred by suppliers would be to the gains which suppliers enjoy by dealing with the large buyers.
Although the buyer’s behavior seems abusive, it is socially desirable because an excess capacity
means that too many resources had been used the production, in spite of the fact that the section 2(f)
of the Robinson-Patman Act seems to be against this behavior. It says that “It shall be unlawful for
any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a
discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section.” When an excess capacity will be
eliminated and a large buyer come to dominate the market, dealing with it below the average total cost
means that supplier would gain nothing but only suffer from a substantial losses. At this point, the
demand from a large buyer would make suppliers leave from the market.
123
Lanik, supra note 121, at 529.
124
Blair & Harrison, supra note 70, at 319. This situation could lead to something like a bilateral
monopoly, which poses a different set of problem. The issue to be examined in its most prestine form
is whether collusion among buyers would be justified when they are faced by a monopolist on the
selling side of the market. Alternatively, the same issue should arise in the context of a collusive
monopoly facing monopsonist. In theory, a full-blown version of such a defense would permit
collusion designed to equal but not exceed the power of parties on the opposite side of the market
even when that power fell short of monopolistic or monopsonistic levels. See e.g., Richard Friedman,
Antitrust Analysis and Bilateral Monopoly, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 873, 891-916 (1986). From the stand
point of social welfare, the structural condition of a bilateral monopoly is preferable to either a
monopoly seller dealing with competitive buyers or a monopsony dealing with competitive sellers.
Should rival buyers take part in forces in response to a monopoly or rival sellers collaborate in
response to a monopsony, the quantity sold to consumers at a downstream market increases, which
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which might lead to the total output of the product at a higher price at an upstream
market.125
In a nutshell, in the long term, the society could be harmed through an allor-nothing deal.
As explained above, the difference from oligopsony is that there is no
social harm in the form of typical dead weight loss in an all-or-nothing deal.
At least one of the scholars seems to consider that this difference justifies
the different standard to be applied to an all-or-nothing deal.126

would benefit consumers and be consistent with the principal purpose of the antitrust law. See Blair &
Harrison, supra note 66, at 121.
Suppose that one unit of an intermediate good (X) is transformed into one unit of final good (Q).
The demand for the final good at a downstream market is downward sloping and the demand for the
intermediate good at an upstream market is derived from the demand from the final product market,
that is a downstream market. Assuming that the cost of transforming one unit of X into Q should be
constant, which is (Ct), we shall represent the average net revenue as a function of the quantity of X
employed. To put it another way, the average revenue can be shown that the demand for the final
product at a downstream market (Dq) minus Ct, which is respresented in Dq-Ct. With the monopolist
in the sale of Q, the hypothetical derived demand for X is the curve marginal to Dq-Ct (Dx). In other
words, Dx is the net marginal revenue product of input X. In addition, suppose that MRx is the curve
marginal to Dx and represents the marginal revenue associated with selling this intermediate good to a
final producer, that MCx is the marginal cost which would be the supply curve given that supplier of
X were to behave as a pure competitior, that AC denotes the upstream market’s monopolist’s average
cost of producing input X, and that MCFx would be the marginal factor cost of the input whose
intersection of the demand curve would determine the quantity of the intermediated good which
monopsonist purchases from competitive suppliers at an upstream market.
For the vertically integrated firm at an upstream market, the profit maximizing quantity would be
determined through the intersection of MCx with MRPx. In this case, the sum of producer and
consumer surplus is maximized at that quantity. In the absence of vertical integration, that is, in a case
of a bilateral monopoly, the quantity determined through this intersection will maximize the joint
profit. Id. at 116. It should be noted that the price is not a rationing device under condition of a
bilateral monopoly. Instead, the price of an intermediate good should be determined through the
negotiation between the two parties, which would be repeated, protracted and costly process. In other
words, the process of discovering and agreeing to joint profit maximizational quantity and price
through negotiation could mean that substantial transactional costs are incurred. Moreover, the
outcome of the negotiation between the two monopolist is hard to predict. In addition, it should be
taken the possibility into consideration that given that joint purchasers should be allowed to collude at
an upstream market they are more likely to collude in their selling the final product to consumers at a
downstream market. Id. at 123-124.
125
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 66, at 75.
126
Levine, supra note 29, at 405.
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However, as analyzed above, even in an all-or-nothing deal, an allocative
inefficiency will happen at an upstream market, which would cause harm to suppliers and
a society. Also, one of the apprehensions about monopsony (oligopsony) is that it might
cause sellers’ leaving from the market in the long run. This is a part of the reason why
monopsony (oligopsony) should be prevented to protect the competitive markets. In
terms of this effect, there are no differences between oligopsony and an all-or-nothing
deal.
Therefore, there are no needs to use the different standard to review its
illegality.127
(5) Difference Between Oligopsony and Collusion to Reduce the Price by Increasing the
Quantity of Input Purchased
As explained above, an oligopsonist achieves the lowered price by
reducing their quantity of input purchased and collusive buyers in an all- or-nothing deal
realize the reduced price by awarding single suppliers a contract for their pooled purchase
with buying no fewer than competitive quantity.
On the other hand, the collusive buyers might try to achieve the lowered
price by buying more than before. Same as in an oligopsony case and in an all-or-nothing
deal case, the collusive buyers exercise their market power but do not reduce their input
purchased to achieve lowered price.

127

Even the courts dealing with an all-or-nothing deal that understand maximizing a consumer
welfare to be the goal of the antitrust law do not distinguish an ologopsony from an all-or-nothing deal.
See e.g., Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80, 84 (3d Cir. Pa. 1973). From
this judgment, it can be said that this court did not find it necessary to apply the different standard to
apply to an all-or-nothing deal.
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This attempt would be successful when an externality accomplished
through joint purchasing lead to the lower MC for suppliers due to the reduced
transactional cost or an enhanced productive capacity of suppliers’ products.
As shown in Figure 7, the market equilibrium in a competitive market
occurs at the intersection of Supply 1 with demand curve, at the price of P1 and the
quantity of Q1.
[Figure 7]Collusion to Increase the Quantity of Input Purchased
Price
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When the collusive buyers exercise their market power to reduce the price
by increasing their quantity of input purchased from Q1 to Q2, given that the MC of
suppliers is reduced through their joint purchasing and that causes the supply curve to
shift from Supply 1 to Supply 2, the collusive buyers’ attempt would be successful and
cause the market equilibrium occurred at the price of P2 and the quantity of Q2.
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This result is due to the efficiency attained by joint purchasing activity, the
MC of collusive buyers does not go up. Thus, under this situation, not only at an
upstream market level but also at a downstream market level, no social harm will be
caused. When the expansion shown in the area BQ1Q2c in Figure 7 is larger than the
reduction shown in the areaP1ABP2 in Figure 7, a society and suppliers at an upstream
market will be better off rather than being harmed. Also, because the MC of the collusive
buyers could be reduced due to being able to purchase more quantity with lower price,
they would have an incentive to pass such a saving to consumers at a downstream market.
Also, the long term anticompetitive effects are not likely to occur because
the expansion is accomplished by the lowered MC of suppliers.
[Figure 8] The Market Spoilage and the Expansion
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Will the attempt by collusive buyers be successful even when an
externality accomplished through joint purchasing does not lead to the lower MC for
suppliers or no externality will occur?
It seems realistic to suppose that when the gains obtained through the
expansion shown by the areaBQ1Q2C in Figure 8 is smaller than the reduction shown by
the area P1ABP2 in Figure 8, collusive buyers’ attempt would be never successful. When
it is not successful, there will be no anticompetitive effects due to their attempt. But this
is not always the case.
Suppose that there are several suppliers at an upstream market.
Under this circumstance, the market spoilage due to the expansion shall be
borne by suppliers in proportion to their market share. On the other hand, suppliers will
be able to enjoy the whole expansion whose magnitude bears no relation to market
share.128 Because small suppliers bear the very little market spoilage effects, they are
likely to have an incentive to obtain the expansion effects. Given that this is the case, the
attempt by the collusive buyers would be successful. On the contrary, given that suppliers
have to bear a large portion of market spoilage effects, they have little incentive to cut
their price to enjoy the expansion, which means that the attempt by collusive buyers will
not be successful and cause no anticompetitive effects.
What anticompetitive effects will be caused when small suppliers reduce
their price?
Because small suppliers’ price reduction have only a small impact on the
market price, it is not so obvious to conclude that a social welfare loss will almost always

128

See CHARLES J. GOETZ, LAW AND ECONOMICS CASES AND MATERIALS 411-413
(West Publishing Co. 1984).
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happen like a typical oligopsony case. Also, they do not have to provide their products at
the price below the average total cost level, their leaving from the market is not likely to
occur.
To summarize, the difference between oligopsony and the collusion to
decrease the price by increasing their quantity of the input purchased is that the
anticompetitive effects are not likely to happen through the collusion or that at least it is
not so obvious to conclude that the anticompetitive effects will almost always happen like
a typical oligopsony case.
Therefore, there is a possibility for different standard to be applied in this
kind of collusion.
(6) Summary of Analysis
(A) The Typical Oligopsony Case
When joint purchasers have oligopsony power at an upstream market and
exercise it, the social welfare losses and allocative efficiencies will happen, whereby both
suppliers and a society will be harmed.
With regard to a downstream market, inasmuch as it is competitive, even
when anticompetitive effects would occur due to oligopsony, consumers would not suffer
from any damages.
When a downstream market is dominated by an oligopsonist, however, a
social welfare loss will happen and consumers will suffer from damages due to the
increased price and the decreased quantity of final products or being supplied with
different quality of final products from the ones provided absent oligopsony.
(B) Oligopsony with Procompetitive effects
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Although joint purchasing could yield procompetitive effects, in the
context of measuring competitive effects on an upstream market, only those effects which
could enhance the productive capacities of final products should be considered.
With regard to an upstream market, inasmuch as the enhancement of
productive efficiencies should be attained absent oligopsony, by the exercise of
oligopsony power, even when procompetitive effects should swamp the anticompetitive
effects, a social welfare loss, allocative inefficiency and the long term anticompetitive
effects will happen.
In addition, even when the enhancement of productive efficiencies is not
obtainable absent oligopsony and procompetitive effects should swamp the
anticompetitive effects, by the exercise of oligopsony power, allocative inefficiency and
the long term anticompetitive effects will happen.
With regard to a downstream market, inasmuch as it is competitive, even
when anticompetitive effects should swamp procompetitive effects at an upstream market,
consumers and a society at a downstream market are not likely to suffer from any harm.
Inasmuch as an oligopsonist dominates a downstream market, both
consumers and a society will be harmed when the anticompetitive effects excel the
productive efficiencies at an upstream market.
However, when the productive efficiencies swamp the anticompetitive
effect at an upstream market, regardless of whether or not oligopsonist dominate a
downstream market, at least in the short term, consumers and a society could be better off.
(C) All-or-Nothing Deal
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In an all-or-nothing deal, although the typical dead weight loss will not be
caused, an allocative inefficiency will happen at an upstream market, which would cause
harm to suppliers and a society.
Also, one of the apprehensions about monopsony (oligopsony) is that it
might cause sellers’ leaving from the market in the long run. In terms of this effect, there
are no differences between oligopsony and an all-or-nothing deal, that is, in an all-ornothing deal, the long term anticompetitive effects will emerge.
Therefore, there are no needs to use the different standard to review its
illegality.
(D) Collusion to Reduce the Price by Increasing the Quantity of Input Purchased
Different from oligopsony, the collusion to decrease the price by
increasing their quantity of the input purchased is not likely to cause anticompetitive
effects or at least it is not so obvious to conclude that the anticompetitive effects will
almost always happen like a typical oligopsony case.
Therefore, there is a possibility for different standard to be applied in this
kind of collusion.
IV. Analysis of Buyers’ Anticompetitive Agreements
As explained later in this article, under the Japanese Antimonopoly Law,
art. 2, para. 6. requires that, even when input of purchased has been reduced, absent
agreements among joint purchasers, their business activities would not be a violation of
the Japanese Antimonopoly Law. Therefore, this article examines the case in which
quantities of input purchased has been lowered through buyers’ agreements.129 As

129

The FTCJ says that given that there are appropriate precautions we can reduce the possibilities
of formation of price fix agreements among buyers. It adds that it is necessary to establish a measure
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discussed in Part III of this article, since buyers’ anticompetitive agreements could cause
competitive harm to suppliers, consumers and society, it is necessary to examine under
what standard both courts and antitrust agencies should deal with them. In Part IV, this
article analyzes legal responses to buyers’ anticompetitive agreements in the U.S. as well
as in Japan.
(1) Legal Responses to Buyers’ Anticompetitive Agreements in the U.S.
In the U.S., courts generally use one of two frameworks to examine if the
given business practice should be a violation of the section 1 of Scharman Act,130 which
makes all agreements of unreasonably restrain of trade unlawful. Two frameworks
adopted by courts are the per se analysis and the rule of reason. The distinction between
the per se analysis and the rule of reason is critical because traditionally the outcome of a
case has turned on the approach chosen by the court. Generally, an application of the rule
of reason means a decision for the defendant, and an application of the per se analysis, a
victory for the plaintiff.131
The per se analysis is the method which determines certain concerted
conduct deemed per se illegal. Such practices, because of “ their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they

to protect confidential information so that participants of B2B may not access the sensitive
information concerning competitions on a given B2B market, such as price and quantity, and that
given that participants dispatch its manager or employee to administrative companies of B2B market
place, careful examinations should be necessary because under this circumstance buyers are likely to
have an incentive to form a cartel agreement. See Consultation Case Concerning B2B, supra note 9.
130
15 U.S.C.S. (2004).
131
See e.g., Donald L. Beschle, “What, Never? Well, Hardly Never”: Strict Antitrust Scrutiny As
An Alternative to Per Se Antitrust Illegality, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 501-502 (1987); Joe Sims,
Developments in Agreements Among Competitors, 58 ANTITRUST L. J. 433, 435 (1989).
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have caused or business excuse for their use.”132 Such practice are justified when the
challenged practices “facially appeared to be one that would always or almost always
tend to restrict competition and decrease output…[not the] one designed to increase
economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive.”133 Although
an application of the per se rule saves limited resources at courts, it impedes more
elaborate examination on each case.
On the other hand, the rule of reason is the analysis which requires the
inquiry into whether an action constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade, unless the
challenged action falls into the category of agreements or practices which because of
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the
precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.134 In the rule of
reason, the collaboration’s procompetitive benefit is considered against its
anticompetitive harm to determine its overall effect on the competition.135 If it is
determined that a certain agreement evidences a likely competitive harm by its very
nature or an anticompetitive harm has already occurred,136 there are no need to make
further analysis into the nature of the agreement unless it would be verified that

132

See Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. at 289.
See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979). See
also National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). It said that
“[t]here are, thus, two complementary categories of antitrust analysis. In the first category are
agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of
the industry is needed to establish their illegality -- they are "illegal per se." In the second category are
agreements whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the
business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed.” Id. at 692.
134
Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. at 289.
135
Collaboration Guideline, supra note 30, at 10.
136
FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986).
133
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procompetitive effects do exist which could offset such an anticompetitive harm.137 In
spite of the anticompetitive harm to be occurred in the future, provided that such harm
have not yet happened or are not explicit by its nature of the agreement, elaborate
examinations will be required.138 Such examinations include studying any factors which
might cause or diminish anticompetitive harm, the total market share of the collaborators,
the incentive of the collaborators to compete each other139 and whether or not the entry
barrier exist.140 If the detailed market analysis failed to make anticompetitive effects of
certain agreements clear, no further examination is necessary. Given that anticompetitive
effects are found, an analysis is undertaken to determine whether or not the agreement is
necessary to achieve procompetitive benefits that could offset anticompetitive harm.141
Although an application of the rule of reason makes it possible more detailed review of
each case, it is also likely to lead to longer, more complicated trials and more ambiguous
outcomes. The classic formulation of the rule of reason includes a long list of factors that
might reveal the purpose or effects of agreement, but it assigns no priority or weight to
any particular factor.142 Even the recent Supreme Court cases failed to refine this open
ended formula.143 Both parties may be more inclined to prolong litigation because of the
rule of reason’s uncertain outcome.144 The increased use of the rule of reason is also said

137

Id. at 460-461.
Collaboration Guideline, supra note 30, at 11.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 22.
141
See id. at 12.
142
See Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). It considered such factors as
circumstances particular to the defendant’s business, conditions before and after the restraint, the
nature and purpose of the restraint, and the competitive effects of the restraint.
143
Continental T. V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). The court cited Justice Brandies’
formulation of “Board of Trade v. United States” without indicating the weight to be afforded
certain factors.
144
See Maxwell M. Blecher, The “New Antitrust” As Seen by a Plaintiff’s Lawyer, 54
ANTITRUST L. J. 43, 45 (1985).
138
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to lead to the federal court’s increased receptivity to economic arguments in antitrust
cases. Beginning in the late 1970s, the federal courts began to emphasize the economic
over the populist goals of antitrust. Several courts concluded that the antitrust
enforcement should be aimed at guaranteeing consumer welfare through lowered prices
and enhanced output rather than at such populist goals as the protection of small dealer or
fairness of the competitive process by relying on the academic writing of
commentators.145
Horizontal price fixing agreements are concerted action generally treated
under the per se rule.146 The Supreme Court stated that “[u]nder the Sherman Act a
combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing,
pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is
illegal per se.”147
In addition, the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act “does not
confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers. Nor
does it immunize the outlawed acts because they are done by any of these”148 and that
“[i]t is clear that the agreement is the sort of combination condemned by the Act...even
though the price-fixing was…by purchasers.”149 Examining the languages adopted by the

145

See Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. Ill. 1982).
See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979);
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); National Soc. of Professional
Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Association, 493 U.S. 411, 436 (1990). The court in Lawyers Association case said that “a
horizontal price-fixing arrangement -- a type of conspiracy that has been consistently analyzed as a
per se violation for many decades.” Id. at 436.
147
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
148
Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948).
149
Id. at 235. See also All Care Nursing Services Inc. v. High Tech Staffing Services Inc., 135
F.3d 740, 747 (11th Cir. Fla. 1998). It said that “price fixing is equally violative of antitrust laws
whether it is done by buyers or sellers is also undisputed.” Id. at 747. See also Todd v. Exxon Corp.,
275 F.3d 191, 201 (2d Cir. 2001). It stated that “a horizontal conspiracy among buyers to stifle
146
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Supreme Court, it can be said that it adopted the per se rule in price fixing agreement
among buyers.
In this regard, in Vogel v. American Soc. of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598 (7th
Cir. 1984), the court stated as follows:150
There are two exceptions to the principle that the only
horizontal price "tampering" that is illegal per se is the type
calculated to raise the market price above the competitive level.
First, buyer cartels, the object of which is to force the prices
that suppliers charge the members of the cartel below the
competitive level, are illegal per se…Just as a sellers' cartel
enables the charging of monopoly prices, a buyers' cartel
enables the charing of monopsony prices; and monopoly and
monopsony are symmetrical distortions of competition from an
economic standpoint.
Id. at 601.
Languages used above suggest that the antitrust legality of buyer’s
agreement should be exam
ined under the per se rule.

151

competition is as unlawful as one among sellers.” Id. at 201. See also United States v. Olympia
Provision & Banking Co., 282 F. Supp. 819 (S. D. N. Y. 1968). In this case, the court adopted the
per se rule to review uniform medium discounts that frankfurter distributors conspired to secure
from frankfurter manufacturers and noted that distributors’ price fixing agreement also invoked
conspiracy with manufactures to raise consumer prices.
150
See also American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219. In this case, there were only three sugar
refiners in northern California which agreed to pay uniform price to sugar beet. This agreement
effectively reduced the prices paid to sugar beet suppliers below the competitive level which might
have prevailed given that there were no agreement. The court said as follows;
“It is clear that the agreement is the sort of combination condemned by the Act, even though the
price-fixing was by purchasers, and the persons specially injured under the treble damage claim are
sellers, not customers or consumers. And even if it is assumed that the final aim of the conspiracy was
control of the local sugar beet market, it does not follow that it is outside the scope of the Sherman Act.
For monopolization of local business, when achieved by restraining interstate commerce, is
condemned by the Act.” Id. at 235-236.
See also United States v. Portac, 869 F. 2d 1288, 1291 (9th Cir. 1989). In this case, the court
affirmed that a conspiracy among buyers to rig bidding for lumber violate section 1 of Sherman Act
by applying the per se rule. Id. at 1291.
151
However it has been pointed out that courts in the U.S. have not distinguished monopsony
(oligopsony) agreements from all-or-nothing deal agreements in terms of the standard to apply. See
Levine, supra note 29, at 421. In this regard, see Anderson v. Shipowners Association, 272 U.S. 359,
361-362 (1926). In this case, shipowners fixed seamen’s wages and required seamen who wanted to
work to register, receive a number and to wait his turn. When a seaman’s turn came up, he must take
the employment offered or none. Although this was a typical all-or-nothing deal case, the court in this
case did not distinguish it from monopsony (oligopsony). Id. at 361-362.
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However, there are some cases where a literally horizontal price fixing
agreement was not examined under the per se rule. The Supreme Court stated that “in
characterizing this conduct under the per se rule…our inquiry must focus on whether the
effect and...purpose of the practice are to threaten the proper operation of our
predominantly free-market economy -- that is, whether the practice facially appears to be
one that would always or…almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output,
and in what portion of the market, or instead one designed to "increase economic
efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive”152 and that “[n]ot all
arrangements among actual or potential competitors that have an impact on price are per
se violations of the Sherman Act…Mergers among competitors eliminate
competition…but they are not per se illegal, and many of them withstand attack under
any existing antitrust standard. Joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements are also
not usually unlawful…where the agreement on price is necessary to…market the product
at all.”153 Further the Supreme Court noted in the case where restriction on ability to
compete in terms of price had been focused on that “despite the fact that this case
involves restraints on the ability of member institutions to compete in terms of price and
output, a fair evaluation of their competitive character requires consideration of the
NCAA's justifications for the restraints”154 and that “analysis of this case under the Rule
of Reason, of course, does not change the ultimate focus of our inquiry. Both per se rules
and the Rule of Reason are employed "to form a judgment about the competitive
significance of the restraint.”155

152

Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. at 19-20.
Id. at 23.
154
National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984).
155
Id. at 103.
153
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In addition, some lower courts adopted the rule of reason to review a
buyers’ price fixing agreement in special circumstances. The Tenth Circuit Court adopted
the rule of the reason test in its review of buyers’ agreement, in spite of the fact that the
agreement was ” the type of naked horizontal agreement among competitive purchasers
to fix prices usually found to be illegal per se.”156 Also, it said that “because horizontal
agreements are necessary for sports competition, all horizontal agreement among NCAA
members, even those as egregious as price-fixing agreement, should be subject to a rule
of reason analysis.”157 Further, the Second Circuit Court determined that buyers’ pricefixing agreement should be examined under the rule of reason not the per se rule.158 In
Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 7 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D. Mass. 1998), the court
determined that “agreements of this sort impose unreasonable restraints on competition,
and therefore, again as a general matter, they are subject to per se
condemnation…significant exception to this general proposition has been recognized
where the horizontal agreement has the characteristics of a joint venture and where it has
as its purpose and effect an efficient or procompetitive outcome. In such cases, horizontal
arrangements have been analyzed under a rule of reason.”159

156

Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1017 (10th Cir. Kan. 1998).
Id. at 1018-1019.
158
Medical Arts Pharmacy, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 675 F.2d 502, 506 (2d Cir. Conn.
1982).
159
Id. at 77. See also Westchester Radiological Associates P.C. v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 708, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). It said that “if the alleged restraint may be
necessary to achieve a pro-competitive result, a court should test the restraint by the rule of reason.
The restraint here is not clearly anticompetitive, and may be necessary to achieve a pro-competitive
result.” Id. at 710. See also City of Long Beach v. Standard Oil Co., 872 F.2d 1401, 1405(9th Cir. Cal.
1989). It said that “[o]n their face, the three-cut exchanges cannot be held to have a single purpose of
stifling competition. As explained below, the exchanges have other justifiable purposes, and so should
be scrutinized under the Rule of Reason.” Id. at 1405. See also Reid Bros. Logging Co. v. Ketchikan
Pulp Co., 699 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. Wash. 1983). In this case, the defendants refused to make a timber
deal or transaction of logs marketed by independent loggers as a part of the scheme to reduce their
cost of timber acquisition. It is argued by the defendants that coordinated action is the only way to
157
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As described above, it can be said that principally the courts in the U.S.
have applied the per se rule to buyers’ price fixing agreement160 and given special
circumstances, exceptionally it adopted the rule of reason instead.161

preserve the Alaskan logging industry in the face of government regulation. The court professed to
apply the rule of reason standard to this monopsonistic behavior. Id. at 1296. See also In re Beef
Industry Antitrust Litigation, 907 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. Tex. 1990). This case involved a lawsuit by
various sellers of beef against beef packers, beef retailers, and the publisher of a commodities price
reporting services. The court said that “an oligopsonist that is satisfied with its market share could
form an alliance with other oligopsonists in the relevant market and attempt to depress prices and
increase profits.” Id. at 515. The court acknowledge that evidence that beef cattle price had remained
stable at low level supported the cattle producer’s allegation that the packers were conspiring to
depress prices and retain market share. Id. at 516. In addition, the court focused on whether the cattle
producers’ evidence of pricing collusion and information exchange was conclusively indicative of
agreement. Id. at 516. As explained above, the court in this case did not adopt the per se rule. The
court ultimately rejected the plaintiff’s claims. However, this may have had more to do with the
plaintiff’s litigation strategy than with the defendant’s behavior. The court suggested that the
plaintiff’s theory was tenuous because the plaintiffs presented claims against only two of the four
dominant packers in the relevant beef market. Id. at 516. The court described how collusion between
only two major participants in a market dominated by four firms would actually lead to a decline in
the market share of the colluding parties. Id. at 516. Although the court’s analysis is correct as far as it
goes, the court failed to recognize the potential for parallel action among all four packers. The
agreement mechanism claimed by the plaintiffs was information sharing through prices published in a
national journal. Id. at 512. This would indicate that the plaintiffs in Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation
case lost their case not for lack of antitrust injury but for poor litigation strategy. Regard with this case,
see Dowd, supra note 63, at 1004-1110. It analyzed this case to support its conclusion that quick look
approach should be applied to oligopsony case.
160
Some of the scholars are opposing to the idea that principally the per se rule should be applied to
buyers’ price fixing agreement. See Blair & Harrison, supra note 51, at 331. Further it explained that
“[p]ricing agreements among buyers should be regarded as per se unlawful unless the buyers are able
to offer colorable arguments that: (1) The horizontal agreement is necessary to achieve some
productive efficiency; (2) A price agreement is required to achieve the claimed efficiency; and (3) the
exertion of monopsonistic buying power to force prices below market levels is required to achieve the
procompetitive efficiencies.” Id. at 342.
161
See United States v. Capitol Service, Inc., 756 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. Wis. 1985). In this case, the
court said as follows; “In NCAA, the Court also applied the Rule of Reason to a horizontal agreement.
The Court noted, however, the unique circumstances which called for the application of the Rule of
Reason rather than the per se rule…What is critical is that this case involves an industry [college
football] in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at
all. Neither of the characteristics unique to blanket licenses or to college football are present in split
agreements. Split agreements do not create a new product and horizontal agreements are not essential
to the existence of the movie industry.” Id. at 506.
According to BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 66, at 99-103, the ancillary restraints doctrine
should be applied to the efficiency producing buying agreements. It says that “Application of that
doctrine suggests that the pricing practices of the cooperative should be treated as per se unlawful
unless the buyers are able to offer colorable argument that (1) the horizontal argument is necessary to
achieve some productive efficiency, that (2) a price agreement is required to achieve claimed
efficiency and that (3) the exertion of monopsonistic buying power to force prices below market level
is required to achieve the procompetitive efficiency.” Id. 102-103.
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(2) Legal Responses to Buyers’ Anticompetitive Agreements in Japan
(A) Court Cases and Recommendations at the FTCJ
The buyers’ agreements to drive down the price though B2B, as far as
the Japanese Antimonopoly Law is concerned, would be a violation of the
prohibition on an unreasonable restraint of trade.162 Although there are several
162

Art. 2 para. 6. When the FTCJ found a violation, according to the law, art. 7. para. 1, it may
order the entrepreneur concerned to cease and desist from such acts, to transfer a part of his business,
or to take any other measures necessary to eliminate such acts in violation of the said provisions. In
addition, the para. 2. says that the FTCJ “may, when it finds it particularly necessary, even when an
act in violation of the provisions of article 3 [prohibition of private monopolization or unreasonable
restraint of trade] has already ceased to exist, order the entrepreneurs concerned, in accordance with
the procedures as provided for in Division II [procedures], Chapter VIII, to take measures to publicize
that the said act has been discontinued and order any other measures necessary to ensure elimination
of the said act: Provided, That the foregoing shall not apply to cases where one year has elapsed since
the date of discontinuation of the said act without recommendation being given to the entrepreneur
concerned or without the hearing procedures being initiated with respect to the said act.” Further,
when the FTCJ find a violation of the law, it is obliged to denounce it to the Prosecutor’s Office. The
law, art. 73. says that the Fair Trade Commission shall, when it considers that a crime violating the
provisions of this Act exists, file an accusation with the Public Prosecutor General and that the Public
Prosecutor General shall, when he has taken measures not to prosecute in a case which is the subject
of an accusation under the provisions of the preceding subsection, without delay, submit to the Prime
Minister through the Minister of Justice a written report stating the said fact and reasons thereof. The
criminal sanction on a price fixing agreement is codified in the Japanese Antimonopoly Law, art. 89,
which says that any person committing one of the following offenses shall be punished by penal
servitude for not more than three years or by a fine of not more than five million yen: (i) Any person
who, in violation of the provisions of article 3 [prohibition of private monopolization or unreasonable
restraint of trade], effected private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade; (ii) Any person
who, in violation of the provisions of article 8(1) [prohibited acts of a trade association] (i), effected
substantial restraint of competition in any particular field of trade. Moreover, the law, art. 95.
stipulates that when a representative of a juridical person, or an agent, an employee or any other
person in the service of juridical person or of an individual has, with regard to the business or property
of the said juridical person or individual, committed a violation as provided for in each of the
following paragraphs, the said juridical person or the said individual shall be punished by such fine as
provided for in the said paragraphs in addition to the punishment of the offender and that, with regard
to the article 89 [penalties against private monopolization or unreasonable restraint of trade, or
substantial restraint of competition by a trade association], fine of not more than 100 million yen.
Until 1991, there were only few cases which the FTCJ denounced to the Prosecutor’s Office. After the
meeting between the government of the U.S. and that of Japan, the criminal accusations from the
FTCJ has increased, which has been said to be at the rate of one cases in two year. Until now, in most
of criminal cases, the defendants were convicted with suspention of execution and there are no cases
with sentence of inprisonment without suspention of execution. See Noriyuki Nishida,
Dokusenkinshihohniokeru Keijibatuno Kyokanituite [The Strengthening of the Criminal Sanction to a
Violation of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law], 13 KEIZAIGAKKAI ANNUAL REPORT 71, 73-75
(1992). In addition, the FTCJ had adopted the strict principle of territorial jurisdiction in applying the
law, art. 2, para. 6. See Nihonyuhsen, 19 SINKETUSHU 57 (FTC, Aug. 18, 1972). In this case, the
FTCJ said that the Japanese Antimonopoly Law should not apply to the agreements concluded outside
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of Japanese jurisdiction. It should be noted, however, that the referee at this hearing expressed its view
that, concerning agreements concluded in Japan, inasmuch as the service of delivery is completed to
the place of business or office, the law should apply to foreign corporations involved in such
agreements but that the service of delivery to agencies and outlets of such foreign corporations located
in Japan should not be admitted because agencies and outlets are not the place of business or office.
Provided that the referee added that given that the FTCJ proved that the agencies or outlets of foreign
corporations in question were invested with receiving delivery of the notification by their head office
or that the delivery had been ratified, the delivery to the agencies or outlets should become effective.
In this regard, the Supreme Court in Japan said in the case not concerning antitrust in relation to the
interpretation of the place of business or office that the outlet of Malaysia Airline located in Tokyo
could be the place of business or office and that the service of delivery to such a place was valid under
the Code of Civil Procedure. See Malaysia Airline System Berhad v. Goto, 35 MINSHU 1284 (Sup.
Ct. Oct. 16, 1981). (Although the disposition of this particular case has been basically supported in
Japan, the reasoning of the Supreme Court judgment was severely criticized. See Hideyuki Kobayashi,
Kokusaisaibannkankatu to Malaysia Koku Jikenhanketu [International Judicial Jurisdiction and the
Malaysia Airline Decision], 26 HOUGAKU SEMINER 20, 24 (1982). Most of the criticism focused
on the Supreme Court’s holding that the logical reason might lead to confer Japanese judicial
jurisdiction over the defendant when any cause of jurisdiction stipulated in the Code of Civil
Procedure. See Morio Takeshita, Note, 637 KINYU SHOJI HANREI 49, 53 (1982). See also Takao
Sawaki, Saiban Kankatuken Saiko [Judicial Jurisdiction Revisited], 9 KOKUSAI SHOJI HOMU 611,
612-614 (1981). Responding to overwhelming criticisms, lower courts in the post Malaysia Airline era
have modified the Supreme Court’s standard by allowing an exception to its literal application. See
Mukoda v. Boeing, Co., 1196 HANREIJIHOU 87 (Tokyo Dis. Ct. Jun. 20, 1986). Regard with
evaluation concerning the creation of exception of the Supreme Court judgment, see Hideyuki
Kobayashi, Kokusai Sosho Kyogo [International Parallel Litigation], 525 NBL 34, 35 (1993); Koichi
Inoue, Kokusaiteki Nijusosho wo Meguru Saikinno Dohkoh [Trend of Recent Case Law Concerning
International Duplicative Litigation], 21 KOKUSAISHOJIHOMU 403, 405 (1993). ) Based on this
judgment, it had been said that there were possibilities that the FTCJ would change its interpretation
of the place of business and office to construe that the service of delivery to agencies or outlets of
foreign corporations located in Japan is valid under the Japanese Antimonopoly Law. In fact, the
FTCJ implied in its public deliverances that there would be the possibility for the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law to be applied to the foreign corporation involved in a cartel aiming at market
within Japanese jurisdiction but that in order to do so the amendment of the law should be more
appropriate. Following the Supreme Court judgment and the public reliverance above, in 2002, the
Japanese Antimonopoly Law was amended so that the FTCJ may use the service of delivery by
notification, which was codified in art. 69-4. In spite of the fact that the FTCJ has not changed the
strict principle of territorial jurisdiction entirely and there have been no cases where the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law was applied to parties located outside of Japanese jurisdiction, based on this
amendment, given that business activities were construed to have been made in Japanese jurisdiction,
it would be greater possibility that the Antimonopoly Law should apply to foreign corporations. With
regard to the responsibility for restitution, art. 25. of the law says that any entrepreneur whose act has
infringed in violation of art. 3, 6 or 19 of the law and any trade association whose act has infringed in
violation of art. 8(1) shall be liable to indemnify the person injured no entrepreneur and trade
association may be exempted from the liability as prescribed in the preceding subsection by proving
non-existence of willfulness or negligence on his part on the condition that the recommendation,
consent or final decision at the FTCJ has become final and conclusive. As clear from the language
above, art. 25. of the law shifts the burden of proof to the defendant’s side to verify non-existence of
willfulness or negligence, quite contrary to the general tort claim under the Civil Code of Japan, art.
709. Most of the civil cases seeking the compensation for the damage, however, have been filed not
under art. 25. of the law but as general tort claim. See Masahiro Murakami, Dokusenkinshihou
Ihannituiteno Tokubetuno Songaibaishoseidonoigi [The Significance of the Special Restitution System
Concerning Violation of the Antimonopoly Law], 959 HANREITIMES 4, 4-8 (1998). There have been
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recommendations at the FTCJ which dealt with joint purchasing,163 there have been
no cases at courts nor recommendations at the FTCJ which treated buyers’
anticompetitive agreements.
Therefore, as shown later, it is necessary to examine the general
interpretation of specific article concerning the prohibition on an unreasonable
restrain on trade in the Japanese Antimonopoly Law.
(B) Guidelines by the FTCJ
Although a guideline by the FTCJ has no binding power over courts
and is just a precept which the FTCJ uses to demonstrates its antitrust policy, it has
been used in practice as important materials in antitrust cases at Japanese courts. In
addition, since there have been no cases in Japan which dealt with neither B2B nor
buyers’ anticompetitive agreements, in order to grapes the tendency at both courts
and the FTCJ, it would be quite important to examine guidelines by the FTCJ.
The descriptions in the guidelines named Antitrust Guideline
Concerning Business Activities by a Body of Businesses in 1995 is the first time that

produced several explanations on the castration of art. 25, one of which is that since after the decision
at the FTCJ the prima facie inference can be drawn from it and there are no special effects in the law
concerning a lawsuit under art. 25 such as the tremble damage, there is no incentive for anyone to use
art. 25. Further, in Japan, the number of the civil litigation seeking the reimbursement is not large
despite art. 248 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which eased the difficulty of proving the amount of
damage in tort claim. This trend demonstrates that still the verification of the damage is the big hurdle
for the plaintiff.
163
See e.g., Himejisikankogyo, available at http://sink.jtfc.go.jp/pdfdocs/H120510H2J025.pdf
(FTC, May 10, 2000) (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). In this case, plumbers formed the association to
administer their businesses and negotiate their purchase of raw materials from suppliers. In order to
implement its policy, the association forced suppliers not to sell raw materials directly to associates.
The FTCJ determined that such an arrangement was a violation of article 19 of the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law because the association purchase the raw materials on the condition that suppliers
accept the unfair policy which bind their business activities unfair way. The FTCJ focused on the
anticompetitive conditions imposed on the suppliers by the association and no consideration has been
done on the joint purchasing activities themselves.
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the FTCJ publicized its view about joint purchasing.164 It said “for example, in joint
selling of commodities or services, purchasing, and joint manufacturing, an antitrust
apprehension will be caused, since the price and quantity of products and services
would be determined through mutual understanding among businesses and
businesses are likely to have an incentive to form cartels” and that “on the other
hand, other kind of joint businesses, such as joint study and utilization of
transportation are not likely to raise antitrust illegalities because these kind of
business activities themselves have no effect on price and quantity. Provided that
participants of these joint businesses, however, should be made carefully so as not to
restrain free competition as a result of their communications through business.” 165
The FTCJ developed this basic framework and presented its policy in
the guidelines named Consultation Case Concerning B2B on November 8, 2000.166
In this guideline, the FTCJ pointed out that several antitrust concerns: First, in B2B
transaction there might be an unreasonable restriction on trade; Second, participants
of the market tend to restrict competitions through easy web-based communications
among sellers or buyers; Third, given that participants are obliged to buy anything
on B2B such a conduct might be a violation of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law as
an unreasonable restrain of trade; and Fourth, given that a procurement of raw
materials on the B2B market places should be indispensable for participants, a
foreclosure from the markets might be a violation of the Japanese Antimonopoly
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The Fair Trade Commission in Japan,
Jigyoshadandaikatudonikannsurudokusenkinshihojonosisin [The Antitrust Guideline Concerning
Business Activities by a Body of Businesses], Section 2-11 (1995), available at
http://hrsk.jftc.go.jp/dk/View_SVG.asp?page=249 (last visited Dec. 12, 2004).
165
Id.
166
Consultation Case Concerning B2B, supra note 9.
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Law.167 Especially, it should be noted that the FTCJ examined competitive effects on
markets of both raw materials and final products, namely an upstream market and a
downstream market,168 which was the first time for the FTCJ to examine the two
kinds of market places. Further, the FTCJ pointed out that given that certain raw
materials have a large proportion in final products, joint purchasers which bought
such raw materials are likely to collude and lower the input purchased.169 As to
downstream markets, the FTCJ said that provided that joint purchasers have market
power at downstream markets and certain raw materials purchased by joint
purchasers should be indispensable elements of final products, the price of final
products is likely to be the same among joint purchasers.170
The FTCJ adopted the same way of analysis, namely analyzing both
an upstream market and downstream market, in the guidelines issued in March 27,
2001.171 In this guideline, the FTCJ commented on the consulted case where several
competitors jointly purchased raw materials from several suppliers at real
marketplaces. In this case, the FTCJ found the following facts: 1. The purpose of the
joint purchasing is to cope with the serious depression by decreasing the procuring
cost of raw materials and advancing compatibility of their components; 2. The
components they are going to purchase jointly was not developed by them but by
specialized manufacturers; 3. The negotiation is to be done with several
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Id.
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
The Fair Trade Commission in Japan, Jigyoshakatudonikansurudodanjireishuu [Consultation
Cases Concerning Business Activities], 30-32 (2001), available at
http://www.jftc.go.jp/pressrelease/01.march/010327.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2004) [hereinafter
Consultation of Business Activities].
168

84

ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF B2B TRANSACTION: AKIRA INOUE

manufacturers after examining several estimates and reviewing the price,
competency of the manufacturers, and quality of the products; 4. The proportion of
the dealing by suppliers with their joint purchasers is less than 1%; 5. The proportion
of the components purchased in final products is from 7% to 8%; and 6. When other
competitor might want to participate in joint purchasing, there are no restrictions on
it.172 Based on aforementioned fact-finding, the FTCJ expressed its view: 1.
Generally speaking, when joint purchasers have large shares at downstream markets
and the proportion of the raw materials in the final products is large, or when the
proportion of their purchasing of raw materials in the total demand for them is large,
there would be an antitrust apprehension; 2. In this case, there would be no antitrust
violation as far as the downstream market is concerned, because the proportion of
the components purchased at the upstream market in final products is only from 7%
to 8%, they will produce and advertise their final products separately at the
downstream market, and there are several competitors which has large market share
in the downstream market but have not participated in the joint purchasing; 3. In this
case, there would be no antitrust violation as far as the upstream market is concerned,
because the raw materials are multipurpose products and the suppliers’ dependence
on joint purchasers is not so high.173 The FTCJ concluded that there are no antitrust
problems in this consultation case.174
The FTCJ adopted the same framework explained above, that is,
analyzing both an upstream market and a downstream market, in the guidelines
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Consultation of Business Activities, supra note 171, at 30-31.
Id. at 31-32.
174
Id. at 32.
173
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issued on July 5, 2001.175 It can be said that this way of examination has been wellestablished way of analysis at the FTCJ.
(3) Interpretation of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law
As explained earlier in this article, buyer’s agreements to drive down the
purchasing price though B2B would be a violation of the prohibition on unreasonable
restraint of trade under the Japanese Antimonopoly Law. The Japanese Antimonopoly
Law, art. 3. says that no entrepreneur shall effect private monopolization or unreasonable
restraint of trade. With regard to "unreasonable restraint of trade," the law, art. 2, para. 6.
clarifies its definition and says that it shall mean “such business activities, by which any
entrepreneur, by contract, agreement or any other concerted actions, irrespective of its
names, with other entrepreneurs, mutually restrict or conduct their business activities in
such a manner as to fix, maintain, or increase prices, or to limit production, technology,
products, facilities, or customers or suppliers, thereby causing, contrary to the public
interest, a substantial restraint of competition in any particular field of trade.” In Japan,
the condition of “in any particular filed of trade” is always construed in connection with
the condition of “substantial restrain of competition” and has no independent
significance.176 Therefore, in order to determine certain business activities as
“unreasonable restrain of trade”, principally three conditions, namely, (1) substantial
restraint of competition in any particular field of trade, (2) mutually restrict or conduct
their business, and (3) against public interest must be met. This article reviews these three
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The Fair Trade Commission in Japan,
Risaikurutounikakarukyodonotorikunikansurudokusennkinnsihouounosisinn [Antitrust Guideline
Concerning Joint Activities on Re-use of Resource], Section1-1 (2001), available at
http://hrsk.jftc.go.jp/dk/View_HTML.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
176
MASAHIRO MURAKAMI, DOKUSENKINSHIHOH [THE JAPANESE ANTIMONOPOLY
LAW] 69 (Hirobundou 2000) (1996).
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conditions separately. First, this article provides the general interpretation of “substantial
restrain of competition in any particular field of trade” of the Japanese Antimonopoly
Law, art. 2, para. 6.
(A) The Interpretation of “Substantial Restrain of Competition in Any Particular Field of
Trade”
Generally, “substantial restraint of competition” means that a competitive
function at a given market is substantially restrained or that an important function of a
given market is lost.177 More precisely, the Tokyo High Court178 made the definition of a

177

Id.
Tohoh Co. v. Fair Trade Commission, 4 MINSHU 497 (Tokyo Hi. Ct. Sep. 19, 1951). Although
Tohoh Co. (“Tohoh”) appealed to the Supreme Court of Japan, seeking the reverse and the entering
into new judgment, the judgment at the Tokyo High Court was affirmed. See Tohoh Co. v. Fair Trade
Commission, 8 MINSHU 950 (Sup. Ct. May 25, 1954). A gist of the fact of this case is as follows:
Tohoh concluded the lease agreement with Subaru Co. (“Subaru”) to lent the two theaters located at
Yurakucho, Thiyodaku in Tokyo on January 26, 1950. The FTCJ decided that the concluding of the
lease agreement would cause a substantial restraint of trade because through the agreement Tohoh
would have come to operate eight theaters out of ten located at Yurakucho and Marunouchi area. The
total seating capacity of the ten theaters was 10,787. On the other hand, the eight theaters operated by
Tohoh already had had the fixed number of seating capacity with 9,742 and this was 90.4% of total
numbers in that area. As Tohoh refused to accept the recommendation from the FTCJ, it initiated the
hearing and rendered the judgment. Tohoh filed the litigation seeking the withdrawal of the judgment
by the FTCJ at the Tokyo High Court on the ground that its order lacked sufficient evidence to prove
that competition of that area would be substantially restrained. The Tokyo High Court, however,
dismissed the Tohoh’s claim. Since the FTCJ intervened this case at the time when the lease
agreement between two parties was concluded and before the actual lease had begun, the elimination
orders pursuant to art. 7. of the law was issued in the form of the prohibition of leasing two theaters
from Subaru to Tohoh, having connection with management of two theaters, and doing any kinds of
business activities having same effects of the lease agreement. Although the Tokyo High Court
determined that through the lease agreement in question Tohoh would come to dominate the given
market, the market share of Tohoh would increase only 7.7% even when the lease agreement was
consummated. Therefore, it would be appropriate to regard this case not as trying to obtain the
dominant position in the market through the agreement but as strengthening its position as the market
leader already established before consummation.
In general, when the FTCJ considered that an antitrust violation should have happened, it appoints
the auditors to make them investigate the cases, from which provided that it considered a violation did
occurred it may issues the recommendation to the parities involved in order to eliminate the illegality
and to prevent a recidivism from happening. Given that the parties accepted the recommendation from
the FTCJ, it renders the judgment the content of which is the same of the recommendation and is
equivalent to the consent order in the U.S. Provided that the parties refused to accept the
recommendation, the FTCJ initiates the hearing, in which proceeding the adversary system is adopted
in order ultimately to hand down the judgment.
178
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(1) substantial restraint of competition in any particular field of trade clear and said as
follows:
A substantial restraint of competition stipulated in the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law, art. 15, para. 1. does not mean each action
conducted by a certain business as the plaintiff argued, but
means the situation where in fact the competition on a certain
market has been reduced substantially and a business or abody
of business has a power to control a market by changing a price,
quality and quantity of goods and so on, at its will or is about
to have such a power…Although a number of seats increased
through the transaction by the plaintiff was small, considering
the location of both theaters, their high reputation, and the fact
that they have been used to show a lot of foreign movies, when
the plaintiff comes to have a substantial control over two
theaters, in addition to the fact that the plaintiff has a majority
of number of seat in the given area, it can be found that the
plaintiff has a great influence in deciding a price and number of
movies shown at the given area. Therefore, we conclude that
the competition in the aforementioned market place would be
substantially restrained by the lease agreement between the
plaintiff and Subaru. The argument by the plaintiff that there is
insufficient evidence to support the fact that competition would
be substantially restrained on the ground that the increased
In the aforementioned case, as Tohoh did not accepted the recommendation, the FTCJ initiated the
hearing and rendered the judgment. When discontent with the judgment, the relevant parties are able
to file the litigation at the Tokyo High Court, the exclusive jurisdiction of this kind of case, in seeking
the revocation of the judgment obtained at the FTCJ. At the Tokyo High Court, parties may plead to
the court for offer to introduce new evidence relevant to the case, provided, that any such offer to
introduce new evidence relating to the facts found by the FTCJ shall have the reason which come
under either where the FTCJ failed to adopt the evidence without good cause, or where it was
impossible to adduce evidence at hearing proceedings of the FTCJ, and there was no gross negligence
on the part of the party in failing to adduce such evidence. Following these procedures, Tohoh, after
obtaining the judgment at the FTCJ, brought the litigation at the Tokyo High Court, the outcome of
which is briefed above. It should be noted that in Japan the administrative guidance by the FTCJ,
which is used to terminate the case in question after commencing the investigation by having the
parties correct their business activities voluntarily without issuing an order or initiating a hearing, is
the different administrative measures from the recommendation. On one hand, using of this measure
should be upheld in the case where the determination as to whether the business activities in question
would be a violation of the law is not easy because it can be assumed that in the case like this the
recognition of illegality of their activities by the parties is not strong and therefore the free
competition is not likely to be affected by them. On the other hand, in Japan, the administrative
guidance has been used so frequently that it has been criticized as the castration of the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law, because the FTCJ has settled the case by using the administrative guidance even
when it found a violation of the law. As this tendency has been said to be in connection with the
careful application of the law by the FTCJ, since threshold to use this measure is not so clear, it is
necessary to make its usage of the measure transparent.
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number of seats through the transaction was small is not
persuasive.
Tohoh Co. v. Fair Trade Commission, 4 MINSHU 497 (Tokyo
Hi. Ct. Sep. 19, 1951).
It should be noted that even though this Tokyo High Court case was not in
connection with interpretation of art.2, para. 6. of the law, since the same languages used
with regards to the “substantial restrain of competition in any particular field of trade,” it
has been construed in Japan that the definition established through the Tokyo High Court
judgment shall apply to the interpretation of art.2, para. 6. of the law.
From this judgment, however, it is not clear what is the “situation where in
fact competition on a certain market has been reduced substantially and a body of
business has a power to control a market by changing a price, quality and quantity of
goods and so on, at its will or is about to have such a power.”179
Due to that unclearness, the commentators and scholars have been trying
to clarify the meaning of aforementioned languages and pointed out that this condition
should be interpreted by taking consideration into other factors, such as market share of
relevant parties, several factors concerning suppliers and purchasers, whether or not there
are substitutes, the difficulties of new entry.180 In addition, it has been indicated that the
condition of “any particular field of trade” should be construed the place where the
transaction of goods and services between suppliers and purchasers is conducted,
economically speaking, the same meaning as “market place.”181 Further, it has been
noticed that, in interpreting this condition, it should be taken into consideration such
factors as objects of transactions, geographical area of transactions, steps of transactions,
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Fair Trade Commission, 4 MINSHU 497.
See e.g., MURAKAMI, supra note 176, at 70.
181
Id.
180
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counter parties of transactions, nature of business activities in question, and a form of
transactions.182
The Supreme Court of Japan, as explained in detail later in this article,
adopted the idea that, in price fixing cases, when an agreement as to fixing price among
the parties should be found, except for the case where parties apparently have no power
to implement their agreement to restrain competition, the condition of “substantial
restraint of competition in any particular field of trade” would be almost automatically
met and the burden of proof shifts the defendant’s side to demonstrate that they were
unable to affect the competition.183 In other words, when a price fixing agreement among
parties should be found, the condition of “any particular field of trade” is automatically
determined as commodities or services and geographical area purported in the price
fixing agreement in question and the condition of “substantial restraint of competition” is
also automatically satisfied by assuming that the agreement contained such an
anticompetitive effect in it.184 To put it another way, in the price fixing cases, when a
price fixing agreement among parties should be found, this condition is automatically to
be fulfilled without an elaborate examination about it.
Based on above, it has been evaluated that the Supreme Court of Japan
adopted the principal similar to the per se rule 185 and detailed examination of this
condition would not be necessary in the price fixing cases.
(B) The Interpretation of “Mutually Restrict or Conduct Their Business”
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Id.
Id. at 131-132.
184
Id. at 70.
185
Id.
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The Supreme Court of Japan186 clarified the meaning of (2) mutually
restrict or conduct their business and said as follows:
The defendants concluded the agreements that they would raise
the price of the oil simultaneously, with strong intent to
implement it and anticipating that other participants of the
agreement would follow the execution. Therefore, it is explicit
that the agreement has an effect to restrict their business once
they concluded it. Their agreement satisfied the condition of
“mutually restrict or conduct their business” in the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law, art. 2, para. 6. and constituted
unreasonable restraint of trade stipulated art. 3. of the law. The
fact that there were no sanctions which guaranteed the
implementation of the agreements does not affect the
conclusion of this judgment.

186

See Japanese Government v. Idemitu Co., 33 KEISHU 1287 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 24, 1984). A gist of
the fact of this case is as follows: After the price increase of crude oil by the OPEC in late 1970, it was
feared in Japan that the price of commodities which used oil and were made of oil would increase
dramatically. In fact, in the late 1973, the social disorder happened because of the sharp increase of
the price of merchandises relating to oil. In 1971, the Ministry of Industry issued positively a lot of
administrative guidance which required the compliance of wholesalers of oil industries to the direction
by the Ministry that wholesalers should bear 10 cents per barrel of the oil when the price should be
raised by the OPEC at that time. In addition, the Ministry of Industry required wholesalers of oil to let
it know when they would raise the price of oil and sometimes intervened how much to raise the price
as well as demonstrating the ideal plan for their raising price. After 1971, with the direction by the
Ministry of Industry, the wholesalers raised the price of oil several times. Neither the FTCJ nor the
Prosecutor’s Office raised the antitrust concerns about these practices. In 1973, before the consultation
with the Ministry of Industry, the person in charge of each wholesalers of oil companies met each
other frequently to discuss and agreed when and how much to raise the price. Following these meeting,
after obtaining permission from the Ministry of Industry, the wholesalers did in fact raise the price
five times. At that time, the Ministry of Industry directed wholesalers positively so that they might not
raise the price sorely on the account of the fact that the new pact had been concluded among the nation
of the OPEC and requested to report the Ministry prior to their price raise in order for the Ministry to
review their plan. In this regard, the Supreme Court said that since the parties involved agreed not
only how much price raise they were going to report to the Ministry but also on the premise that the
Ministry would admit their proposal of price raise actually how much to raise the price of oil, which
was well beyond the scope of the administrative guidance ordered by the Ministry and should well
deserve accusation although it found that judging from the situation at that time it might not so
unreasonable for them to expect that the Ministry would admit, even if with some modification, their
proposal of price raise.
In this case, the defendants argued that their agreement and subsequent price raises would not
constitute a violation of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law because what they did was just following the
direction by the Ministry of Industry and they had obtained the permission from it before their price
raise. This case includes a lot of factual disputes as well as legal issues. The Tokyo High Court held
that all the defendants were guilty by rejecting all the argument raised by them. On appealing, the
Supreme Court rendered the judgment that 20 out of 23 of the defendants were guilty by rejecting the
argument raised by them.
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Japanese Government v. Idemitsu Co., 33 KEISHU 1287 (Sup.
Ct. Feb. 24, 1984).
The Supreme Court adopted the view that a strong binding power was not
required to meet the condition of “mutually restrict their business” and that when a price
fixing agreement should be concluded this condition would be automatically met. This
reasoning is said to be the ground that the Supreme Court of Japan adopted the principal
similar to the per se rule.187
(C) The Interpretation of “Against Public Interest”
The Supreme Court of Japan defined the meaning of (3) against public
interest and said as follows:
Judging from the purpose, the keystone and the progress of its
revision of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law, “against public
interest” stipulated in the law, art. 2, para. 6. in principal an
establishment of free competition which the law seeks to
accomplish. However, even if a certain action should be judged
as against public interest formally, such an action should not be
judged as “against public interest” when it is not practically
against the ultimate purpose of the law stipulated in art. 1,
which says that the law “aims to promote free and fair
competition, to stimulate the creative initiative of entrepreneurs,
to encourage business activities of enterprises, to heighten the
level of employment and people's real income, and thereby to
promote the democratic and wholesome development of the
national economy as well as to assure the interests of
consumers in general,” after comparing the principal purpose
of the law with interests protected by such a business
activity…when businesses agreed to restrict each other’s
business activities by determining the prices through mutual
consultation, when the competition in the given market place
has been restrained substantially against public interest by their
agreement, such a business activity would become immediately
a violation of the law and there are no need to examine an
actual implementation of the agreement by the parties.
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MURAKAMI, supra note 176, at 126-127.
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Japanese Government v. Idemitsu Co., 33 KEISHU 1287 (Sup.
Ct. Feb. 24, 1984).188
The Supreme Court judgment above has three significances to antitrust
practices in Japan.
First, the Supreme Court demonstrated its view that the public interest in
the Japanese Antimonopoly Law, art. 2, para. 6. meant to promote the democratic and
wholesome development of the national economy as well as to assure the interests of
consumers in general, which is stipulated in the law, art. 1. Before this judgment,
principally there were two views concerning the definition of the public interest. First
view was to regard the public interest as an economic order based on the free competition
and assumed that, by promoting it, the purpose of the law stipulated in art. 1 would be
realized.189 The FTCJ had adopted the first view before the Supreme Court judgment.190
According to the first view, a restraint of competition would be against the public interest
without exception.
188

After the Supreme Court judgment of Feb. 24, 1984, the Tokyo high Court adopted almost the
same definition of “against public interest.” See Japanese Government v. Mitsuitoatsukagaku Co., 46
KOKEISHU 108 (Tokyo Hi. Ct. May 5, 1993). A gist of the fact of this case is as follows: The
Japanese stretch film industry had increase its sales favorably until around 1988 because of their
superior characteristic as a rapping material of fresh foods. In spite of the fact that manufactures of
this kind of products devised to differentiate its product from competitors’, their competition of the
products tended to become a price competition because there are almost no differences in terms of out
looking and performance. Therefore, the price of the products was going down constantly. In 1988,
new company participated in the market of stretch film industry. Further, in 1989, one of the
competitors started operating new factory established at northern Japan to increase their amount of
producing and decrease costs. In addition, since the demand of stretch film had not increased as before
because of the advent of substitutable products, the price of the product decreased more. Therefore,
some of the companies in the industry were in red ink. Under this circumstance, the top shared
company in the industry conspired with the third shared company to raise the price. Later, the second
shared company took part in the cartel. The FTCJ accused this cartel on the ground that it would be a
violation of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law. After the judgment at the FTCJ which found their cartel,
the defendants filed the litigation at the Tokyo High Court seeking the nullification of the judgment
not favorable for them. After the trial, the Tokyo High Court rendered the judgment finding the cartel
among them with rejecting all the argument raised by them.
189
See e.g., YOSHIO KANAZAWA, KEIZAIHOH [LAW OF ECONOMY] 159 (Yuhikaku 1980).
190
See Nodashouyu Co., 4 SHINKETSUSHU 1 (FTC, Arp. 4, 1952). See also Nodashoyu Co. v.
Fair Trade Commission, 8 GYOSAISHU 2300 (Tokyo Hi. Ct. Dec. 25, 1958).
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The second view was to regard it as to promote the general interest of the
public in addition to realizing the free competition.191 The second view could lead to
greater possibility for a restraint of trade to be justified on the account that it was not
against the public interest.192 Judging from the languages of the law, art. 1, it is clear that
the law assumes that its purpose would be realized by a sound economic order based on
the free competition, the basic policy of the law. Therefore, the first view is more in line
with the inherent intention of the law.
However, as the Supreme Court judgment suggested, the assumption
carrying out the policy strongly always contributes the purpose of the law does not
always true because the hypothesis has not been verifiedyet after alm ost fifty years has
past since its enactment. As these backgrounds might have affected, it can be evaluated
that the Supreme Court adopted the middle course between the first and the second view
193

because it admitted the possibility for a cartel to be justified, whereas it denied the

general interest of the public should be included in the concept of the “public interest.”
The second significance is that the Supreme Court admitted that although
the law purported to realize the public interest, there was a room that the public interest
would be realized by admitting cartels, which means that, even when a price fixing
agreement should be concluded, such an agreement could be justified as not against
public interest.194 When emphasizing the rationale of the judgment which says that after
191

See e.g., YOSHIHIKO RYOKAKU, KYOSOUTO DOKUSENNO HANASHI [THE TALK
ABOUOT COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY] 170 (Soukeisha, 1978).
192
Id. at 168-171.
193
MURAKAMI, supra note 176, at 66-67.
194
With regard to the relationship between the administrative order issued by the Ministry of
Industry and the price fixing agreement, see Idemitsu Co., 33 KEISHU 1287. The gist of the Supreme
Court judgment is as follows: When taking consideration into the necessity to cope with the dynamic
situation flexibly, there are no reason why the administrative direction having no ground in the law of
oil business should be determined as illegal inasmuch as such a way of administrative direction is
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comparing an economic order based on the free competition with the interest protected by
the business activity in question, given that the latter swamped the former, it is not
“against the public interest,” the possibility for a price fixing agreement to be justified
would be greater.
However, this judgment admitted that principally that the “against public
interest” was the same meaning of against an economic order based on the free
competition and that a price fixing agreement to be justified as not against public interest
was an exception.195 Therefore, the cases where a price fixing agreement would be
justified under the rational of the Supreme Court judgment should be very limited.196 This
deliberation would be supported by the fact that the price fixing agreement in the
aforementioned Supreme Court case in which the price raises were implemented in
accordance with the direction by the Ministry was not admitted to be justified.197
There could be an argument against the rational of the Supreme Court
judgment that it hindered the stability of the law and it might lead to the arbitrary

within the common idea of the society, and it may not interfere with the ultimate purpose of the law
when there is a strong necessity for the direction to be issued. Although a price fixing agreement
among the parties seemed to be a violation of the law facially, when such an agreement was concluded
by following and cooperating a legitimate administrative direction, an agreement would be justified.
Based on above, although the Supreme Court admitted the legitimacy of the administrative direction,
it denied that the cartel in this case would be justified with the reasoning that “it is clear that their
price raise was not made by cooperating the direction by the Ministry because they agreed not only
how much to raise but also raising the price of oil from tomorrow on the premise that they would
obtain the permission from the Ministry about their price raise.”
195
Id.
196
See e.g., KENZO SANEKATA, JOHKAI DOKUSENKINSHIHOH [THE INTERPRETATION
OF THE JAPANESE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW] 37 (Kobundo 1997).
197
MURAKAMI, supra note 176, at 66-67. See also KAN IJUH, DOKUSENKINSHIHOH NO
TEBIKI [THE GUIDANCE OF THE JAPANESE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW] 33
(Tokyokeizaishinpousha 1982). According to this article, the practice at the FTCJ has been
consistently that the fact that a certain business activity was the result of following the direction by the
Ministry does not always justify it. Basically the policy taken by the FTCJ is correct because whether
or not a certain business activity meets the requirement of a justifiable cause is case-by-case judgment
and traditionally the courts in Japan tend not to admit the satisfaction of the requirement of a
justifiable cause easily.
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application of the law because the Supreme Court did not clarify under what cases and
conditions an price fixing agreement would be justified.
However, even when adopting the standpoint of the Supreme Court
judgment, there would be no changes at all in that a price fixing agreement in principal is
illegal under the law because the justification is only an exception to be permitted in a
limited and exceptional case. In addition, the parities which are going to form a cartel are
always compelled to do so at the risk of violating the law, which sometimes triggers the
commencement of derivative actions198 given that the parties are corporation, and the
punishments with criminal sanction as well as the Punitive Penalty (Surcharges). Since it
is clear that the party shall bear huge risk in forming a cartel, the party could easily
anticipate whether or not they should form it by taking into consideration of the huge
legal risk arising out of it. Further, as twenty years has past since the Supreme Court
judgment was rendered, there have been no situations in which the law has been applied
arbitrary nor implementation of the law was impaired due to the vagueness of the
languages in the judgment. Therefore, the standpoint adopted in the judgment should be
upheld.199
The third significance is that the Supreme Court made it clear that, in a
price fixing case, when the court find an agreement among the parties to fix a price, such

198

Since the 1993 Amendment to the Commercial Code of Japan (Law No. 62 of 1993), which
significantly lowered the court-filing fee for the shareholders derivative suit (now JPY 8,200), the
derivative suit has become very popular in Japan and management’s attention to the likelihood of
being sued via this form of suit has significantly increased. According to the survey by the Shoji
Homu, being a prominent Japanese law review magazine, it is reported that the overall number of
derivative actions in Japan increased at approximately 5-10% annually after 1993 to 1999. Particularly,
the Osaka District Court’s 2000 judgment in the Daiwa Bank case, which held 12 directors of the
Bank liable in amounts in the order of between US$70 million to US$775 million per person, created
a significant sensation, and is said to have contributed to the December 2001 Amendment to the Code
that created a limitation on a director’s liability as discussed.
199
MURAKAMI, supra note 176, at 67.
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an agreement would automatically satisfy all the constituent elements of the law and be
presumed to be illegal without reviewing the real effects of an agreement on the
competition and examining whether or not it is against public interest. In this regard, it
can also be said that, as to a price fixing case, the Supreme Court adopted the principal
similar to the per se rule.200
In relation to above, the Supreme Court also clarified that the fact that a
price fixing agreement among the parties was not against the public interest was a
justifiable cause with which defendants shall bear the burden of proof. In other words,
when an agreement to fix the price should be found, it is presumed that such an
agreement meets the condition of (1) substantial restraint of competition in any given
field of trade, (2) mutually restrict or conduct their business, and (3) against public
interest, which means that the agreement is presumed to be illegal and the burden of
proof to verify that the agreement will not cause a substantial restrain of competition or
promote public interests shifts the defendant’s side as a justifiable cause.
This interpretation of the Supreme Court judgment is also evidenced by
the rationale that the Supreme Court determined that a price fixing agreement would be a
violation of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law at the time when such an agreement has
been concluded.201

200

Id. at 127.
Before the aforementioned Supreme Court judgment, there were several views as to which point
a price fixing agreement would be a violation of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law. The first view was
that a price fixing agreement would be a violation of the law at the time when an agreement was
concluded, which was adopted by the Supreme Court Judgment and the subsequent Tokyo High Court
judgment. The second view was to regard the commencement of the agreement as a violation of the
law. The third view was to regard the real implementation of the agreement as a violation of the law.
The most important ground of the second and third view is the language of the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law, art. 2, para. 6, which says “causing, contrary to the public interest, a substantial
restraint of competition in any particular field of trade” not “trying to cause a substantial restrain of
competition.” To be sure, it is consistent to interpret the law like the second and third view with its
201
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The distribution of the burden of proof articulated in the Supreme Court
judgment should be basically upheld because it is consistent with the traditional
interpretation of articles of the law which stipulate the criminal or administrative penalty
that always requires to review the three aspects of law, that is, a fulfillment of a
constituent element, an existence of a justifiable cause and a cause of non-culpability
separately in this order. Also the traditional interpretation grants a strong presumption of
illegality should all constituent element be fulfilled.
After this Supreme Court judgment, the Tokyo High Court clarified the
aforementioned principal much more and said that in a price fixing case when an
agreement as to fixing price among the parties should be found, the condition of (1)
substantially restrain on competition in any given field of trade, (2) mutually restrict or
conduct their business, and (3) against public interest would be almost automatically met
and that the agreement should be a violation of the law at the time of its conclusion.202

language. In addition, before the Supreme Court judgment, the FTCJ had rendered the judgment in
which not only a conclusion of the agreement but also an implementation of it had been written.
Further, a real implementation of an agreement had been focused on at the real practice at the FTCJ.
On the other hand, the first view has advocated that it was unrealistic to consider that the FTCJ could
not do anything even when it could find a price fixing agreement before its commencement. It is not
appropriate to construe, however, that this is the decisive ground for the Supreme Court to adopt the
first view because practically it has been quite rare for the FTCJ to expose a price fixing agreement
before its commencement. Even when it did expose, it can be said that in most cases the reason why
the FTCJ did not issue the elimination order did not lie in the fact that it adopted the first view but in
the fact that parties of the agreement complied with an informal direction by the FTCJ and issuing the
formal order was no longer necessary. The most important ground for the Supreme Court to adopt the
first view is the basic concept that the effective regulation on a cartel is one of the most important
subjects of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law. Practically speaking, when adopting the second and third
view, the FTCJ shall bear the heavy burden of proof to demonstrate an actual commencement and
implementation of the agreement, which is no doubt time consuming and has the possibilities to lesson
the effectiveness of the law to promote the free competition in the national economy. Considering
illegality of a price fixing agreement, it is appropriate to adopt the first view which enable the FTCJ to
expose a cartel without reviewing a real implementation of an agreement. See MURAKAMI, supra
note 176, at 128.
202
See Mitsuitoatsukagaku Co., 46 KOKEISHU 108.
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This interpretation is the logical consequence of the conclusion that presumes illegality
when a price fixing agreement should be found.
(D) The Application of the General Interpretation to Buyers’ Anticompetitive
Agreements
All the interpretations analyzed above were established concerning sellers’
price fixing agreements. Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether or not the
interpretations established through sellers’ price fixing cases would also be applied to
buyers’ cartel cases or any modification should be necessary only because the parties
which collude to manipulate the price are not sellers but buyers.
In this regard, the Japanese Antimonopoly Law, art.1. says as follows:
This Act, by prohibiting private monopolization, unreasonable
restraint of trade and unfair trade practices, by preventing
excessive concentration of economic power and by eliminating
unreasonable restraint of production, sale, price, technology
and the like, and all other unjust restriction of business
activities through combinations, agreements and otherwise,
aims to promote free and fair competition, to stimulate the
creative initiative of entrepreneurs, to encourage business
activities of enterprises, to heighten the level of employment
and people's real income, and thereby to promote the
democratic and wholesome development of the national
economy as well as to assure the interests of consumers in
general.
From the languages above, it is clear that the principal purpose of the
Japanese Antimonopoly Law is to “promote the democratic and wholesome development
of the national economy as well as to assure the interests of consumers in general.”203 For
that purpose, it does not distinguish between sellers and buyers which unreasonably
restrain the competition. In other words, inasmuch as the free competition is restrained, it

203

SANEKATA, supra note 196, at 10.
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does not matter under the Japanese Antimonopoly Law whether sellers or buyers restrain
the free competition.
As the court in National Macaroni Manufacture Association v. Federal
Trade Commission pointed out, the reason why the illegality of price fixing agreements
does not depend on a showing of its unreasonableness is that it is contrary to the policy of
competition.204 There is no difference between buyers’ cartel agreements and sellers’
ones in that it does cause anticompetitive effects on the free competition. It is consistent
to the principal purpose of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law to construe that the
interpretation established through sellers’ price fixing cases should be applied to buyers’
cartel cases.
In addition, as explained earlier in this article, even when joint purchasing
would yield procompetitive effects or transactions should be concluded in the form of allor-nothing deal, there would be almost always anticompetitive effects either in the short
term, in the long term or both. To put it another way, when buyers collude to manipulate
the price, the collusion will almost always cause anticompetitive harm at an upstream
market, a downstream market or both.
Moreover, the reason why the Japanese Antimonopoly Law is concerned
with excessive aggregation of market power is to prevent misallocation of competitive
efficiencies. As discussed earlier in this article, when collusive buyers exercise their
market power, even in a joint purchasing with procompetitive effects model or an all-or-

204

See National Macaroni Manufacture Association, 345 F.2d at 427. This interpretation is
consistent with the basic principal of the antitrust law to protect the free competition. See also United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1945). It said that “Throughout
the history of these statutes it has been constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate
and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units
which can effectively compete with each other.” Id. at 429.
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nothing deal, misallocation of competitive efficiencies will almost always happen. Just as
sellers’ cartel cases, inasmuch as the Japanese Antimonopoly Law is concerned, it is
necessary to prevent these inefficiencies.
Therefore, there is the good foundation to apply the interpretation
established through sellers’ price fixing case to buyers’ collusion to manipulate the price.
As explained above, when agreements to lower the input purchased among
buyers or to transact in an all-or-nothing deal should be found, the agreement would be
presumed to be the substantial restrain of competition against the public interest and
thus a violation of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law, art. 3. unless buyers could
overturn the presumption drawn from the fulfillment of every constituent element of
the law, art. 2, para. 6. by proving that they lacked market power to affect the
competition or their agreement has procompetitive effects which could offset the
anticompetitive effects caused by it.205

205

In Japan, there are no cases in which the courts adopt the argument although the court in
Idemitsu Co., 33 KEISHU 1287 admitted the possibility for a price cartel to be justified given that it
should be proved that it is not against the public interest.
In the U.S., this kind of argument is sometimes raised from purchases. See Knevelbaard Dairies v.
Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. Cal. 2000). In this case, against the complaint that the
defendants, cheese makers agreed to depress the price they had to pay for California milk, the
plaintiffs, under the state competition law, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked a
cognizable antitrust injury since the agreement would benefit consumers by forcing milk producers to
sell at more competitive price. Id. at 988. See also Live Poultry Dealers' Protective Ass'n v. United
States, 4 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1924). The defendants in this case argued that their agreements
caused no antitrust harm as it would benefit to consumers. The court in this case, however, after
examining the argument from the defendant, stated “The defendants raise two chief objections: First,
that the commerce is not interstate; and, second, that the agreement is not an unreasonable restraint of
trade…it is somewhat surprising at this day to hear it suggested that a frank agreement to fix prices
and prevent competition as regards them among one-half the buyers in a given market may be
defended, on the notion that the results are economically desirable. We should have supposed that, if
one thing were definitely settled, it was that the Sherman Act forbade all agreements preventing
competition in price among a group of buyers, otherwise competitive, if they are numerous enough to
affect the market.” Id. at 982-983.
See also Kamine/Besicorp Allegany L.P. v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 908 F. Supp. 1194
(W.D.N.Y. 1995). The court in this case adopted the argument from the defendants and said
“Kamine's allegations, however, fail to indicate a truly anticompetitive effect as a result of RG&E's
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As explained earlier in this article, however, it is not clear that agreement
among buyers to increase their quantity of input purchased to manipulate the price
would almost always cause anticompetitive effects and thus presumed to be against the
principal purpose of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law. Thus, inasmuch as this kind of
agreement is concerned, some modifications should be necessary in applying the
rationale established through sellers’ price fixing cases.
(E) Analysis of Arguments and Proof Structure under the Japanese Antimonopoly Law
(a) The Typical Oligopsony Case
When collusive buyers have oligopsony power at an upstream market and
exercise it, this business activity would be presumed to be illegal and meet all the
conditions of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law, art. 2, para. 6. automatically, given that
an agreement among collusive buyers should be found and proved.
This conclusion is supported by the analysis that, as detailed earlier in this
article, in this case suppliers at an upstream market will suffer from damages due to the
change in quantity of an input purchased and price.206 In addition, the analysis that when

actions. The chief danger associated with monopsony power--market power on the buying side of the
market--occurs when a company has significant market power both "upstream" and "downstream,"
meaning that the company can control the level of demand for the product that it buys and the level of
supply for the product that it sells to its own buyers. Such a market position allows the company to
demand a low price from its suppliers while simultaneously raising the prices it charges its buyers.
The problem with this type of monopsony power, then, is that ultimately it can injure consumers by
forcing up the price of the end product. Where the risk of that happening is slight or nonexistent,
however, monopsony power per se does not create an antitrust concern…There is little evidence here
that RG&E's alleged use of its monopsony power poses a threat of increased consumer prices. In fact,
the evidence suggests the opposite--that paying the price under the PPA, which Kamine demands, will
drive up the cost to the ratepayer. Furthermore, although RG&E does possess both upstream and
downstream power in the energy market, its position is not analogous to that of a manufacturer of
goods that can simply reduce its output in order to increase its price. As a state-regulated utility,
RG&E cannot unilaterally reduce its output of electric power to the point where consumers are willing
to pay an exorbitant price. If anything, if RG&E's own cost of power drops, it would have greater
difficulty justifying approval of a rate increase.” Id. at 1203-1204.
206
In Japan, there is an argument that suppliers’ damage should not be taken into consideration
when examining a violation of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law. See SANEKATA, supra note 196, at
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a downstream market is dominated by collusive buyers, consumers would suffer from the
loss due to the increase of price, the decreased quantity of supply, and the worsened
quality of final goods is the ground of this conclusion.
Collusive buyers could make a counter argument to overturn the
presumption.
One of the possible arguments would be that they have no market power207
to control the price and quantity at an upstream market. With regard to market power,
there are no detailed examinations in Japan. The only indication, which is concerning
sellers’ price fixing and merger cases, is that market share is the proxy to measure market
power.208 Also in the U.S., the courts sometimes use market share to analyze the market

12. The ground of this argument might be the fact that the Japanese Antimonopoly Law, art. 1. says
“This act…aims to promote free and fair competition, to stimulate the creative initiative of
entrepreneurs, to encourage business activities of enterprises, to heighten the level of employment and
people's real income, and thereby to promote the democratic and wholesome development of the
national economy as well as to assure the interests of consumers in general” and does not mention
anything about business’ income.
Also, in the U.S., there is a similar argument. See Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d at 988. In this case,
the defendants argued that their collusion to drive down the purchase price would cause no harm to
consumers because they can reduce the cost to manufacture cheese by obtaining cheaper milk. Id. at
988. As the court in this case said, however, supplies’ damage should also be included as the antitrust
damage under the Japanese Antimonopoly Law in the context of measuring the antitrust illegality
because the main purpose of the antitrust law lies in the protection of the free competition, which has a
great impact on the welfare and income of the people.
See also Marius Schwartz, Buyer Power Concerns and the Aetnea-Prudential Merger, addressed at
5 th Annual Health Care Antitrust Forum (Oct. 20, 1999), (1999), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/3924.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2005). He mentioned that
“[s]hould antitrust be concerned with monopsony mergers which reduce welfare but do not harm
consumers? An objection I've heard is that "antitrust protects consumers not competitors." In my view,
however, this phrase should not be read literally as saying that only consumers matter. It is a metaphor
for saying that antitrust is concerned not with individual competitors but with the competitive process.
So if a merger increases market power and thereby harms the firm's trading partners -- customers or
suppliers -- by more than it benefits the firm, antitrust concern is warranted. Insisting on consumer
harm is overly narrow.”
207
See Collaboration Guideline, supra note 30, at 11. It defines the market power to buyers and says
“Market power to a buyer is the ability profitably to depress the price paid for a product below the
competitive level for a significant period of time and thereby depress output.” Id. at 11.
208
MURAKAMI, supra note 176, at 134.
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power.209 Further, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the U.S. Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) have established the safety zone in relation to market share which
describe situations in which a collaboration agreement will be presumed to be lawful.
Namely, it says that a collaboration will generally not be challenged when the market
share of the collaboration and its members equal no more than twenty percent of the
market in which competition may be affected.210 It also notes, however, that this safety
zone does not apply to agreements which are the per se illegal, or that would be
challenged even without undertaking of a detailed market analysis.211 Although the
principal adopted in the Supreme Court in Japan is slightly different from the per se rule,
the both principal are same in that they presume illegality when price fixing agreements
should be found. Based on this indication, even if collusive buyers proved that their
market share is less than twenty percent in a given market, their argument is not likely to
prevail.
Another way to demonstrate that they lack market power is buying power
index (“BPI”).212
This is represented in a following equation.
BPI=1/epsilon 213
The epsilon means the elasticity of supply.214 The elasticity of supply is
the measure of the responsiveness of quantity supplied to change in price. It varies with
209

See SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 92, at 624. See also Thomas J. Horton & Dr.
Stefan Schmitz, The Lessons of Covisnt: Regulating B2Bs Under European and American
Competition Laws, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 1231, 1249 (2001). It says that the most important factor to
determine market power is market share. On the other hand, there is an indication that too much
reliance on market share to measure market power is not appropriate. See also BLAIR & HARRISON,
supra note 66, at 58.
210
Collaboration Guideline, supra note 30, at 26.
211
Id.
212
See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 66, at 48.
213
See Blair & Harrison, supra note 51, at 351.
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the ability of marginal suppliers to put their resources to alternative uses, either producing
other products or services. Suppliers with highly specialized and immobile equipment
might be vulnerable to exploitation by collusive buyers because they have no alternative
but to continue supplying their products as long as they can recover their initial
investment.215
As the elasticity increases, the collusive buyers’ market power declines. In
the event that the supply curve would be flat and the supply elasticity would be infinite,
the BPI will be zero, which means no buying power exists in the given market place.216
As suggested above, when examining the elasticity of supply, the ease of
exit from the market should be taken into consideration. The easier exit is the more
elastic the supply response would be.217 In so doing, it would be necessary to consider
such factors as, how long it takes to convert a plant to new uses,218 whether or not a
production technology is available or subject to patent control,219 whether or not a
converted facility would be sunk,220 whether or not brand preferences must be
established,221 and whether or not a firm must go into the new industry on a relatively
large scale.222
Also, a higher elasticity of demand, the willingness of other buyers in the
market to increase their purchases if prices should fall, means lower buying power and

214

Id.
See Clark C. Havighurst, Antitrust Issues in the Joint Purchasing of Health Care, 1995 UTAH L.
REV. 409, 433 (1995).
216
See Blair & Harrison, supra note 51, at 351.
217
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 66, at 60.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
Steven Salop, Measuring the Ease of Entry, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 551. 562 (1986).
221
Id. at 560.
222
Id. at 560-561.
215
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this would be reflected in the calculation of the BPI.223 In other words, given that other
buyers would increase their consumption substantially at moderately lower prices,
suppliers could resist most of the concessions demanded by collusive bueyrs.224 As a
result, the overall output in an upstream market would not reduce appreciably, which
means that given that they try to exercise their market power, it would be difficult for
them to affect the quantity and price. In this case, the BPI would be low. Should other
purchasers be not able to substitute reduced demand easily, decrease of price would not
lead to increase of purchases. In this case, the elasticity of demand would be low, which
will, in turn, indicate that the BPI would be high.225
Although it is not easy to measure the elasticity of neither supply nor
demand curve in a real case,226 given that they could demonstrate that the elasticity is
high enough to assume that they lacked the market power, their counter argument might
prevail in overturning the presumption of illegality.
Collusive buyers cannot overturn the presumption by their argument that
their joint purchasing yields procompetitive effects at other market because harm to
competition in one market is difficult to be justified by benefits of concerted action in
another.227
Therefore, even if they raised this argument, it is not likely to prevail.
(b) Oligopsony with Procompetitive effects

223

See Blair & Harrison, supra note 51, at 361.
See Havighurst, supra note 215, at 433.
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
See United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963). In this case, the
court rejected the idea that anticompetitive effects in one market could be justified by procompetitive
consequences in another. Id. at 370
224
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When collusive buyers have oligopsony power at an upstream market and
exercise it, this business activity would be presumed to be illegal and meet all the
conditions of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law, art. 2, para. 6. automatically, even when
joint purchasing could enhance the productive capacity of final products, given that an
agreement among collusive buyers should be found and proved. This conclusion is
supported by the analysis that, even when the procompetitive efficiency which would be
never attained absent oligopsony swamped the anticompetitive effects, suppliers and
societies could be harmed by this joint buying effort.
Collusive buyers could make a counter argument to overturn the
presumption of illegality.
One of the possible arguments would be that they lacked market power as
explained before in this article.
Another argument would be that procompetitive effects swamped the
anticompetitive effects and suppliers and societies would benefit rather than being
harmed.
As analyzed before, however, provided that procompetitive effects should
be obtainable absent the exercise of oliposony power, same as the oligopsony with no
procompetitive effects, a society and suppliers at an upstream market would be caused by
social welfare losses, allocative inefficiencies and the long term anticompetitive effects.
Based upon this analysis, even if collusive buyers raised this argument, it is not likely to
prevail at Japanese courts.
In addition, at least one of the scholars commented that, where the
exertion of market power to lower the price is indispensable to accomplish the
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procompetitive effects,228 the buyers’ agreement is necessary to achieve some productive
efficiency,229 or the agreement is required to achieve the claimed efficiency, 230 the
different standard should be applied when reviewing the illegality of joint purchasing.
This scholar seems to consider that when procompetitive effects are not obtainable absent
oligopsony, instead of applying the standard to review the illegality of oligopsony, the
different standard shall be used. However, as analyzed before, only procompetitive
effects to be considered in reviewing illegality of joint purchasing is what could enhance
the productive capacity of final products. In addition, even when the enhancement of
productive capacity which would have been never attained absent oligopsony excel
anticompetitive effects, suppliers and societies would suffer damages in the long run.
Unless collusive buyers could establish the argument that the allocative inefficiency and
the long term anticompetitive effects should not be taken into account when examining
whether or not joint purchasing meet the condition of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law,
art. 2, para. 6, collusive buyers shall bear the heavyburden of proof that the
procompetitive effects, that is, the enhancement of productive capacity due to oligopsony
exceeded the allocative inefficiency and the long term anticompetitive effects.
In this regard, although there are no examinations in Japan under the law,
there are no reasons to distinguish the short term anticompetitive effects on asocial
welfare from the allocative inefficiency and the long term anticompetitive effects under
the law. This is because the principal purpose of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law is to
“promote the democratic and wholesome development of the national economy as well as

228

BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 66, at 102-103. It discusses this condition in the context of
application of the ancillary restraint doctrine to the cooperative buying effort.
229
Id.
230
Id.
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to assure the interests of consumers in general”231 and to accomplish this purpose there
are no needs to differentiate these anticompetitive effects. Based upon this analysis, even
if collusive buyers raised this argument, it is not likely to prevail at Japanese courts.
On the other hand, as a factual matter, there could be the case where the
quality of final product is improved through buyers’ agreement. Since a quality
improvement has no connection with price or quantity, there could be the case where this
procompetitive effects, that is, the improvement of quality, swamped all the
anticompetitive effects caused by oligopsony. In this case, given that collusive buyers
could prove that the procompetitive effects due to the improved quality of final products
swamped the anticompetitive effects, which is quite difficult in practice, their counter
argument should prevail.
Given that courts rejected the aforementioned counter arguments,
collusive buyers could raise an argument as a cause of non imputability that they are
inculpable since they believed that their joint purchasing would never cause
anticompetitive effects or that the procompetitive effects would always swamp the
anticompetitive effects.232
There are, however, no Supreme Court judgements which admitted this
argument. Therefore, this counter argument is not likely to prevail.
(c) All-or-Nothing Deal
231

SANEKATA, supra note 196, at 10.
See Idemitsu v. Fair Trade Commission, 33 KOUKEISHU 497 (Tokyo Hi. Ct. Sep. 26, 1980). In
this case, the Tokyo High Court decided that the chairman of the oil union which cooperated the
administrative directions by the Ministry of Industry were inculpable because they lacked the
recognition of the illegality of their price coordination. The Ministry of Industry had admitted and
welcomed the price coordination as a well-organized production for a long period of time. In addition,
the FTCJ had not initiated any proceedings in spite of the fact that they had recognized that the oil
manufacturing corporations had regulated their pricing. Based on these facts, the court decided that it
was too much severe to conclude that the defendants should bear the responsibility for their
compliance with the directions by the Ministry.
232
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When collusive buyers exercise their market power at an upstream market,
such a business activity would be presumed to be illegal and meet all the conditions of
the Japanese Antimonopoly Law, art. 2, para. 6. automatically, even when no short term
anticompetitive effects on social welfare should be caused due to their joint purchasing,
given that an agreement among purchasers should be found and proved. This conclusion
is supported by the analysis that, even when the procompetitive efficiency should be
accomplished in the short term, suppliers and a society would be harmed by this joint
buying effort in the long run by the allocative efficiencies, suppliers’ leaving from the
market or suppliers’ losing incentive to innovate.
In this regard, the district court in Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Soundview Techs.,
Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 180 (D. Conn. 2001) dealt with the case where the buyers agreed to
depress the unit price of patent artificially without decreasing their quantity of input
purchased. The case involved the holder of a patent for a technology that the
manufactures of the television are required to include in their products.233 The patent
holder alleged that television manufactures colluded to lower the price for the royalty of
the patent that they had to use than they would have to pay otherwise.234 Based on the
facts briefly outlined above, the court said “Sony and the counterclaim defendants,
however, are not alleged to have reduced input prices simply by buying fewer licenses; to
the contrary, they seek a lower per unit price for those licenses, presumably to allow them
to continue manufacturing a large number of television sets with the required technology.
Nothing in the counterclaims alleged here indicate that Sony and the counterclaim

233
234

Id. at 181-182.
Id.
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defendants are producing fewer television sets, or that their conspiracy was to do so.”235
In addition, the court pointed out that, even if consumers at a downstream market would
benefit, the patent holders are likely to lose their incentive to innovate because of the
decrease of price, which would be a social loss.236
Collusive buyers could make a counter argument to overturn the
presumption.
One of the possible arguments would be that they lacked a market power
as explained before in this article.
Another argument would be that procompetitive effects swamped the
anticompetitive effects and suppliers and societies would be benefited rather than harmed.
As explained before, different from oligopsony, in an all-or-nothing deal, consumers
could benefit by the reduced consumer prices. Although collusive buyers shall bear the
burden of proof that the benefit enjoyed by consumers at a downstream market is larger
than the anticompetitive effects, given that they would succeed in their verification, their
counter argument should prevail.
Given that courts rejected all the counter arguments explained above,
collusive buyers could raise an argument as a cause of non imputability that they are
inculpable since they believed that their joint purchasing would never cause any
235

Id. at 185.
Id. at 186. The court also pointed out as follows: “While Sony's argument does point out some
flaws in the economic underpinnings of Soundview's claims, the Court does not accept entirely Sony's
argument that the scheme alleged in the counterclaims could have no anticompetitive effects. As
outlined by Professor Blair, monopsonistic pricing conspiracies can have distributional injuries, such
as where a group of buyers gets together and agrees on an all-or-nothing pricing scheme (as is alleged
here), as contrasted with the Areeda & Turner theory about reducing the quantity of raw materials
purchased in order to lower production costs. The all-or-nothing price set by these colluding
purchasers can depress the price below the optimal price that would obtain if usual market forces of
supply and demand were at work. The price to consumers does not decrease, but there may be social
welfare consequences in the long run, because suppliers will leave the industry (or, as Soundview has
it, will cease to innovate and invent).” Id. at 186.
236
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anticompetitive effects or that the procompetitive effects would always swamp the
anticompetitive effects.
This counter argument, however, is not likely to prevail as explained
earlier in this article.
(d) Collusion to Reduce the Price by Increasing the Quantity of Input Purchased
It is necessary to review whether the constituent element of the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law, art. 2, para. 6. would be automatically satisfied and an antitrust
illegality would be presumed when agreement by collusive buyers should be found in the
case where collusive buyers agree to reduce the price by increasing their quantity of input
purchased artificially.
The principal purpose of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law is to “promote
the democratic and wholesome development of the national economy as well as to assure
the interests of consumers in general”237 and why the law purports to protect a free
competition in a given market by prohibiting price fixing agreements is that it is clear that
it would almost always cause anticompetitive harm.
The collusion to decrease the price by increasing their quantity of the input
purchased, however, does not cause anticompetitive effects or at least it is not so obvious
to conclude that the anticompetitive effects will almost always happen like a typical
oligopsony case. Thus, it would be difficult to assume the anticompetitive effect only
from the conclusion of agreements among collusive buyers.
In addition, in Japan, constituent elements of the law have been considered
what classified illegal conducts based on common sense. However, under present
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See SANEKATA, supra note 196, at 10.
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circumstances, it would be difficult to decide swiftly that common sense among Japanese
has been established that this collusion is illegal.
Inasmuch as constituent element level is concerned, it is appropriated to
construe that the rationale of the Supreme Court judgment does not apply this kind of
agreement and that the plaintiff shall bear the burden of proof to verify that
anticompetitive effects could be caused from their agreement.
When the plaintiff should be successful in their verification that collusive
buyers concluded an agreement which would cause anticompetitive effects, it is
appropriate to construe that constituent elements of the law, (1) substantially restrain on
competition in any given field of trade, (2) mutually restrict or conduct their business,
and (3) against public interest, is automatically fulfilled. And such a business activity
would be presumed to be illegal because the reason why the burden of proof to show the
anticompetitive effects is on the plaintiff’s side is that, different from the typical
oligopsony, it is not clear that anticompetitive effects would occur from the agreements
and other than that there are no differences from them.
Collusive buyers could make a counter argument to overturn the
presumption.
One of possible arguments would be that they lacked a market power as
explained before in this article.
Another argument would be that procompetitive effects swamped the
anticompetitive effects or that there are no anticompetitive effects, which means that
suppliers and societies would benefit. Although collusive buyers shall bear the burden of
proof, given that they would succeed in their verification, their argument should prevail.
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In this regard, the district court in the U.S., in the case where buyers
agreed to increase their input purchased to lower the unit price of bottle, points out the
fact that output of product has been increased as a demonstration that the defendant’s
business activities are procompetitive without mentioning the long term anticompetitive
effects which could be caused through buyers collusion to increase their input
purchased.238 In addition, the court did not assume the long term anticompetitive effects
only from the agreements among buyers but instead ruled that the plaintiff should bear
the burden of proof to show that their agreement would cause anticompetitive effects.239
From the rationale of this judgment, it should be upheld that the long term
anticompetitive effects is not automatically presumed only from the agreements to
increase the quantity of input purchased.
Given that courts rejected the counter argument explained above, joint
purchasers could raise an argument as a cause of non imputability that they are inculpable
since they believed that their joint purchasing would never yieldanticompetitive effects
or that the procompetitive effects would swamp the anticompetitive effects.
This counter argument, however, is not likely to prevail as explained
earlier in this article.
(4) Summary of Analysis

238

See Sewell Plastics, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 720 F. Supp. 1196 (W.D.N.C. 1988). In this case, the
court declared that “Plaintiff has failed to prove that defendants' actions have harmed or will harm the
competitive process. Since the formation of Southeastern through 1986, plastic bottle prices have
decreased, output of plastic bottles has increased, the number of competitors has remained the same,
market concentration has decreased, and production processes have become more efficient. At best,
plaintiff has shown that Southeastern has at times experienced quality problems with its
bottles…certain companies have decreased research and development expenditures. However,
plaintiff has not produced evidence of a decline in overall plastic bottle quality or research and
development expenditures in the market as a whole…Plaintiff has failed to set forth specific facts
demonstrating an actual or probable adverse impact on competition.” Id. at 1218-1219.
239
Id.
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As discussed above, when an agreement among collusive buyers to
exercise their market power should be found, except from the agreement to increase the
quantity of input purchased, the business activities would be presumed to be illegal and
meet the condition of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law, art. 2, para. 6. automatically and
the necessity and the burden of proof shift collusive buyers’ side to justify their collusion.
Therefore, in spite of the fact that the characteristics of B2B could make it
possible to enhance efficiency, productivity and profitability, inasmuch as a buyers’
anticompetitive agreement would not entail these pro transactional effects, once the
agreement should be found, it is presumed to be illegal.
It is, however, not always easy to find an agreement among buyers even
on B2B or obtain direct evidence like on a real market place, although there are some
records as to communications among buyers to conclude agreements at internet providers
or servers.240 This is especially true when the information as to lowering price is available
not only for buyers but for sellers.241 In addition, the fact that the most of B2B lack the
mechanism through which buyers and sellers signal each other about future price changes
makes it harder to make an inference that price coordination is occurring.242 Therefore,

240

See Baker, supra note 12, at 47. It suggests that, in electronic market places, the feature that the
negotiation process is always recorded makes it easier for the law enforcement agencies to detect the
agreement.
241
Id. However, it suggests that this generalization argument does not always hold water in sellers’
price fixing agreement by giving the example that sellers negotiate a price fixing agreement publicly
by giving advance notice of anticompetitive price increase so that the competitors modify or adjust
before the consensus is reached. See also Gotfredson, supra note 52, at 131. It says that the “primary
difficulty in policing potential price-fixing agreements in the B2B industry, as elsewhere, will likely
involve cases lacking an express agreement. It can be very difficult to distinguish between an implicit
price-fixing agreement and simple competitive behavior.” Id. at 131. Further it pointed out that
“[m]ere "follow the leader" behavior, in which no seller is willing to cut prices unless another seller
does so first, is not illegal as long as there is no actual agreement, tacit or otherwise, to fix prices, even
if the result is supracompetitive pricing.” Id. at 130.
242
See Gotfredson, supra note 52, at 131.
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even if an agreement should be concluded via communication system on B2B, it is
necessary to examine tangential facts and circumstantial evidence to infer collusion.243
Moreover, in Japan, since a fact-finder is not jury but professional judge
whose examination on inference is strict, it would be useful to review what factors to be
raised to find collusion on B2B.
Further, although the FTCJ has a strong authority to investigate a cartel
case, that is, compulsory measures244 admitted to prosecutors as well,245 under the

243

See U.S. v. Airline Tariff Publishing Co., 58 FR 3971 (Department of Justice Jan. 12, 1993). In
this case, the price fixing among sellers on electronic commerce occurred over a network more readily
available for sellers than consumers and was conducted through communication with little value to
buyers. Thus it is assumed that this information generalization defense was not raised from sellers.
244
The Japanese Antimonopoly Law, art. 46, para.1. says “ (1) The Fair Trade Commission may, in
order to conduct the necessary investigation with regard to a case of violation, take any one of the
following measures: (i) Ordering persons concerned with a case, or witnesses to appear for
interrogating, hearing their views or collecting reports from them; (ii) Ordering experts to appear to
have them give expert testimony; (iii) Ordering persons holding accounting books, documents and
other matters to submit the same, or to retain such submitted matters; or (iv) Entering any place of
business of the persons concerned with a case, or other necessary places and inspecting conditions of
business operation and property, accounting books, documents and other matters.” Precisely speaking,
all the measures admitted to the FTCJ are different from compulsory measures in that it does not need
to obtain a writ from courts, which means that there are no safe guards to prevent their excessive
exercising of these measures. This difference is embodies in the law, art. 46, para. 4, which says that
“The authority to take action pursuant to the provision of subsection (1) above shall not be construed
as one granted for criminal investigation.” Due to this difference, however, there are no procedures
codified in the Japanese Antimonopoly Law for the prosecutor to take over the evidence obtained by
the FTCJ. In spite of this imperfection of the law, there has been no major problem arising out of it,
because, in Japan, criminal cases due to a violation of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law are rather rare.
On Jan. 1991, a consensus was created at the meeting between the FTCJ and the Prosecutor’s Office
in connection with how to corporate effectively each other in their criminal investigation. Up until
now, however, no sweeping reforms have been taken in this area at Japanese side.
245
See Masahiro Murakami, Joukyoshokoniyorukakakukaruterunoninntei [Finding a Cartel from
Circumstantial Evidence], 1003 HANREITIMES 64, 71 (1999). It suggests that since the FTCJ could
exercise their compulsory measures and direct evidence to prove an agreement is not difficult, in
criminal cases, there are no needs to infer an agreement from circumstantial evidence. However, as
discussed later in this article, this argument is not at all appropriate because it is equal to admitting the
present tendency to place too much emphasis on confessions from the defendant. In Japan, the
regulation on interrogation has been castrated through the practical importance in obtaining confession.
Denying the importance of examination on tangential facts and circumstantial evidence could lead to
the conclusion to admit the present tendency. Therefore, unless the Japanese Antimonopoly Law
would be amended so that the necessary safe guards to prevent the excessive investigation should be
codified, examinations on tangential facts and circumstantial evidence are still indispensable.
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Punitive Penalty (Surcharges) system,246 the FTCJ shall bear the heavy burden of proof to
verify an agreement up to the standard required in the civil litigation cases, the
preponderance of the evidence.

246

The Japanese Antimonopoly Law, art. 7-2. says that “ (1) In case any entrepreneur effects an
unreasonable restraint of trade or enters into an international agreement or an international contract
containing such matters as constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade, which pertains to the price of
goods or services or results in affecting in effect the price of such goods or services by curtailing the
volume of supply thereof, the Fair Trade Commission shall order the entrepreneur concerned, in
accordance with the procedures as provided for in Division II [procedures], Chapter VIII, to pay to the
Treasury a surcharge of an amount equivalent to an amount arrived at by multiplying the sales amount
of such goods or services, computed in accordance with the method prescribed by a Cabinet
Ordinance, for the period from the date on which the entrepreneur was engaged in the business
activities as implementation of such conduct to the date on which the entrepreneur ceased to engage in
the business activities as implementation of such conduct (in case such period exceeds three years, the
period shall be for three years retroactively from the date on which the entrepreneur ceased to engage
in the business activities as implementation of such conduct; hereinafter referred to as "period of such
implementation") by six percent (or by two percent for retail business or by one percent for wholesale
business): Provided, That in case the amount thus computed falls below five hundred thousand yen,
the Commission shall not order the payment of such a surcharge. (2) In the case of the preceding
subsection, the term "six percent" appearing in the preceding subsection shall be "three percent" and
the term "two percent" shall be "one percent," if the entrepreneur falls under any one of the following
paragraphs: (i) Any company whose capital or subscription is not more than 300 million yen and any
company or individual whose pay-roll employees are not more than 300 persons, whose main activity
is to carry on business in the fields of manufacturing, construction, transportation and other kinds of
business (excluding the kinds of business stipulated in paragraph from (ii) to (ii)-3 of this subsection
and the kinds of business stipulated by the Cabinet Ordinance pursuant to paragraph (iii) of this
subsection); (ii) Any company whose capital or subscription is not more than 100 million yen and any
company or individual whose pay-roll employees are no more than 100 persons, whose main activity
is to carry on business in the fields of wholesale trade (excluding the kinds of business stipulated in
the Cabinet Ordinance pursuant to paragraph (iii) of this subsection); (ii)-2 Any company whose
capital or subscription not more than 50 million yen and any company or individual whose pay-roll
employees are no more than 100 persons, whose main activity is to carry on business in the fields of
service (excluding the kinds of business stipulated in the Cabinet Ordinance pursuant to paragraph (iii)
of this subsection); (ii)-3 Any company whose capital or subscription not more than 50 million yen
and any company or individual whose pay-roll employees are no more than 50 persons, whose main
activity is to carry on business in the fields of retail trade (excluding the kinds of business stipulated in
the Cabinet Ordinance pursuant to paragraph (iii) of this subsection): (iii) Any company whose capital
or subscription is not more than that specified by the Cabinet Ordinance for each kind of business and
any company or individual whose pay-roll employees are not more than that specified by the Cabinet
Ordinance for each kind of business, whose main activity is to carry on business in fields specified by
such Cabinet Ordinance. (3) Any person who has received an order under the provisions of (1) shall
pay the surcharges as provided for in (1) and (2) of this section. (4) In case the amount of surcharge
calculated in accordance with the provisions of (1) or (2) of this section contains a fraction less than
ten thousand yen, such fraction shall be disregarded. (5) In the case the entrepreneur who has
committed an act in violation of the provision of (1) above is a company and if such company has
ceased to exist through a merger with another company, the violation of such company shall be
considered as a violation of the merging company or consolidated company as a result of the merger,
and the provisions of the preceding subsections shall apply thereto. (6) When a period of three years
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has elapsed from the date of expiration of the period of such implementation (or when a period of one
year has elapsed from the date on which the hearing procedures ended in case such hearing procedures
had been initiated with respect to such a violation (in case the expiration of the three-year period
following the expiration of the period of such implementation, then the date on which the three-year
period expired)), the Fair Trade Commission shall not order such entrepreneur to pay a surcharge for
such violation: Provided, That the foregoing shall not apply to cases where the Fair Trade
Commission has ordered to pay the surcharge for the said violation to the Treasury under the
provisions of art. 48-2 (1) [surcharge payment order] and thereafter.”
In this regard, the law, art. 48-2. stipulates that “(1) The Fair Trade Commission shall, when it finds
there exists a fact as provided for in subsection (1) [surcharges] of art. 7-2 (including cases where this
provision is applicable mutatis mutandis under art. 8-3 [surcharges against constituent entrepreneurs];
hereinafter the same in this section), order the entrepreneur or the constituent entrepreneurs of the
trade association (or other entrepreneur in case a constituent entrepreneur is acting for the benefit of
the other entrepreneur; hereinafter the same in this section) to pay to the Treasury a surcharge as
prescribed in art. 7-2(1) or (2): Provided, That in case hearing procedures have been initiated with
respect to such violating act, such order shall not be issued by such time as such procedures have been
completed. (2) An order prescribed in the preceding subsection ("payment order") shall be made by
serving to such entrepreneur a certified copy of such payment order which states the amount of the
surcharge to be paid, the basis of calculation of such amount, the violating act responsible for such
surcharge and deadline for payment. (3) The deadline for payment of such surcharge as prescribed in
the preceding subsection shall fall on a date two months after the date on which such payment order is
forwarded. (4) The Fair Trade Commission shall, when it contemplates issuing a payment order, give
in advance, the entrepreneur or the constituent entrepreneur of the trade association concerned, an
opportunity to present his views and to submit evidence in support thereof. (5) If any person is
dissatisfied with the payment order, he may, in accordance with the Rules of the Fair Trade
Commission and within thirty days from the date on which the certified copy of such order was
forwarded, request the Commission to initiate hearing procedures on the said case. (6) Expect in cases
where such a decision was rendered pursuant to the provisions of subsection (4) of the preceding
section, art. 53-3 [consent decision] or art. 54 [formal decision] with respect to the said violating act, a
payment order (One against the constituent entrepreneurs of the trade association whose act has
infringed in violation of art. 8(1) or (2) is excluded.) shall be deemed final and conclusive for the
purpose of applying the provisions of art. 26 [restriction on exercise of the right to claim for damages
in court, prescription], after the lapse of the period prescribed in the preceding subsection.”
See also MURAKAMI, supra note 176, at 468. The Punitive Penalty (Surcharges) system is the
system which makes it possible for the FTCJ to order the parties committing a violation of the law as
cartel to pay the penalty calculated by multiplying the amount they earns through their cartels by
certain percentage stipulated in the law, which was introduced in the amendment taken place in 1977.
The targeted cartel in this system is what purports to provide products or services or has any
connection with them. When a cartel should be found, the FTCJ is bound to order the penalty and
there is no discretion as to whether to order it. The characteristics of the Punitive Penalty (Surcharges)
system are basically considered to be the confiscation of illegal profit due to cartel and sanction on the
violation of the law. Given emphasizes the latter character, it is apprehended it would be against the
double jeopardy rule in Constitution of Japan, art. 39.
In this regard, it has been construed that this system is not against the double jeopardy rule because
administrative sanctions are different from criminal offenses. See MURAKAMI, supra note 176, at
470. The FTCJ expressed its understanding about the Punitive Penalty (Surcharges) that this system
was established to order the relevant parties to pay illegal profit which they had obtained through their
cartels to national treasury in order to make the regulation on cartel under the Japanese Antimonopoly
Law more effective based on the present situation where there were so many cartels and recidivist.
Further it added that although it could not be denied that the Punitive Penalty (Surcharges) had a
aspect as a sanction, it was the administrative order not the criminal punishment and that judging from
its inherent nature there was no discretion granted to the FTCJ concerning whether or not it ordered
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and what amount to order. See the Fair Trade Commission in Japan, Dokusenkinshihou Kaiseino
Youten [The Gist of the Amendment of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law], 320 KOUSEITORIHIKI 15
(1977). After the introduction of this system, although the Japanese Industry recognized it as the
sanction on forming a cartel, it has contributed the deterrence of a violation of the law and pervading
the realization that forming a cartel should be illegal. Accordingly, the number of cartel cases accused
by the FTCJ decreased although this was also due to the careful antitrust practice adopted at the FTCJ
because when finding a cartel it had been obliged to order the Punitive Penalty (Surcharges). The
amount of penalty under this system was raised due to the sever criticism from the U.S. government in
1991 that, in Japanese market, cartel, bid rigging, and group boycott were rampant partly because the
sanction on them was so loose that there could not be expected any effects of deterrence from it. The
FTCJ expressed in the report in relation to the Punitive Penalty (Surcharge) in December 1990 that the
characteristic of the Punitive Penalty (Surcharge) was purporting the realization of social justice as
well as making the regulation of cartels in the law more effective and that the amount of penalty
should be established in a manner which could prevent formation of cartels effectively and not be
necessarily corresponding to the profit enjoyed by cartel parties. See the Fair Trade Commission in
Japan, Dokusenkinshihou Kenkyukai Hokokusho [The Report by the Study Group Concerning the
Japanese Antimonopoly Law], 15-20 (2003), available at
http://www2.jftc.go.jp/pressrelease/03.october/sochi2.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
Along with the introduction of the Punitive Penalty (Surcharge), in order to prevent oligopilists
from gaining excessive profits in a highly concentrated market, the reporting requirement on parallel
price increases was introduced in art. 18-2. of the law, which says “given in any particular field of
business where the total price of goods (this term refers to the price of the goods concerned less an
amount equivalent to the amount of taxes levied directly on such goods) of the same description
supplied in Japan (excluding those exported; hereinafter the same in this article) or the total prices of
services (this refers to the price of the services concerned less an amount equivalent to the amount of
taxes levied on the recipients of such services with respect thereto) of the same description supplied in
Japan during a one-year period designated by a Cabinet Ordinance, is in excess of 60 billion yen, the
ratio of the total amount of such goods or services supplied by the three entrepreneurs, which rank
among the three largest entrepreneurs in Japan in terms of volume of supply (this refers to the quantity
of goods or services of the same description which one entrepreneur supplied during a given one-year
period, and in case it is not appropriate to be calculated by the quantity, the quantity shall be
represented in terms of the amount of their prices; hereinafter the same meaning in this section) to the
aggregate volume of such goods or services of the same description supplied in Japan during such
one-year period (hereinafter referred to as "the aggregate volume") exceeds seven tenths, and if two or
more major entrepreneurs (including the largest one) (this term means the five entrepreneurs each of
which account for one twentieth or more of the aggregate volume and rank among the five largest
entrepreneurs in Japan; hereinafter the same meaning in this article) raise the price they use as the
basis of their transactions in such goods or services of the same description by an identical or similar
amount or percentage within a period of three months, the Fair Trade Commission may ask such
major entrepreneurs for a report, furnishing a statement of reasons for such a raise in the price of such
goods or services: Provided, That this shall not apply to price increases effected by entrepreneurs
whose price of such goods or services is authorized or approved by, or filed with the competent
minister in charge of the business in which the said entrepreneurs are engaged (in case such price shall
be filed with the competent minister, this shall apply only to such cases where the competent minister
has the authority to order a change in such price).”
Although this reporting requirement could be praised given information provided by reports based
upon this article could be beneficial in exposing cartels, it has been criticized that it cannot be
expected that parties required to report based upon this article could inform unfavorable information
to them and that cracking down on cartel has been made easier on the misassumption that most of
cartel case should be dealt with the requirement of report based on this article. See Murakami, supra
note 176, at 400. This consideration has been supported by the fact that after the introduction of the
reporting requirement the price raise by news publishers had not come to be exposed by the FTCJ.
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It should be borne in mind that obtaining direct evidence is not always
easy even when the FTCJ exercise compulsory measures to expose an agreement as far as
it follows the regulation strictly.
In addition, it is not appropriate to argue that an examination on tangential
facts and circumstantial evidence is not necessary on the ground that the FTCJ is always
able to obtain direct evidence to prove an agreement by exercising compulsory
measures.247 Although it is true that direct evidence has been sometimes acquired through
interrogation by violating the regulations, these historical facts would never justify the
castration of the law. On the presupposition that the regulations on compulsory measures,
especially on interrogation by the FTCJ, do not function very well under the present
practices, it should be construed that an examination on tangential facts and
circumstantial evidence would be indispensable and that heavy reliance on direct
evidence, that is, confessions, is not appropriate. In connection with finding buyers’
agreements from tangential facts and circumstantial evidence, Part V of this article
provides several factors to find an agreement among buyers.
V. Several Factors to Find Buyers’ Agreements
Even through the price of product at an upstream market seems to have
been lowered, as explained before, absent an agreement to reduce the price 248 this

Responding to the criticism outlined above, the FTCJ is now in the process of reviewing as to how to
change so that this system may work more effectively. See The Report by the Study Group Concerning
the Japanese Antimonopoly Law, supra note 246, at 58.
247
Murakami, supra note 245, at 71-72.
248
With regard to the definition of “ agreement”, see Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,
465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984). It defined “agreement” that “concept of "a meeting of the minds" or "a
common scheme" in a distributor-termination case includes more than a showing that the distributor
conformed to the suggested price. It means as well that evidence must be presented both that the
distributor communicated its acquiescence or agreement, and that this was sought by the
manufacturer.” Id. at 764. See also Collaboration Guideline, supra note 30, at 2. See also Baker,
supra note 12, at 45. It stated that “common judicial definitions of agreement -- a "meeting of the
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business activity is not a violation of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law, art. 2, para. 6.
Therefore, obtaining evidence to infer an agreement among buyers is often the decisive
point in these cases.
In this regard, in Japan, it has been construed that, in order to find an
agreement, a concurring among the parities based on communications is necessary.249
Given that there are no communications among parties, under the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law, it is impossible to infer an agreement, because the constituent
elements of the law are not fulfilled. In addition, if concluding an agreement does not
make any economic sense, which will be raised from defendants as a justification defense,
no inferences could be drawn from any circumstantial evidence.250

minds" or "conscious commitment to a common scheme" -- are not the most useful tools to identify
agreements from circumstantial evidence in parallel pricing cases” and that “the inference of
conspiracy could make economic sense. In particular, a court should be willing to infer an agreement
in a parallel pricing case in an industry where entry and discounting are discouraged if the firms
appear to have been doing more than merely following each other's market moves. Three economic
indicators could help courts infer that firms have selected a coordinated equilibrium by engaging in
the forbidden process of negotiation and exchange of assurances.” Id. at 45.
249
See Baker, supra note 12, at 47. It discusses the communications among the competitors in the
context of plus factors to mere parallel pricing to find an agreement. It notes that given that the parties
have gone through a process of negotiation and exchanged assurances in addition to their parallel
behavior the strong inference would be drawn to support the conclusion based on the totality of the
circumstantial evidence that they have done more than following the price the other competitors have
set.
250
In this regard, see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 596,
598 (1986). In this case, the Supreme Court in the U.S. refused to permit the inference of conspiracy
that did not make an economic sense. See also Reserve Supply Corp. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp., 971 F.2d 37, 49-55 (7th Cir. Ill. 1992). In this case, the court said that no inference as to
conspiracy could be drawn without direct evidence in high concentrated market for a standardized
product with inelastic demand curve. See also Baker, supra note 12, at 47. It pointed out that, if the
industry structure is not conductive to coordination, a court should recognize that it would be
irrational for firms to take a risk of prosecution by engaging the forbidden process without any hope of
gaining market power. However, as explained earlier in this article, since the Supreme Court in Japan
adopted the principal that would presume the illegality when an agreement among parties should be
concluded, the defendant shall bear the burden of proof to demonstrate that concluding an agreement
does not make any economic sense in the context that they lacked the market power.
See also Montana v. Superamerica, Div. of Ashland Oil, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 298 (D. Mont. 1983). In
this case, the court declined to infer an agreement to fix the price for the retail gasoline in the absence
of direct evidence in a market with competitive characteristic.
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Given that communications among buyers included critical information as
to their price raise or it was assumed that the parties engaged in communications as to
price, there would be strong presumption that they reached an agreement.
On the other hand, provided that their communications should not include
any information as to price or it should not be assumed that the parties engaged in
communications as to price,251 it would be necessary to examine other tangential facts
and circumstantial evidence to decide whether or not it could be possible to make an
enough inference to find an agreement. Hereinafter, this article provides several factors to
consider in this examination.
(1) Factors to Infer Buyer’s Agreements
(A) Large Market Share 252

251

Given there are systematical safeguards created in B2B to prevent the formation of cartels, even
if there are communications among purchasers, it would be difficult to assume only from the
communications that they agreed to fix the price. In this regard, see Gotfredson, supra note 52, at 131133. It suggests that the most commonly suggested solution in preventing the formation of cartel
consists of restrictions on the amount of information that buyers are allowed to share in transactions
on B2B. See also The Original Equipment Suppliers Association, Comments Prepared for the Federal
Trade Commission in Connection with Its Workshop on Competition Policy in the World of B2B
Electronic Market Place, 3-5 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/b2b/comments/oesa.pdf (last
visited Feb. 5, 2005). It proposes creating vertical path within the exchange information via B2B,
protected firewalls within the software driving B2B. Vertical path allows a purchaser to see the bid
which it has made, and not the bids for other purchasers. Given this systematical restriction on
information sharing among buyers, it would be difficult to draw inferences from communications that
they reached agreements.
252
With regard to market delineation, see the U.S Department of Justice and the Fair Trade
Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, (1992), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Horizontal Merger
Guideline]. It defines that “A market is defined as a product or group of products and a geographic
area in which it is produced or sold such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm, not subject to
price regulation, that was the only present and future producer or seller of those products in that area
likely would impose at least a "small but significant and nontransitory" increase in price, assuming the
terms of sale of all other products are held constant. A relevant market is a group of products and a
geographic area that is no bigger than necessary to satisfy this test. The "small but significant and nontransitory" increase in price is employed solely as a methodological tool for the analysis of mergers: it
is not a tolerance level for price increases.” Id. at section 1.0. See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 335 (1962). In this case, the Supreme Court held that “the proper definition of
the market is a ‘necessary predicate’ to an examination of competition that may be affected by the
horizontal aspects of merger.” Id. at 335. The market delineation-market share measurement approach
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In order to analyze market power of given parties, in Japan, the most
important factor is said to be measuring the market share.253 Given that collusive buyers
have only small market share at an upstream market, even though the collusive buyers try
to lower their input purchased, their competitors would substitute the reduced demands
easily. Consequently, there would be no change in quantity of input purchased at an
upstream market.
On the contrary, given that collusive buyers have large market share, they
can reduce total quantity of input purchased at an upstream market at their will. Therefore,
provided that purchasers at an upstream market have large market share, when a quantity
of input purchased has been lowered below competitive level, it can be assumed the
exercise of oligopsony power and agreements among collusive buyers.
In this regard, the FTCJ commented that given that joint purchasers had
large market share in total demands of certain products, joint purchasers were likely to
have market power and to exercise it and that it was apprehended that the exercise of
oligopsony power would restrict the free competition.254 Although the only factor to

was further sophisticated in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 355-369
(1963). When delineating the market, it would be necessary to examine whether B2B itself provides a
new products or services separated from the product being traded on a real market place. This should
be, however, discussed in the context of demand substitutability and the characteristics of B2B itself
do not justify the conclusion that products traded in a real market place are always considered
separated products transacted on B2B as a different market. See also BLAIR & HARRISON, supra
note 66, at 83. It says that in the case of monopsony, market definition is in many respect the reverse
of that applied in the case of sellers and that the market are comprised of buyers who are seen by
sellers as being reasonably good substitutes. According to this article, the greater the number of good
substitutes from the point of view from sellers, the more easily sellers may substitute away from low
paying buyers in favor of high paying buyers, which is represented in elasticity of supply curve.
253
See SULLIVAN & HOVANKAMP, supra note 92, at 624. See also Horton & Schmitz, supra
note 209, at 1249. See also Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. at 360-363. In this case, the court
held that the large market share was a convenient proxy for appraising the danger of monopoly power
resulting from a horizontal merger. Under its rationale, it added that a merger resulting in a large
market share was presumably illegal, rebuttable only by a demonstration that merger would not have
anticompetitive effect. Id. at 363.
254
Consultation Case Concerning B2B, supra note 9.
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measure market power that the FTCJ suggested in its guidelines is market share, it should
be kept in mind that the FTCJ did not deny other factors to draw inference. As explained
earlier in this article, joint purchasers with only modest market share might be able to
control the price and quantity at an upstream market in which both supply and demand
elasticity were low. Therefore, in order to measure market power accurately, it is
necessary to take into other factors consideration together with market share.
In addition, the FTCJ demonstrated its view that the market share was the
basic indication to infer the market power and that when given parties have large market
share in a given market place the degree of the restriction on the free competition would
be higher.255
In addition, the FTC and the DOJ have demonstrated its concern about
market share in connection with measuring market power and established the safety zone
in relation to market share, which describes situations in which a collaboration agreement
will be presumed to be lawful.256 These considerations demonstrate their concerns about
market share in the context of measuring market power.

255

See The Fair Trade Commission in Japan, Dokusenkinshihoujouno Kigyoketugosinsa Nikansuru
Unyohshisin [The Guideline Concerning the Examination on Merger and Acquisition under the
Japanese Antimonopoly Law], 18 (2004), available at
http://www2.jftc.go.jp/pressrelease/04.may/04053101.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter
Examination Concerning Merger and Acquisition].
256
See Collaboration Guideline, supra note 30, at 26. See also the U.S. Department of Justice And
the Federal Trade Commission, Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy In Health Care, (1996),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/hlth3s.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2005). It mentioned that
“Agencies will not challenge, absent extraordinary circumstances, any joint purchasing arrangement
among health care providers where two conditions are present: (1) the purchases account for less than
35 percent of the total sales of the purchased product or service in the relevant market; and (2) the cost
of the products and services purchased jointly accounts for less than 20 percent of the total revenues
from all products or services sold by each competing participant in the joint purchasing arrangement.”
See also Charles F. Rule, The Antitrust Division’s Approach to Shipper’s Associations, addressed
before Chemical Manufacturers Association, (1985), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/2163.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2005). He addressed his
concern about market share in the context of measuring the market power and mentioned that “we
need to know the percentage of final product or service price represented by the transportation cost
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(B) Entry Barrier 257
Even when collusive buyers have large market share, given that there is
low entry barrier to the market and new entry is quite easy, collusive buyers are not likely
to collude because even though they try to lower the quantity of their input, new
participants of the market are ready to substitute the reduced demands. In this case, even
when they collude, since there are no prospects to obtain market power in competitive

component in question. As this percentage increases, the collective purchase of transportation at
identical rates may enhance the ability of member firms collectively to reach and maintain prices
above the competitive level...if the transportation cost represents less than 20 percent of final product
price, a shippers' association's setting of transportation rates would not significantly enhance the
likelihood that this form of anticompetitive pricing would result.”
257
See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 248, at section 3.0. It says that “A merger is not
likely to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its exercise, if entry into the market is so easy
that market participants, after the merger, either collectively or unilaterally could not profitably
maintain a price increase above premerger levels. Such entry likely will deter an anticompetitive
merger in its incipiency, or deter or counteract the competitive effects of concern. Entry is that easy if
entry would be timely, likely, and sufficient in its magnitude, character and scope to deter or
counteract the competitive effects of concern. In markets where entry is that easy (i.e., where entry
passes these tests of timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency), the merger raises no antitrust concern and
ordinarily requires no further analysis.” Id. at section 3.0.
With regard to this definition, there are several criticisms. See United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc.,
285 U.S. App. D.C. 222, 908 F.2d 981 (1990). The court point our that “That the "quick and effective"
standard lacks support in precedent is not surprising.” Id. at 987. Some of the lower courts treated easy
entry into the market as a trump to overturn the presumption. See United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F.
Supp. 78, 92, 94 (D. Colo. 1975). In ruling that acquisition was not the violation of the section 7 of the
Clayton Act, the courts listed the ease of entry as one of many reasons, despite the fact that it would
create concentration over the Philadelphia standard. See also United States v. Waste Management, Inc.,
743 F2d. 976, 983-984 (2d Cir. 1984). In this case, the district court had blocked the merger involving
waste haulers, after concluding that easy entry merely weakens the inference of anticompetitive effect
arising from concentration. The court noted that there is no persuasive authority for allowing low
entry barriers and potential competition to overcome a strong prima facie showing of concentration in
the existing competitive structure. Id. at 983-984. United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 588 F.
Supp 498, 513 (S. D. N. Y. 1983). The second circuit rejected this legal proposition and reversed the
district court decision. It held that a finding of easy entry into trash collection trumps the other
evidence relied upon. Id. at 513. See also United States v. Calmer Inc., 612 F. 2d 1298, 1306 (D. N. J.
1985). In this case, the district court rejected to be concerned about a merger in pump sprayers once it
found that any firm in the injection molding business could easily make them and thus enter the
market. Id. at 1306. Although these examinations are concerning how to tramp the presumption
created through high market share and market concentration under the Philadelphia Bank Standard, it
can be said that given that entry into the given market should not be easy, the inference shall be drawn
that given parties are likely to have market power in the market place vice versa.
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market with low entry barrier, it is difficult to assume that they concluded an agreement
to reduce the price.258
On the other hand, it can be said that there were a high entry barrier at a
given market, it could be easier for them to collude to lower their input. Therefore,
provided that quantity of input purchased has been lowered below competitive level at an
upstream market with high entry barrier, it could be assumed that there were an
agreement among them.259
The FTCJ expressed its view in the guidelines concerning merger that an
entry barrier should be taken into account in measuring market power.260 It explains that
given entering into a given market is easy, even when given parties try to raise the price
or arrange the quantity of their product, their competitor immediately enter the market,
which makes it difficult for them to enjoy benefit arising from their coordination.261 It
adds that due to this difficulty they are less likely to collude in a market with low entry
barrier.262 Further it says that when examining entry barrier, it is necessary to take into
account such factors as the regulation on entering into the market, minimum amount of
cost which shall be borne by new participants, the location of the market, the technology
to be developed to enter the market, the ways to procure raw materials, the condition of
selling the products, the difficulty for other competitors which have been manufacturing

258

See Baker, supra note 12, at 47. It said that “if instead entry is not easy and firms can discourage
price cutting, a court should consider whether it was necessary for the firms to engage in the forbidden
process to reach a coordinated, high-price equilibrium, or whether they could achieve the same
outcome through leader-follower behavior that does not carry the risk of liability.” Id. at 47.
259
See Collaboration Guideline, supra note 30, at 21-22. It pointed out that “[e]asy entry may deter
or prevent profitably maintaining price above, or output, quality, service or innovation below, what
likely would prevail in the absence of the relevant agreement.” Id. at 21-22.
260
See Examination Concerning Merger and Acquisition, supra note 255, at 22.
261
Id.
262
Id.
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other products to switch their production, and the possibilities for foreign firms to enter
the market.263
(C) Purchase Obligation
Given that collusive buyers are obligated not to buy products out side of
their collaboration, it is assumed that they collude to lower the quantity of input
purchased, because they are likely to be motivated that they discontinue their competition
in buying products from sellers at an upstream market. Therefore, in this case when the
quantity of input purchased has been lowed below competitive level, it is assumed that
they concluded an agreement to lower their input purchased.264
In this regard, although not discussed in the context of inferring an
agreement among buyers, the FTCJ says it could be a violation of the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law when collusive buyers are obliged not to buy anything outside of an
upstream market since in this case a free trade between sellers and buyers are likely to be
substantially restrained.265
(D) Complexity of the Behavior
When communications among the parties are more complex than would be
plausible absent an agreement, such communications as including “we should raise price
with common percentage” and “we do not solicit each other’s customers,” it could be
inferred that the parties exchange the forbidden information as to price and therefore
reach an agreement.266 In order to conclude an agreement, the negotiations among the
parties should include several and complex bargaining processes. Therefore, when the

263

Id.
See Consultation Case Concerning B2B, supra note 9.
265
Id.
266
See Baker, supra note 12, at 47.
264

127

ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF B2B TRANSACTION: AKIRA INOUE

communication should be complex, it would be more likely that the parties concluded an
agreement through forbidden process of exchanging information. 267
(E) Fewness of Buyers
When the number of buyers is small, less time and cost would be
necessary to reach an agreement and police the implementation of it.268 Therefore, it can
be said that, compare to the market with large number of buyers, they are more likely to
be motivated to conclude an anticompetitive agreement.269 Historically, in real market
places, there had been small number of suppliers with numerous buyers, whose interest
diverged, which made it difficult to organize them into powerful buying unit.270
On the other hand, in B2B, there would be the market with small number
of buyers. Through emerging of B2B, it can be said that this factor is more likely to be
realized.
(F) Product Homogeneity
When the products at an upstream market are homogeneous, an agreement
among buyers could be simplified, because there is only a single price to reduce in a
given market.271
On the other hand, provided that products are heterogeneous, complex
price schedule would be necessary to maintain equilibrium price differentials.272 This
leads to differences of opinion and causes to undermine stability of buyers’ agreement.273
Therefore, it can be said that, compare to the market with heterogeneous products,
267

Id.
See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 66, at 43.
269
Id.
270
See Havighurst, supra note 215, at 421.
271
Id. at 44.
272
Id.
273
Id.
268
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provided that products in a given market should be homogeneous, they are more likely to
be motivated to conclude an anticompetitive agreement.
(G) Sealed Bids
When buyers offer sealed bids on items, collusion would be facilitated
because no one can cheat on the agreement without being discovered.274 Therefore, in
this situation, they would have more incentive to conclude an anticompetitive agreement
because it would be more stable and less cost would be necessary for policing.
(H) Inelasticity of Supply
When supply at an upstream market should be inelastic, buyers need not to
restrict their purchases much in order to accomplish a desired price reduction.275 The
greater the reward to their successful collusion, the more incentive they will have to reach
an agreement.276
(I) Inelasticity of Demand
When demand at an upstream market should be inelastic, collusions by
buyers are likely to be successful because given they reduced their purchase other
competitor cannot substitute the reduced demands.277 The greater the possibility of their
successful collusion is, the more incentive they will have to reach an agreement.
(J) No Justification on their Coordinated Behavior
When claims of legitimate business justification on coordinated behavior
are unconvincing or pretextual, it is inferred that they reached an anticompetitive

274

Id.
Id.
276
Id.
277
See Havighurst, supra note 212, at 435.
275
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agreement,278 compared to the situation where ample business justifications have been
offered. Although the justification that their posting price is to tell sellers what price they
are going to buy is plausible,279 given that information is not available for sellers easily,
an inference would be strengthened that they reached an agreement.
(2) Summary of Analysis
When the price of products at an upstream market seems to have been
lowered and yet communications among buyers should not include any information as to
price or it should not be assumed that the parties engaged in communications as to price,
it would be useful to examine factors indicated above in order to find an agreement,
indispensable element of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law, art. 2, para. 6.
Under the present antitrust practices in Japan, when the FTCJ find an
anticompetitive agreement, it shall order the Punitive Penalty (Surcharge), whose amount
is far larger than criminal penalty, to the parties involved as well as ordering elimination
measures to restore the free competition at a given market. Based on these practices,
careful fact-finding of an agreement is required and thoughtlessreliance on direct
evidence, especially confessions from parties involved, should be refrained.
In a transaction via B2B, because communications among buyers are
recorded either on web-server or administrator of B2B, compared to real market places, it
is easier to obtain tangential facts and circumstantial evidence and would not be
necessary to depend so much on confession from the parties involved.
In Japan, traditionally, both courts and the FTCJ have relied on direct
evidence so heavily, that is, confessions from relevant parties, which is said to have lead

278
279

See Baker, supra note 12, at 48.
Id.
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to illegal interrogation practices and to the situation where fact- finding based on
tangential facts and circumstantial evidence has not been developed. In order not to
confirm the present antitrust practices in Japan, it would be desirable to try to examine
carefully both tangential facts and circumstantial evidence in finding an agreement
among buyers on B2B.
In addition to above, as an antitrust policy making matter, by amending
the Japanese Antimonopoly Law, it is necessary to strengthen investigation measures by
the FTCJ so that it may collect evidence more effectively to cope with transaction via
internet and to enact the protection for whistle blowers, at the same time making their
procedure more strictly and clearly. As present measures under the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law were built based upon transactions on real market places, not all
measures are useful for investigating cases concerning buyers’ agreement on B2B.
Especially, measures to confiscate transaction record on B2B under the supervision of
courts would be necessary.
In addition, although it goes without saying that whistle blowers have
played a large role in cartel cases, also it is true to say that they have faced some sort of
retaliations. Since their cooperation will be useful even in cases on B2B, it is desirable to
set up appropriate protections for them.
VI. Concluding Remarks
Due to the advancement of the internet technology, million of businesses
can participate in market places on the web site at the same time with ease where they
shop for information, buy and sell goods and services. The technological developments
that have made B2B possible also have enhanced the efficiencies of businesses to collect,
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analyze, store, and transfer vast amount of data, and communicate easily through internet.
Both sellers and buyers on B2B could be benefited through these procompetitive
efficiencies. These procompetitive effects of B2B could contribute to turn around
Japanese economy and to accomplishment of the purpose of the Japanese Antimonopoly
Law. Therefore, the importance of these procompetitive effects should not be overlooked
and it is not appropriate to regulate B2B in a manner which might cause chilling effects.
But on the other hand, it should be noted that, on B2B, buyers are able to
form a cartel or conclude anticompetitive agreements to restrain the free competition and
to detect deviation from them via efficient communications on B2B far much easier than
real market places. Buyers are more likely to collude on B2B than real market places
because they are able to do so easily by making use of efficient communication tools on
B2B. And when buyers collude to affect the price, like in sellers’ cartel cases,
anticompetitive effects would be almost always caused by their agreements.
As explained in this article, even when joint purchasing would yield
procompetitive effects or transaction should be concluded in the form of all-or-nothing
deal, there would be almost always anticompetitive effects either in the short term, in the
long term or both. Therefore, as in sellers’ cartel case, it is necessary to regulate them
under the Japanese Antimonopoly Law.
In this regard, although there are no court cases and recommendations at
the FTCJ concerning buyers’ cartel agreements, because the reason why the illegality of
cartels does not depend on a showing of its unreasonableness is that it is contrary to the
policy of competition and there is no difference between buyers’ cartel agreements and
sellers’ ones in that they do cause anticompetitive effects on the free competition, the
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interpretation of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law established through sellers’ cartel cases
shall apply to buyers’ cartel agreements, except for agreements to increase the quantity of
input purchased. It is consistent to the principal purpose of the Japanese Antimonopoly
Law to construe in this way.
Based on this conclusion, except for agreements to increase the quantity of
input purchased, since when buyers’ agreement should be found, it is presumed to be
illegal, chilling effects on B2B could be caused by the present tendency that both courts
in Japan and the FTCJ have placed too much emphasis on direct evidence. In finding
agreements, courts and the FTCJ should adopt the way to examine tangential facts and
circumstantial evidence carefully and correct their present practices to rely heavily on
confessions thoughtlessly.
For fundamental solution, after balancing both the necessity to regulate
illegal buyers’ agreement on B2B and to prevent any chilling effects on B2B to be caused,
the best way is to strengthen the investigation measures invested with the FTCJ so that it
may collect evidence more effectively to cope with transaction via internet and to enact
the protection for whistle blowers, at the same time making their procedure more strictly
and clearly. Through these fundamental measures, it could be possible for the FTCJ to
deal with buyers’ agreements on B2B more appropriately.
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